Into EurAsia – Monitoring the EU’s Central Asia Strategy. Report of the EUCAM Project. CEPS Paperbacks. February 2010 by Emerson, Michael et al.
 
 
INTO EURASIA 
MONITORING THE EU’S 
CENTRAL ASIA STRATEGY 
   
 
INTO EURASIA 
MONITORING THE EU’S 
CENTRAL ASIA STRATEGY 
REPORT OF THE EUCAM PROJECT 
 
 
 
 
MICHAEL EMERSON & JOS BOONSTRA (RAPPORTEURS) 
NAFISA HASANOVA, MARLENE LARUELLE, SEBASTIEN PEYROUSE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES (CEPS), BRUSSELS 
FUNDACIÓN PARA LAS RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES Y EL DIÁLOGO EXTERIOR 
(FRIDE), MADRID  
 
The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is an independent policy 
research institute based in Brussels. Its mission is to produce sound 
analytical research leading to constructive solutions to the challenges facing 
Europe today.  
FRIDE is an independent European think tank based in Madrid that 
provides innovative thinking on Europe’s role on the international stage; its 
core research interests include democracy, human rights, peace and 
security.  
Support for the EU-Central Asia Monitoring (EUCAM) project is gratefully 
acknowledged from the Open Society Institute and the ministries of foreign 
affairs of The Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Spain and the United 
Kingdom. 
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors writing in a 
personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect those of CEPS, FRIDE or 
any other institution with which they are associated.  
 
 
 
Cover: Decorations inside the Gur-e Amir mausoleum in Samarkand, 
Uzbekistan. 
Photo credit: Doron. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN 978-92-9079-966-5 
© Copyright 2010, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, and 
Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), 
Madrid. CONTENTS 
Preface...................................................................................................................... i 
Executive Summary & Recommendations ........................................................ 1 
1.  Introduction – Rationale for a European Union Strategy towards 
Central Asia ..................................................................................................... 8 
2.  The Political, Economic and Social Landscape in Central Asia.............. 11 
2.1  Political regimes, civil society............................................................ 11 
2.2  Economic and social conditions........................................................ 16 
2.3  External trade and investment structures........................................ 22 
2.4  Security threats and challenges......................................................... 26 
2.5  Regional cooperation and tensions................................................... 31 
3.  Roles of International Actors....................................................................... 36 
3.1  Russia.................................................................................................... 36 
3.2  China..................................................................................................... 40 
3.3  The United States ................................................................................ 43 
3.4  Turkey, Iran, Japan, India .................................................................. 47 
3.5  International organisations 
(OSCE/UNDP/NATO/ADB/EBRD/IBRD).................................. 52 
4.  The European Union in Central Asia......................................................... 58 
4.1  Presence of the EU and member states since independence......... 58 
4.2  The EU Central Asia strategy since 2007 ......................................... 64 
4.2.1 Political dialogue....................................................................... 65 
4.2.2 Human rights and democracy................................................. 66 
4.2.3 Rule of law.................................................................................. 72 
4.2.4 Education.................................................................................... 74 
4.2.5 Energy – oil and gas.................................................................. 77 
4.2.6 Water and hydro-energy.......................................................... 81 
4.2.7 Transport corridors................................................................... 84 
4.2.8 Security and border management........................................... 87 
4.3  EU assistance........................................................................................ 91  
4.4  Differentiated policies towards the Central Asian states ............ 102 
4.4.1 Kazakhstan............................................................................... 102 
4.4.2 Kyrgyzstan................................................................................ 104 
4.4.3 Tajikistan................................................................................... 106 
4.4.4 Turkmenistan........................................................................... 107 
4.4.5 Uzbekistan................................................................................ 109 
4.4.6 The regional dimension – from Central Asia to EurAsia... 111 
5.  Locating Central Asia in a normative global strategy ........................... 115 
5.1  Protection from security threats...................................................... 119 
5.2  Projection of values........................................................................... 120 
Annexes............................................................................................................... 124 
Annex A: Official text of the EU’s Central Asia Strategy, 2007 
“The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership”..... 124 
Annex B: The EUCAM Expert Working Group...................................... 139 
Annex C: List of EUCAM Events.............................................................. 140 
Annex D: EUCAM Publications at www.eucentralasia.eu................... 141 
Annex E: About the Authors..................................................................... 143 
 List of Tables and Boxes 
Table 1. Democracy ratings, 2009...................................................................... 13 
Table 2. Central Asian GDP growth rates, 2000-2009..................................... 18 
Table 3. Central Asian economic structures in 2008* ..................................... 19 
Table 4. Percentage of exports to the GDP and exported production.......... 22 
Table 5. Exports of the Central Asian countries (2007).................................. 24 
Table 6. Imports of the Central Asian countries (2007).................................. 24 
Table 7. Share of Russia, China, and the EU in Central Asian countries’ 
imports, exports and total trade (2008) (€ million) and their rank.. 26 
Table 8. Turkey, Iran, Japan and Indian bilateral trade with Central Asia, 
2008 (€ million)........................................................................................ 51 
Table 9. Diplomatic representation of the EU in Central Asia as of 2009.... 60 
Table 10. Total number of projects in Central Asia by country and 
by EU member state underway or planned in 2008.......................... 62 
Table 11. EU grant aid to Central Asia in 2007-20010 .................................... 92 
Table 12. Central Asia Indicative Programme for Technical Assistance 
(2011-2013, draft).................................................................................... 93 
Table 13. Commitments and payments to Central Asia under Tacis 
and DCI programmes, 2004 to 2008 (€ million).................................. 94 
Table 14. European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR) ongoing projects, 2005-2011 (as of 5 March 2009).............. 99 
 
Box 1. EU sanctions on Uzbekistan after Andijan........................................... 69 
Box 2. Agenda for the human rights dialogue with Kazakhstan................ 104 
Box 3. Agenda for the human rights dialogue with Kyrgyzstan................ 106 
Box 4. Agenda for the human rights dialogue with Tajikistan................... 107 
Box 5. Agenda for the human rights dialogue with Turkmenistan ........... 109 
Box 6. Agenda for the human rights dialogue with Uzbekistan ................ 111 
Box 7. Lisbon Treaty - General Provisions on the EU’s External Action – 
Art. 21..................................................................................................... 117  
 
Glossary of Abbreviations 
 
ADB  Asian Development Bank 
AIDCO  Aid and Cooperation Directorate General (European Commission) 
AKDN  Aga Khan Foundation for Development  
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
bcm  Billions of cubic metres 
BISTRO  EC programme (TACIS BISTRO)  for Russia and Central Asia 
BIT  Bilateral Investment Treaty 
BOMBAF  Border Management Badakhshan, Afghanistan 
BOMCA  Border Management Programme for Central Asia 
BTC  Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline 
BTE Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum  gas  pipeline 
CAAEF  Central-Asian American Enterprise Fund 
CACO  Central Asian Cooperation Organization 
CADAP  Central Asia Drug Action Program 
CAREC  Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation 
CAREN  Central Asia Research and Education Network  
CEPS  Centre for European Policy Studies 
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States 
CSTO  Collective Security Treaty Organization 
DCI Development  Cooperation  Instrument 
DED  Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst (German Development Service) 
DFID  Department for International Development (UK) 
EaP Eastern  Partnership 
EAPC Euro-Atlantic  Partnership  Council 
EBRD  European Bank of Reconstruction and Development 
EC European  Communities 
ECO  Economic Cooperation Organization 
EECCA  Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia 
EIB  European Investment Bank 
EIDHR  European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 
ENPI  European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument  
EU European  Union 
EurAsEC Eurasian  Economic  Community 
EUCAM  EU – Central Asia Monitoring 
FREEDOM  Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and 
Open Markets 
FRIDE  Foundation for International Relations and External Dialogue 
(Spain) 
GONGO Government-Operated  Non-Governmental  Organization GSP  Generalized System of Preferences 
GTL  Gas to Liquids 
GTZ  Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German 
Technical Cooperation)  
IBRD  International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
IFAS International  Fund for Saving Aral Sea 
IFI International  Financial  Institution 
IfS  Instrument for Stability 
IMF International  Monetary  Fund 
INOGATE  Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe 
IOM  International Organisation for Migration 
IP Indicative  Programme 
IPAP Individual  Partnership Action Plan 
KfW  Kreditanstalt Für Wiederaufbau (German Development Bank) 
KGB  State Security Committee (former USSR surveillance service) 
KIMEP  Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics and Strategic 
Research  
LNG  Liquefied Natural Gas  
MFN  Most Favourite Nation 
MtR Mid-term  Review 
NATO North  Atlantic  Treaty Organization 
NGO Non-Governmental  Organization 
OSCE  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
OSI Open  Society  Institute 
PCA  Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
PFM  Public Financial Management 
PfP Partnership  for  Peace 
RATS Regional  Anti-Terrorist  Strategy 
RSP Regional  Strategy  Paper 
SCO  Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
SDC  Swiss Development Cooperation 
SIDA  Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
SSR Security  Sector  Reform 
STD  Sexually Transmitted Disease 
TACIS  Technical Assistance Commonwealth of Independent States 
TAIEX  Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument 
TIFA  Trade and Investment Framework Agreement 
TRACECA  Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Central Asia 
UNDP  United Nations Development Program 
UNODC  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
USAID United  States  of  America International Aid 
WEC Water  Energy  Consortium 
WTO World  Trade  Organization 
 | i 
 
PREFACE 
uropean Union foreign and security policy is a work in progress. The 
EU seeks to become more of a global actor beyond its near 
neighbourhood, and this will now be boosted at the institutional 
level by the Lisbon Treaty.  
The EU’s decision to adopt a Strategy for Central Asia in 2007 is part 
of this move. Two years into the implementation of this Strategy 
(reproduced in Annex A), it is time to review progress. With this in mind, 
the Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior 
(FRIDE), Madrid and the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in 
Brussels joined together to undertake the present EU-Central Asia 
Monitoring (EUCAM) project, starting in September 2008. From the outset 
the Open Society Institute (OSI), through its offices in Almaty, Bishkek, 
Dushanbe, New York and Brussels, was closely involved through 
participation, advice and financial support. But several EU member states 
have also taken a keen interest in the project and contributed financially, 
first and foremost the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, followed by 
the ministries of foreign affairs of the Czech Republic, Spain and the United 
Kingdom. 
Over the last 18 months the project has aimed to raise the profile of 
the EU Strategy for Central Asia and more specifically to: 
-  Monitor critically, yet constructively, implementation of the EU’s 
Strategy, and generate recommendations to strengthen it, 
-  Establish a network of experts and civil society institutions in the EU 
and Central Asia to raise awareness of the EU initiative and provide a 
forum for interested parties to comment on it, 
-  Enhance knowledge of Central Asia and the policy issues it raises 
among European policy-makers, researchers and civil society.  
At the start of the project FRIDE and CEPS established an Expert 
Working Group (see Annex B) consisting of ten experts from the Central 
Asian states and the EU. This group has met several times in Brussels, 
Almaty, Madrid, Prague and Stockholm, each of the meetings dealing with 
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specific aspects of the Strategy and connected to public meetings in Europe 
and Central Asia (see Annex C).  
The project has established its own web site - www.eucentralasia.eu, 
publishing policy briefs, working papers, commentaries and news bulletins 
on almost all aspects of EU-Central Asia relations (see Annex D), with 
contributions from independent experts from Central Asia and Europe.  
Most of the daily EUCAM business has been run from CEPS in 
Brussels by senior coordinator Nafisa Hasanova and junior coordinator 
Aigerim Duimagambetova, who have made EUCAM and its web site into a 
knowledge hub on EU-Central Asian relations, building an extensive 
network of relations and providing information to a host of readers. 
Members of EUCAM staff have also travelled regularly to Central 
Asia for research purposes and consultations. The most substantial trip 
took place in September and October 2009 with a mission to all five 
countries (see map of the region on the following page), meeting 
government officials, diplomats, representatives of international 
organisations, academics and civil society experts, while also visiting major 
hydro-electric facilities.  
This final monitoring report draws on all these resources and 
activities, including numerous discussions with EU officials in Brussels and 
those of member states in other European capitals. A small group of co-
authors and advisors has been responsible for drafting this monitoring 
report. Michael Emerson (CEPS) took the lead in coordinating the current 
report together with Jos Boonstra (FRIDE). Marlène Laruelle and Sébastien 
Peyrouse from the Institute for Security and Development Policy in 
Stockholm made substantial contributions. Alain Deletroz, Johannes Linn, 
Neil Melvin and Jacqueline Hale served as external advisors and the main 
reviewers. Background research and coordination was provided by Nafisa 
Hasanova and Aigerim Duimagambetova.  
We have had many contacts with the European Commission in 
Brussels and its delegations in Central Asia, with embassies of member 
states there, and with Special Representative Pierre Morel and his staff, to 
whom we are grateful for their very open cooperation. All views expressed 
in this report are attributable only to the authors.  
 
Michael Emerson & Jos Boonstra 
Brussels & Madrid, February 2010 INTO EURASIA - MONITORING THE EU’S CENTRAL ASIA STRATEGY | iii 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
he EU’s Central Asia strategy was introduced in 2007 in order to 
upgrade the EU’s cooperation with the five states of the region. The 
political context at that time was dominated by concerns in the EU 
over energy security and the war in Afghanistan. The strategy took a wide 
and comprehensive approach however, identifying a considerable number 
of priority actions (political dialogue, human rights and the rule of law, 
education, economic development, energy and transport links, 
environmental sustainability and water, common threats such as drug 
trafficking, etc.).  
This approach has led to engagement in many dialogue procedures 
and projects. While there has been an undoubted increase in the level of 
activity, the extensiveness of the agenda and relatively low level of 
resources committed to the strategy entails a risk that the whole process 
may not have real impact and credibility. This risk is quite visible in most 
chapters of the strategy. For the time being it is felt by EU officials that 
these are early days still, and that results take time, and there has to be 
patience to deepen trust and experience in the region. Up to a point this 
may be valid. Yet there is a manifest need to sharpen the real operational 
objectives and raise the level of operations to the point of being 
demonstrably effective.  
Our shortlist of critical recommendations in this sense is divided into 
two categories – the strategic and general, and then the more specific and 
technical: 
Strategic aspects 
1. Well into its third year of implementation, the EU would do well to 
engage in a critical review of the Strategy. The political process could be 
initiated by the current Spanish EU Council Presidency in the first half of 
2010 together with the new High Representative for foreign and security 
policy. A possible re-vamping of the strategy would be more appropriate in 
2011 when the new External Action Service is in place.  
T 2 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
2. The EU has some clear security concerns in relation to Central Asia: 
energy supply security through diversification of sources, and linkages 
with Afghanistan (supply logistics, political spillover risks, drug 
trafficking). All these security issues are quite rightly enumerated in the EU 
strategy and sit alongside the EU’s general branding of its foreign policy 
strategy as seeking to contribute to the development of a normative, rule-
based world order with strong reliance on human rights, international law, 
regional cooperation and multilateral institutions. Contrary to certain 
debates, we do not see this as a conflict of interests versus values, as long as 
legitimate interests are pursued in a principled manner. However, Central 
Asia presents a real challenge in this regard, since the present state of 
governance in the region is so distant from these principles. This presents 
the EU with a choice: either to pass over its preferred principles in this case, 
or to make a special effort to apply its principled approach in ways that are 
realistically operational in this difficult political environment. The EU 
strategy struggles to pursue the second approach, but not without 
ambiguity. This report seeks to clarify and reinforce such an approach. To 
do this effectively is crucial for the credibility of the EU’s chosen role as a 
global actor working to promote a normative world order. A fuller 
discussion of the issues of principle is included at the end of this report.  
3. The case of Kazakhstan deserves special mention as a key country 
in the region that has chosen to reply to the EU strategy by adopting its 
own ‘Path to Europe’. Coupled with Kazakhstan’s new chairmanship in 
2010 of the OSCE, this European orientation as part of a multi-vectored 
foreign policy presents an important opportunity for political and 
economic convergence with Europe, including deepening relations with the 
Council of Europe. These strategic directions have been announced, and 
the EU has also responded by agreeing to work towards a new treaty-level 
agreement with Kazakhstan. These developments are to be welcomed, but 
should be accompanied by clarity over the steps in the political sphere that 
Kazakhstan needs to make, progressively, for this to be a real movement 
beyond mere political declarations. If this succeeds it should have a wider 
demonstration effect elsewhere in Central Asia, which would be an 
achievement of strategic importance. In particular it is to be hoped that a 
positive momentum in EU relations with Uzbekistan becomes feasible. 
4. The EU’s concept of regional cooperation in Central Asia needs 
revision. Intra-regional cooperation is surely desirable and the EU rightly 
tries to facilitate this. However it should not be over-emphasised in relation 
to opportunities for regional cooperation with neighbours external to the INTO EURASIA - MONITORING THE EU’S CENTRAL ASIA STRATEGY | 3 
 
region (Eastern Europe, Russia, China and South Asia), and where the EU 
has several major interests (e.g. in energy, transport and security). The EU 
does work on this wider regionalism with projects to link Central Asia to its 
Eastern Partnership initiative, but with limited regard to the region’s Asian 
neighbours so far. Such elements of wider regional cooperation could help 
disenclave the land-locked Central Asia, and for the EU contribute to a 
wider ‘EurAsia strategy’ overarching and going beyond the several 
regional dimensions of the EU’s present neighbourhood policy. This wider 
EurAsian dimension, involving all the major powers of the EurAsian 
landmass, would fit in with the increasingly evident need to channel the 
new global multi-polar dynamics into an ordered world system. These 
considerations go well beyond concern for Central Asia alone, but the 
region is inevitably going to be at the cross-roads of many issues of global 
significance.  
Specific aspects 
5. The EU intends to increase its diplomatic presence in the region, and 
with the impetus of the new Lisbon Treaty provisions this needs to be done 
decisively, with adequately staffed EU delegations in all five states. It is 
already a positive feature of the Central Asia strategy that ways are being 
developed for individual member states of the EU to work more actively 
and synergetically with the Commission in the execution of various 
projects; to do this might seem obviously desirable, but it has not often 
been seen in practice so far.  
6. In the human rights field a structured process has been set up at 
both official and civil society levels. But this needs to be carefully 
upgraded, without which it risks becoming little more than a token routine 
of political convenience for both sides. Requests to make the process 
symmetrical, with dialogue on EU experience in managing difficult human 
rights issues, should receive a positive response. The interaction between 
the official dialogues and civil society seminars could be strengthened, with 
the civil society seminars invited to undertake regular year-to-year 
monitoring of progress in relations to appropriate benchmarks. Publication 
of the results and recommendations of civil society seminars is in principle 
being done, but these are not yet accessible on Commission websites.  
7. Concerning the rule of law initiative, it is too early to judge results 
since such work needs to be sustained over a long-term period. We call for 
the formulation of clear and practical benchmarks to evaluate progress in 
this field in a public document setting out the EU’s priorities and strategies. 4 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
The full development of this initiative is important as a values-driven 
commitment to the region, especially given the absence of an explicit 
democratisation agenda.  
8. The sanctions on Uzbekistan after the Andjian events in 2005 did 
not yield substantial change and have now been lifted for the sake of 
engaging with the regime. If the EU should in future resort to such 
measures in Central Asia (or elsewhere) it has to be disciplined and unified. 
Naturally this is a topic that elicits a range of political positions in 
democracies such as the EU, but when the decision is made it has to be 
loyally backed by all, otherwise the operation and the EU itself is 
discredited.  
9. The Education Initiative so far mainly repackages existing 
programmes, but with a significant increase in funding, with both Tempus 
and Erasmus Mundus now to receive doubled funding from €5 to €10 
million annually, the launch of a policy dialogue, and with the Bologna 
process serving to frame the reform of educational structures (notably in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan). This increased prioritisation of education 
within the total aid effort is to be welcomed. However, the Commission 
should now evaluate the first results of the Erasmus Mundus programme 
in the region, which seems not be adequately adapted to Central Asian 
realities, and undertake a broader education strategy review for Central 
Asia. Consideration should be given to other projects (examples are given 
below) with a view to a clearer branding of the EU as promoter of a cluster 
of high-quality and independent education and research institutions, as 
well as a supporter of reform of the basic education systems. There are also 
some changes in the management of the Education Initiative within the 
Commission that seem to be warranted.  
10. In the area of water management and hydro-electric power there 
is a robust case for major investment in upstream states that could also 
bring huge benefits for downstream states, and avert the real risks of inter-
state conflict over water. These risks are now heightened with the 
disintegration of the regional electricity grid. The EU is engaging in 
multiple initiatives in the area, ranging from the technical to political 
dialogue. This dialogue seems to remain rather general and superficial, 
however. While the EU is not in a position to lead on a resolution of the key 
water problem, it could help establish the technical-economic case for 
investment in increased hydroelectric capacity that could offer benefits to 
both upstream and downstream states, outline the mechanisms for regional INTO EURASIA - MONITORING THE EU’S CENTRAL ASIA STRATEGY | 5 
 
cooperation that would assure equitable implementation, and raise these 
issues at the top political level in alliance with major multilateral 
organisations. The EU should make available a special trust fund of grant 
resources for this purpose to enable the World Bank to draw up scenarios 
and cost-benefit calculations, in collaboration with the UN Centre for 
Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia and the Asian Development Bank. 
In any case there is also a large agenda for ‘no regrets’ investments in 
improved water management, modest-sized hydroelectric facilities and 
solar and wind renewable energies. 
11. In the field of energy policy the EU is conducting wide-ranging 
energy dialogues with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The EU has a non-
binding memorandum of understanding with Turkmenistan that envisages 
the purchase of gas, and this would fit into its Southern Corridor concept of 
diversifying gas supplies with a trans-Caspian link. The EU has indicated 
its support for the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, and should 
back this up in its energy policy dialogues and operational projects. While 
the EU has been debating various pipeline options for years, China has 
acted with great speed in constructing oil and gas pipelines across Central 
Asia. Meanwhile Iran also inaugurated a new pipeline to Turkmenistan 
that will increase the capacity of this southern export route. This is a classic 
example of how the EU and its member states have to negotiate and decide 
faster on elements of a common energy policy, or see the world leave it 
behind. 
12. In the field of transport the EU’s present corridors and axes that 
extend east through or around Central Asia have become in part obsolete, 
and need to connect with the new trans-continental Eurasian realities, east-
west and north-south. The EU, and in particular the Commission’s 
transport department and the European Investment Bank, should 
communicate to the CAREC programme of the Asian Development Bank 
their willingness to enter into discussions to optimise the coherence of EU 
and CAREC transport corridors that do or could link Central and Eastern 
Asia with Europe; in addition there is a new US initiative (Northern 
Distribution Network) to develop supply routes from Baltic and Caspian 
sea ports to Afghanistan via Central Asia. The EU has both grant funded 
technical assistance and loan finance for infrastructural investments to 
support the development of agreed priority corridors. Since China, Russia 
and the US all have major stakes in various of these transport corridors, the 
case for explicit coordination is evident. 6 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
13. The main contribution to combating common security threats has 
been regional programmes for border management (BOMCA) and hard 
drugs (CADAP). These programmes could be further built upon, with 
some management changes. The BOMCA model might be applied to other 
parts of the security sectors in Central Asia to enhance effectiveness and 
good governance of police and security forces, at least in Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, possibly in cooperation with the OSCE and 
through the active involvement of key EU member states. 
14. Concerning EU assistance, Brussels should consider focusing on 
fewer priority areas, given the impossibility of having a real impact on all 
seven priorities of the EU strategy with the €719 million available over 
seven years under the Development Cooperation instrument (DCI). The EU 
does make differentiated priorities by country, but still there are difficult 
issues of assuring real effectiveness, going beyond ‘ticking the boxes’ 
indicated by the Strategy. We support the present move towards according 
higher priority to education programmes. 
15. Assistance is most needed in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The EU 
h a s  s o m e  l e v e r a g e  o n  t h e  d i r e  c o n d i t ions in these countries through its 
sectoral budget support programmes. The impact of the economic crisis 
might, in combination with other security-related factors, even destabilise 
Tajikistan, which justifies the new social policy orientated programme of 
the EU. The case for conditional budget support to these two countries is in 
principle strong, but there should be no illusions over the difficulties in 
securing effective specification and implementation of the conditions. 
Analysis of the results of these conditional grants should be published. The 
EU has every interest in fostering donor coordination on the spot, 
especially with regard to these budget support programmes, and this 
should clearly be with EU member states and the rest of the donor 
community. Assistance allocated to energy-rich and fast developing 
Kazakhstan should be mainly confined to education and support to civil 
society, while Astana is in a position to buy into European expertise for 
many policy advice needs. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are only 
marginally receptive to EU assistance initiatives, where the EU would do 
well to focus on education for the time being. 
16. The Commission has established a comprehensive project 
monitoring system for its aid programmes, but the results have not been 
published. The EU should create a database of monitoring reports to be 
made available on the Commission’s website in the interests of INTO EURASIA - MONITORING THE EU’S CENTRAL ASIA STRATEGY | 7 
 
transparency and accountability. There is also a case for administrative 
separation of project evaluation from project operations to further 
guarantee objective analyses. The European Parliament should strengthen 
its oversight role in scrutinising EU Commission assistance to Central Asia, 
requesting more adequate analysis and monitoring assessments than so far 
made available.  
17. The administration of funds for civil society should be simplified, 
especially for small projects, staffing at the delegations needs to be 
strengthened, with the contracting of projects to experienced and well-
established NGOs with a strong presence on the ground. For small projects 
the requirement of co-funding and complex procurement restrictions 
should be scrapped, and ultra-simplified procedures adopted for mini-
projects for civil society through the EIDHR. The BISTRO programme 
formerly used by the Commission in Russia and Ukraine could be revived.  8 | 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION – RATIONALE FOR A 
EUROPEAN UNION STRATEGY 
TOWARDS CENTRAL ASIA 
he Central Asian region has a population of only 61 million people, 
but a huge land mass, mainly in Kazakhstan, which stretches over 
one third of the way between Berlin and Beijing. While the region 
has a clear geographical and cultural-historical identity, it is subject to 
divergent economic fortunes, with huge advances in the oil/gas-based 
wealth of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, against impoverishment in the 
two mountain states, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, with Uzbekistan in an 
intermediate position. Politically all five states are consolidated 
authoritarian regimes, although there are limited civil liberties in 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.  
In 2007, the European Union decided to upgrade its policies towards 
Central Asia under the banner of a ‘strategy’. While this term tends at times 
to be overused, for our part in monitoring this initiative we take the 
language at face value: a strategy should be an initiative of broad and real 
importance backed up by adequate instruments of action.  
The EU’s ‘strategic interests’ in the region are said to be its “security 
and stability”, and further defined in terms of a “peaceful, democratic and 
economically prosperous Central Asia”. A long list of instruments of action 
is then enumerated.1 The problems here are that the strategic interests are 
expressed in such general terms that they lack vivid meaning; and the 
‘instruments of action’ are such a varied and extensive mix of normative 
                                                      
1 Bilateral and regional cooperation; human rights, rule of law, good governance 
and democratisation; youth and education; promotion of economic development 
through trade and investment; strengthening energy and transport links; 
environmental sustainability and water; combating common threats and 
challenges; inter-cultural dialogue. 
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objectives and technical instruments that it is not evident where the action 
is going to be effective and indeed strategic, or where it will be only 
secondary or symbolic. Moreover, in the two years of implementation so 
far it has not become much clearer which of the several initiated policy 
dialogues are likely to become operationally significant. 
Nonetheless, we consider that there is a robust case for a strategic 
approach to Central Asia, which we would build around three main 
propositions.  
First, the EU has some clear security concerns in relation to Central 
Asia: energy supply security through diversification of sources, and 
linkages with Afghanistan (supply logistics, political spillover risks, drug 
trafficking). All these security issues are quite rightly set out in the EU 
strategy. However, the EU is not sufficiently equipped to be a hard security 
actor, and frames its foreign policy as seeking to contribute to the 
development of a normative, rules-based world order with strong reliance 
on human rights, international law, regional cooperation and multilateral 
institutions. Contrary to certain debates, we do not regard this as a conflict 
of interests versus values, as long as legitimate interests are pursued in a 
principled manner. Yet in this regard Central Asia presents a real 
challenge, since the present state of governance in the region is so far-
removed from these principles. This presents the EU with a choice; either to 
pass over its preferred principles in this case, or to make a special effort to 
apply its principled approach in ways that are realistically operational in 
this difficult political environment. The EU strategy struggles to pursue the 
second approach, but not without ambiguity. This report seeks to clarify 
and reinforce such an approach. To do this effectively is crucial for the 
credibility of the EU’s chosen role as a global actor that works in favour of a 
normative world order. A fuller discussion of the issues of principle is 
included at the end of this report.  
Second, the case of Kazakhstan deserves special mention as a key 
country in the region which has chosen to reply to the EU strategy by 
adopting its own ‘Path to Europe’. Coupled to Kazakhstan’s new 
chairmanship in 2010 of OSCE, this European orientation as part of a multi-
vectored foreign policy presents an important opportunity for political and 
economic convergence with Europe, including deepening relations with the 
Council of Europe. The strategic directions have been announced, and the 
EU has also responded by agreeing to work towards a new treaty-level 
agreement with Kazakhstan. These developments are to be welcomed, but 10 | INTRODUCTION  
 
should be accompanied by clarity over the steps in the political sphere that 
Kazakhstan needs, progressively, to take for this to be a real movement 
beyond mere political declarations. If this succeeds it should have a wider 
demonstration effect elsewhere in Central Asia, which would become an 
achievement of strategic importance. In particular, it is to be hoped that a 
positive momentum in EU relations with Uzbekistan will become 
achievable. 
Third, in our view the EU’s strategy needs to pay more attention to 
the wider regional context, which necessarily involves Central Asia’s 
neighbours at all points of the compass: Eastern Europe, Russia, China and 
Southern Asia. This concerns issues at the level of the transcontinental 
EurAsian map, and leads into questions of how the emerging global multi-
polarity is going to be managed. So far the EU strategy treats Central Asia 
as if it was a regional extension of its neighbourhood policy, and advocates 
regional cooperation, mainly among the five states. While better intra-
Central Asian cooperation is an absolute necessity, there are also wider 
EurAsian horizons to be pursued. Central Asia is in fact the only place in 
the world that sees the interests of all the major powers intruding from all 
points of the compass, Russia to the North, China to the East, South Asia to 
the South, and Europe nearby to the West, together with the ubiquitous 
presence of the United States. We advocate that the EU, as part of its wider 
global strategy and world view, pursue opportunities in Central Asia for 
cooperative actions with the major external actors present there, and this 
report identifies several areas in which this could be done. | 11 
 
2.  THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL LANDSCAPE IN CENTRAL ASIA 
2.1  Political regimes, civil society 
At the time of their declarations of independence, the Central Asian states 
attested to their will both to establish democratic political systems, inspired 
by the western model, and to make a more or less gradual transition to a 
market economy. The new Constitutions, drawn up between 1992 and 
1993, are generally inspired by West European models; they claim to stand 
for human rights, the respect of individual liberties, and to lay down the 
foundations of democratic systems in the framework of a sovereign 
republic, one and indivisible. Despite these guarantees, all the states of 
Central Asia have moved (or are currently moving) towards the 
progressive concentration of powers in the hands of the president. The 
functions of the prime minister have been relegated to the background, and 
the most important ministers (Interior, Defence, Finance, Foreign Affairs, 
etc.) are directly appointed by the president. Political continuity with the 
Soviet regime has also been a structuring element: the first heads of state 
were all former First Secretaries of the Communist Parties of their 
respective republics, with the exception of Askar Akaev (a former scientist) 
in Kyrgyzstan. 
During the first half of the 1990s, the political trajectories of these 
countries took separate paths. Turkmenistan refused to introduce the pluri-
party system. Uzbekistan organised a presidential election in December 
1991 in a relatively free way, but Islam Karimov came to feel threatened by 
his opponent Muhammad Salikh and around 1993 decided to harden the 
regime: indeed, pluri-partyism has become no more than a façade, where 
the majority of candidates advocate voting for the president on election 
day. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan all established more 
diversified political regimes. Already in 1992, however, Tajikistan was 
plunged into a civil war costly in human lives, and thereby served as a 
counter-model for all Central Asian regimes: an ill-assured presidential 
power is interpreted as risking destabilisation. Until 1995, Kazakhstan and 12 | THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LANDSCAPE IN CENTRAL ASIA 
 
Kyrgyzstan remained the most liberal countries: the presidents found 
controlling their often rebellious parliaments difficult, and the opposition 
parties expressed themselves with relative freedom in the press.2  
At the turn of the 1990s, all the regimes became more restrictive of 
political freedoms. Tensions between Russians and Kazakhs in the north of 
Kazakhstan, the Tajik civil war, the Afghan conflicts, claims staked by 
nationalist parties, and the emergence of an Islamist threat, all provided 
Central Asian leaders with reasons to justify authoritarian measures. They 
declared that it was impossible to import the Western political system into 
societies that were supposedly not yet mature enough for democracy. Each 
announced a specific path of development. The Kazakh, and to a lesser 
degree the Kyrgyz, political opposition was in large part muzzled; the 
media were increasingly subject to control; electoral processes were marred 
by multiple irregularities; the legislative and judicial powers became 
largely, if not entirely, controlled; and heads of state were consistently re-
elected in the name of so-called popular will. Elections have therefore only 
rarely provided the political parties with any real representativeness.3 
Foreign observers, in particular the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), have continuously denounced the legal 
malpractices that impede opposition candidates from running for election. 
The OSCE refused to monitor several elections in Uzbekistan, never did so 
in Turkmenistan, and has delivered very critical reports of the elections 
held in the three other states.  
A new bout of political hardening occurred throughout the region in 
the 2000s. The fear arose that the ‘colour revolutions’ would spread, so the 
presidents followed the Russian example, clamping down on public 
liberties, in particular with respect to NGOs. Then the Andijan tragedy, in 
May 2005, revived the spectre of popular uprising (see section 4.2.1). 
Today, in Uzbekistan there is complete uncertainty over how a successor to 
President Karimov might emerge, while pluri-partyism, though allowed 
through the Constitution, remains banned in practice in Turkmenistan. 
Tajikistan, which after the peace accords of 1997, has preserved a broad 
                                                      
2 M. Brill Olcott, Central Asia Second Chance, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, Washington, D.C., 2005. 
3 M. Laruelle and S. Peyrouse, Asie centrale, la dérive autoritaire, Paris: CERI-
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democratic consensus involving a recognised Islamic Party (the sole case in 
Central Asia), is tending towards the Uzbek model, but its growing 
authoritarianism is provoking the discontent of former warlords and 
Islamist leaders. In Kazakhstan, the regime is broadly comparable to the 
Putin model: the country’s economic success has guaranteed Nursultan 
Nazarbaev the broad support of the population, which sees no other 
emerging political or economic alternative and accepts authoritarianism in 
exchange for improvements in its living standards. In Kyrgyzstan, the 
‘tulip revolution’ did not give way to a democratic revival after the 
authoritarian drift of the Akaev family, but confirmed the continuing 
struggle between the clans in power. President Kurmbanbek Bakiev has 
been trying to consolidate a ‘vertical of power’ similar to the Russian and 
Kazakhstan models.  
An overall picture of the political regimes is given in Table 1, which 
gives quantitative readings of the shades of difference between the five 
Central Asian states, and comparison with three European states. Within 
Central Asia there are modest degrees of relative liberalism in Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan, with similar rankings also for Russia. The rankings for 
Bulgaria and Ukraine are in different categories, except that Ukraine’s 
record on corruption is not so far from the Central Asian standard. 
Table 1. Democracy ratings, 2009  
  Electoral 
process 
Civil 
society 
Media 
indep- 
endence 
National 
govern. 
Local 
gov. 
Judiciary 
Indepen-
dence 
Corrupt.  Overal
l 
Kazakhst. 6.75    5.50  6.50  6.75 6.25  6.00 6.32 6.32 
Kyrgyzst. 6.00    4.75  6.25  6.50 6.50  6.00 6.25 6.04 
Tajikistan 6.50    5.75  6.00  6.25 6.00  6.25 6.25 6.14 
Turkmen. 7.00    7.00  7.00  7.00 6.75  7.00 6.75 6.93 
Uzbekist. 7.00    7.00  7.00  7.00 6.75  7.00 6.50 6.89 
              
Russia 6.75   5.75  6.25  6.50 5.75  5.50 6.25 6.11 
Ukraine 3.50    2.75  3.50  5.00 5.25  5.00 5.75 4.39 
Bulgaria 1.75    2.50  3.75  3.25 3.00  3.00 4.00 3.04 
Note: 1 indicates the highest degree of freedom, 7 the lowest. 
Source: Freedom House 
(http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2008). 
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In all Central Asian states, the judiciary is officially independent of 
the executive, but in reality subordinate to the latter. Judiciary procedures 
remain very opaque.4 The death penalty was either abolished or stopped by 
moratorium in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan at the end of the 
1990s, and in Uzbekistan in 2008. However, these decisions are not 
necessarily irreversible; for example in the autumn of 2009 Kyrgyzstan saw 
intense debates about a possible return of the death penalty.5 In 
Turkmenistan, although it was formally abolished in 1999, the international 
community has remained alert to the fact that political opponents continue 
to disappear. Generally, most of the accused do not choose their lawyers, 
who, in turn, can only rarely meet with their clients. The Turkmen and 
Uzbek regimes are engaged in the torture of individuals arrested and send 
human rights activists to psychiatric hospitals.  
As in the Soviet era, the right to demonstrate, while officially 
recognised, is extremely limited in practice, with the exception of 
Kyrgyzstan. In Uzbekistan, political gatherings are systematically banned 
and their leaders are given prison sentences. In Kazakhstan, the authorities 
have the right to repress marches or public reunions that “might disturb 
the public order”, and strikes are banned in firms that operate day and 
night, and in a number of state-listed, ‘strategic’ sectors. There is practically 
no right to strike in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Unions hardly exist or 
remain, in the Soviet tradition, an instrument of state propaganda over the 
work place. 
The media soon became a prime target of the political authorities and 
were submitted to strong pressures. Administrative regulations (absence of 
registration, accusations of accounting errors or even drug trafficking, etc.) 
constitute one of the principal tools for regulating the media, as they enable 
the authorities to exonerate themselves of the charge of censorship or 
crimes against opinion. In Uzbekistan, printing houses are exclusively the 
property of the state. In Tajikistan opposition parties have been forced to 
have their newspapers printed in Kyrgyzstan. In Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, the media have been bought by large private holdings close to 
the authorities. The difficulties encountered by the political opposition in 
                                                      
4 See Amnesty International’s many reports on this question at www.amnesty.org. 
5 E. Marat, “Death Penalty Receives Widespread Political Support in Kyrgyzstan”, 
Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 210, 13 November 2009. INTO EURASIA - MONITORING THE EU’S CENTRAL ASIA STRATEGY | 15 
 
possessing its own newspapers or televisual media have driven it to rely on 
new means of communication such as the internet. While access to the 
internet continues to be free in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan 
(despite the fact that it is limited to the urban populations and middle-
classes, and has not yet reached the rural milieus), its use is extremely 
limited in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In addition, in the whole of 
Central Asia, the political powers that be seek to control access to dissident 
sites and have set up information filters to prevent them from being 
consulted from within the country.6 
NGOs, which flourished at the start of the 1990s, have also been 
subject to pressures due to the political hardening of the Central Asian 
regimes. The difficulties in obtaining foreign financing, which is almost 
impossible in Turkmenistan and very complicated in Uzbekistan, have 
mounted in Kazakhstan and in Tajikistan. Local regulations on receiving 
outside support are strict: Those who manage to obtain foreign financing 
still have to endure growing administrative and legal pressures. NGOs 
have enjoyed a more propitious climate in Kyrgyzstan, although the 
situation is also deteriorating there. Social activities (defence of women, 
supervision of disabled children, combating alcoholism, etc.) are among the 
main activities still authorized. The political will to control this sector of 
civil society has given rise to GONGOs (government-operated non-
governmental organisations), which are state-run but make it possible to 
display a democratic facade.  
Lastly, the Central Asian heads of state have all instrumentalised 
Islamism to get their populations to accept secular authoritarianism. 
Religious rights differ in the five states. All Islamist parties are banned, 
except in Tajikistan. The Orthodox Church enjoys legal recognition 
throughout the whole region as the national religion of the Russian 
minority. In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Islam is highly monitored, 
Muslim and Christian proselytism alike are banned, those who convert to 
Protestantism are arrested, and the dissemination of the bible is prohibited. 
The Uzbek regime practices massive arbitrary imprisonment.7 The 
association for the defence of human rights estimates that today the 
                                                      
6 See Reporters Without Borders (www.rsf.org). 
7 S. Peyrouse, “Islam in Central Asia: National specificities and Post-Soviet 
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country has close to 6,000 political prisoners, the majority of whom are 
accused of ‘Wahhabism’. In Tajikistan, the previously more liberal situation 
has also hardened: proselyte movements are pursued, and women are 
forbidden from frequenting mosques. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, 
Muslims and Christians alike enjoy greater freedoms, with the exception of 
some Protestant movements, which are considered sects. There is 
widespread legislation aimed against the spread of an uncontrolled Islam 
and the groups that refuse to submit themselves to the tutelage of the 
Committee of Religious Affairs open themselves up to tough 
administration sanctions.8  
2.2  Economic and social conditions 
In the first half of the 1990s, the five states developed divergent economic 
strategies. Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan followed the Russian ‘shock 
therapy’ model and embarked on a rapid privatization of small, medium-
size and large companies, employing a voucher system inspired by the one 
launched in Russia. This sudden economic shift led to a collapse of the 
population’s living standards: in Kazakhstan, the rate of persons living 
below the poverty line went from 5 percent in 1991 to 50 percent in 1993-
1994, while the poverty that was already very present during the Soviet 
period drastically increased in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, in particular in 
rural areas. In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the established powers, 
distinctly more reticent about the idea of reform, all profess to be following 
a specific ‘gradualist’ path of transition to the market economy, one which 
starts with small business, then medium-size enterprises.9 The large 
enterprises remain in state hands, thereby enabling the central powers to 
keep control over the manna of primary resources.10  
The present situation sees a wide range of approaches to economic 
development. The Uzbek economy is being organised along a dual axis: a 
progressive dismantling of the planned economic system and a 
reinforcement of its self-sufficiency in cereals and hydrocarbons. However, 
                                                      
8 See regular reports on www.forum18.org. 
9 D. Kandiyoti, “Post-Soviet institutional design and the paradoxes of the ‘Uzbek 
path’”, Central Asian Survey, No. 1, 2007, pp. 31-48. 
10 R. Pomfret, The Central Asian Economies since Independence, Princeton: Princeton 
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while this strategy was beneficial in the 1990s, today, in association with 
the regime’s growing isolationism, it is leading to a deadlock. 
Turkmenistan is a unique case, since it has practically implemented no 
policies of liberalisation: only small street trade is privatised, the large 
factories are still subsidised by the state despite their inefficiency. Tajikistan 
only began to implement structural reforms after the peace agreements 
signed in 1997: the poorest country of the Soviet Union, it embarked on a 
process of privatisation of public enterprises and of distribution of land to 
farmers. As for Kazakhstan, although it has largely privatised its economy, 
the large monopolies (electricity, railways, hydrocarbons) have been kept 
in state hands, and since the 2000s the authorities attempt to re-centralise 
particularly profitable sectors such as metallurgy and banking. Kyrgyzstan 
aims to be the most market-driven Central Asian economy, a goal that was 
consolidated by its entry into the WTO in 1998.11 
In the 1990s the early stages of the post-communist transition saw 
sev ere declines in ou tpu t and increased social hardship. However, from 
2000 until the 2008-2009 global economic crisis, all states of the region have 
benefitted from high and sustained rates of GDP growth (Table 2). The 
average for the region as a whole from 2000 to 2007 was consistently 
between 8 and 10 per cent. In Kazakhstan the high growth rates, led by the 
oil sector, made it possible to cut the number of people living below the 
poverty line by half, which has dropped to less than 15 percent of the 
population. It is the second richest country of post-Soviet space: with a 
GDP per inhabitant estimated at $11,500 in 2008, it is placed just behind 
Russia (about $16,000), but is far ahead of the other Central Asian countries. 
Its GDP represents 70 percent of the overall total of the five states. What 
bodes well for its long-term stability is that Kazakhstan has seen the 
emergence of some middle-classes; beneficiaries of the rapid economic 
development. This is especially the case for Kazakh state employees who 
accepted to leave their former capital, Almaty, for the new one, Astana. 
While in both cities a bourgeoisie linked to the sectors of oil and gas, 
construction, and diverse tertiary services has emerged, the transition to a 
market economy has been of less benefit to the inhabitants of provincial 
                                                      
11 G. Gleason, Markets and Politics in Central Asia. Structural Reform and Political 
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towns and the countryside.12 Turkmenistan has seen the highest growth 
rates, entirely due to increased gas output, and ranging between 10 and 
even 20 per cent according to the year, but here the distribution of the 
increased wealth has been even more conspicuously concentrated in the 
capital city with huge construction works. But also the states with much 
more limited natural resources, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 
have seen robust growth in the 2000s. Kygyzstan and Tajikistan have been 
hard hit by the current economic crisis, however, whereas Uzbekistan 
seems to have weathered this much better. 
Table 2. Central Asian GDP growth rates, 2000-2009 
 2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 2009 
Kazakhstan 9.8  13.5  9.8  9.3  9.6  9.7  10.7  8.9  3.2 -1.3 
Kyrgyz Republic  5.4  5.3  0.0  7.0  7.0  -0.2  3.1  8.2  7.6 1.5 
Tajikistan 8.3  10.2  9.1  10.2  10.6  6.7  7.0  7.8  7.9 2.0 
Turkmenistan 18.6  20.4  15.8  17.1  14.7  13.0  11.4  11.6  10.5 6.0 
Uzbekistan 3.8  4.1  4.0  4.2  7.7  7.0  7.3  9.5  9.0 7.0 
Average1 8.4  10.8  8.6  8.9  9.8  9.1  9.8  9.2  5.0 0.8 
Note: 2009 data are forecasts or estimates. 
Source: EBRD. 
Nonetheless, the arrival of the market economy has resulted in 
widespread impoverishment of the rural and agriculture-based population. 
The pressure on the land is all the stronger as birth rates remain high, in 
particular in the countryside, where more than half of the populations of 
the four southern republics live.13 In addition, in both Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, given the difficulties of living in the city without work, a 
process of ruralisation has taken shape. Many persons have preferred to 
return to the land, setting up in their villages to work their own individual 
patches of land. Given the shortage of land, the rural populations are 
suffering from very high unemployment rates and overpopulation. The 
most acute situation is in the Fergana Valley, where more than 10 million 
people live, or nearly 20 percent of the entire Central Asian population.  
                                                      
12 J.C.K. Daly, “Kazakhstan’s Emerging Middle Class”, Silk Road Papers, The 
Central Asia and Caucasus Institute, Washington, D.C., March 2008. 
13 According to figures from 2003, 65% in Kyrgyzstan, 72% in Tajikistan, 55% in 
Turkmenistan, 58% in Uzbekistan and 44% in Kazakhstan. | 19 
Table 3. Central Asian economic structures in 2008* 
 Kazakhstan  Kyrgyzstan  Uzbekistan Tajikistan  Turkmenistan 
Population  15.4 million  5.4 million  27.6 million  7.3 million  4.9 million 
GDP   $176 billion  $11.41 billion  $71.63 billion  $15.4 billion  $29.65 billion 
GDP per capita  $11,500  $2,100  $2,600  $2,100  $6,100 
GDP by sector  Agric. 5.8% 
Indust. 39.4% 
Services 54.7% 
Agric. 32.4% 
Indust. 18.6% 
Services 49% 
Agric. 28.2% 
Indust. 33.9% 
Services 37.9% 
Agric. 23% 
Indust. 29.4% 
Services 47.6% 
Agric. 10.7% 
Indust. 38.8% 
Services 50.4% 
Labour force by 
occupation 
Agric. 31.5% 
Indust. 18.4% 
Services 50% 
Agric. 48% 
Indust. 12.5% 
Services 39.5% 
Agric. 44% 
Indust. 20% 
Services 36% 
Agric. 67.2% 
Indust. 7.5% 
Services 25.3% 
Agric. 48.2% 
Indust. 14% 
Services 37.8% 
Population in poverty  13.8%  40%  33% 60% 30% 
Budget revenues  $29.64 billion  $1.17 billion  $8.005 billion  $1.28 billion  $1.393 billion 
Human develop. index**  71  122  119 124 108 
* Based on the CIA world factbook economic data (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/). 
** http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/alphabetical2008/. The figures are rank orders of the 179 states according to measures of life 
expectancy, standard of living literacy etc. The calculation is favourable to the Central Asian states because it is based on the literacy rates 
given by the governments, which claim about 98% of the population to be literate. However, the reality is less positive. 
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Caught in the dilemma of cotton versus food self-sufficiency, the 
Central Asian states are hesitant about all land reform. They also have to 
contend with numerous other structural problems, including high levels of 
corruption in the agrarian administrative organs, the opacity of decision-
making structures for the export of production, child labour, and serious 
environmental problems related to the overuse of the soil.14 Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan are classified among the poorest countries in the world.15 
This difficult situation contributes to the reinforcement of traditional 
domestic economies: withdrawal into the family, self-sufficiency based on 
working a patch of land; and partially demonetarised economies. The only 
sources of money stem from the sale of products at bazaars, while the rest 
of economic life functions according to a barter system and food self-
sufficiency.  
As a result the social fabric has been profoundly altered and each 
group has had to play the cards it was dealt. For instance, the 
representatives of the national minorities, who are excluded from the 
public service reserved to titular populations, have reoriented their 
activities towards the private sector. Small enterprises in the tertiary 
domain, technical maintenance (plumbers, electricians, etc.), servers and 
vendors in restaurants and boutique or private security services are 
considered as sectors in which Russians dominate,16 while the Koreans 
work – as they did in the Soviet period – as sellers of fresh produce at the 
bazaars. Among the titular populations, several social groups have taken 
shape over recent years which are tied to specific categories of resources.  
The first group, the one most directly heir to the Soviet system, is that 
of state employees. Their living standards remain extremely disparate, 
depending upon their level, all receive their incomes from state. This 
includes professionals such as teachers and doctors. Where the bureaucracy 
is concerned the public function is intrinsically linked to political power 
and to patronage systems. The high state employees are all connected, in 
one way or another, to the political authorities, and belong to regional clans 
                                                      
14 S. Peyrouse, The Agricultural Sector in Central Asia, EUCAM Working Paper, No. 
3, EU-Central Asia Monitoring, CEPS and FRIDE, Brussels and Madrid, 2009. 
15 Central Asia Human Development, UNDP, Washington, D.C., 2005.  
16 S. Peyrouse, The Russian Minority in Central Asia: Migration, Politics, and Language, 
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or solidarity networks giving them protection from above. Most members 
of the political elite already held posts under the Soviet regime and today 
are leaving their posts for their children, who are educated in the training 
institutions for cadres linked to the presidential apparatus, structures that 
are equivalent to the former Party schools. Irrespective of whether there 
has been a privatisation process of the large national enterprises, the local 
nomenklatura has managed to maintain its stranglehold over the primary 
resources.  
The second social group to form over the last two decades is that of 
businessmen and traders. Trade constitutes one of the main areas of 
profitability for Central Asian economies, returning the region to its 
historical role as a trading crossroads. Yet even this private sector is hardly 
dissociated from that of state employees. Even more than in the 1970s-
1980s, the political and economic networks are deeply enmeshed. If 
hydrocarbons, metals, and cotton are all in state hands, other sectors, such 
as drug trafficking, are located at the core of struggles for influence 
between the criminal milieus that initiated these illegal flows and the state 
structures that control them today, in particular the customs services. In 
addition, even in less criminal structures than those of drugs, many major 
businessmen, in particular owners of bazaars, have heavily invested in 
official political life in order to acquire political immunity for themselves.17 
This interaction is two-way, since the key high state employees, in 
particular those from the security sector (armed forces, militias, secret 
services, troops of the Interior Ministry, border guards, etc.), are themselves 
also implicated in commercial structures. 
Last, the final group, namely rural populations, has only one 
resource, namely their labour power. All of Central Asia is experiencing 
strong migratory dynamics, which involves at least three million Tajiks, 
Uzbeks, Kyrgyz working abroad either permanently or seasonally. The 
migration flows are mainly bound for Russia, but also for Kazakhstan, 
which hosts many Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in agriculture and building. They 
also head to other countries such as South Korea and the United Arab 
Emirates, but to a lesser extent. These massive migrations entail a thorough 
                                                      
17 A. Kupatadze, “Organized crime before and after the Tulip Revolution: the 
changing dynamics of upperworld-underworld networks”, Central Asian Survey, 
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transformation of the Central Asian social fabric, in particular in Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan, where, depending on the region, migrants reportedly 
represent between 25 and 45 percent of the male working-age population.18 
These migrant communities have suffered greatly in the 2008-2009 global 
economic crisis, some having to return home to desperate living conditions 
and with migrant remittances dropping substantially. 
2.3  External trade and investment structures 
The Central Asian economies are relatively unintegrated into the global 
market, nonetheless they are not closed economies. Natural resources play 
a primary role in their trade strategies. The ‘black gold’ of the Caspian Sea 
occupies the central point, particularly for Kazakhstan, whereas it is the 
‘blue gold’ (gas deposits) for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.19 Kazakhstan 
also has the world’s second-largest reserves of uranium and in 2009 became 
the world’s leading uranium producer. Lastly, the Central Asian states are 
rich in precious minerals (gold and silver, aluminium, copper, zinc, lead) 
and rare minerals (such as tungsten and molybdenum), and these are 
practically the only resources, apart from water, of Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan. 
Table 4. Percentage of exports to the GDP and exported production 
  Exports/GDP %  By products 
Kazakhstan  49  Oil, minerals, iron and steel 
Kyrgyzstan 45  Gold  and  cotton 
Uzbekistan  40  Gold, gas and cotton 
Tajikistan 21  Aluminium  and  cotton 
Turkmenistan 63  Gas  and  cotton 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators (www.worldbank.org). 
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Kazakhstan is heavily reliant on its oil, which represents more than 
20 percent of its budget revenues and 58 percent of its exports; 
Turkmenistan is reliant on its gas, which accounts for 60 percent of its 
exports, while its cotton accounts for 25 percent of state revenues; and 
Uzbekistan is dependent on its cotton and its gold, which represent 17 and 
25 percent of its exports respectively. Kyrgyzstan’s main source of revenue 
in hard currency is the Kumtor gold mine, which alone represents 40 
percent of Kyrgyz exports and 13 percent of its GDP; while in Tajikistan, 
the Tursunzade aluminium smelter counts for more than 60 percent of 
exports. The region’s development is thus subject to the ups and downs of 
world prices of oil, gas, metals, and cotton. What has been emerging in 
Central Asia is hardly different from the situation in other rent economies: 
a widening of social inequalities and an absence of real legal or institutional 
constraints to ensure that economic decisions are made in the public 
interest.20  
The impact of the economic crisis of 2008 has been severe at the 
economic, political and geopolitical levels. The banking and real estate 
sectors in Kazakhstan, the most globalised economy of the region, was 
close to collapse.21 In the other states of the region, less subject to global 
flows, the impact of the crisis has been visible in the rise in prices of basic 
necessities, as well as in the decrease in salaries received by migrants and 
their remittances. This world financial crisis has dramatically weakened 
these already fragile economies, accentuated authoritarian measures, and 
intensified general social discontent. Large numbers of Central Asian 
migrants that were working in Russia and Kazakhstan returned to their 
countries of origin without the money they had been expecting to earn.  
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Table 5. Exports of the Central Asian countries (2007) 
 Exports  By  commodities 
Kazakhstan  $66.6 billion  oil and oil products, ferrous metals, chemicals, 
machinery, grain, wool, meat, coal 
Kyrgyzstan  $1.7billion  cotton, wool, meat, tobacco; gold, mercury, 
uranium, natural gas, hydropower; machinery; 
shoes 
Uzbekistan  $9.9 billion  cotton, gold, energy products, mineral fertilizers, 
ferrous and non-ferrous metals, textiles, food 
products, machinery, automobiles 
Tajikistan  $1.4 billion  aluminum, electricity, cotton, fruits, vegetable 
oil, textiles 
Turkmenistan  $9.9 billion  gas, crude oil, petrochemicals, textiles, cotton 
fibre 
Source: Based on the CIA world factbook economic data 
(https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/). 
Table 6. Imports of the Central Asian countries (2007) 
 Imports  By  commodities 
Kazakhstan  $37.5 billion  Machinery and equipment, metal products, 
foodstuffs 
Kyrgyzstan  $3.5 billion  oil and gas, machinery and equipment, 
chemicals, foodstuffs 
Uzbekistan $6.5  billion machinery  and equipment, foodstuffs, chemicals, 
ferrous and non-ferrous metals 
Tajikistan  $3.2 billion  electricity, petroleum products, aluminum oxide, 
machinery and equipment, foodstuffs 
Turkmenistan  $5.3 billion  Machinery and equipment, chemicals, foodstuffs 
Source: Based on the CIA world factbook economic data 
(https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/). 
Despite their subsoil wealth, the states of the region struggle still to 
find a model of economic development able to lift them out of their post-
Soviet pauperization. Central Asia is particularly lacking in efficient 
transport infrastructures, making transport costs exorbitant. The 
agricultural sector happens to be caught in a complex logic, since the 
cotton-producing states (essentially Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) tend to 
intensify cotton production, despite its being detrimental to the 
environment and harmful to the food security of the population, and refuse INTO EURASIA - MONITORING THE EU’S CENTRAL ASIA STRATEGY | 25 
 
to invest in grain and market garden produce.22 The lack of cooperation 
over water distribution blocks the development of hydroelectricity. De-
industrialisation is continuing and, with the exception of Kazakhstan, the 
Central Asian states lack investment in innovative technology or in the 
service industries. 
Overall the Central Asian states are finding it difficult to open up 
their economies internationally. Their main economic partners are their big 
neighbours, Russia and China. The balance between these two powers is 
now changing in favour of Beijing, whose exponentially increasing trade 
with Central Asia will soon surpass that of Russia, and already exceeds it in 
some sectors in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.23 Other countries are present 
in the Central Asian market, but this presence is often due to very 
specialised production niches: South Korea and Bangladesh in Uzbekistan, 
for the co-production of Daewoo cars and the purchase of cotton 
respectively; the United Arab Emirates and Switzerland in Kyrgyzstan for 
the sale of gold; the Ukraine in Turkmenistan thanks to the gas agreements 
between the two countries; while Turkey and Iran have managed to 
establish broader presences, but which are modest compared to China and 
Russia.  
Lastly, the EU is a major trading partner of Central Asia. It is the 
foremost economic partner of Kazakhstan in total trade volume, ahead of 
Russia and China. It is in second place in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, in 
third place in Tajikistan and fourth place in Kyrgyzstan. Among EU 
member states, Germany is distinguished by its presence throughout the 
whole region, followed by Italy, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and 
France.24 
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Table 7. Share of Russia, China, and the EU in Central Asian countries’ imports, 
exports and total trade (2008) (€ million) and their rank 
 Imports  Exports  Total 
Kazakhstan Russia:  36%  (1st) 
China: 24.3% (2nd) 
EU: 21% (3rd) 
EU: 45.9% (1st) 
China: 14.3% (2nd) 
Russia: 12.3% (3rd) 
EU: 34.4% (1st) 
Russia: 23.4% (2nd) 
China: 18.9% (3rd) 
Kyrgyzstan China:  70.5%  (1st) 
Russia: 13.9% (2nd) 
EU: 4.1% (3rd) 
Russia: 29.6% (1st) 
China: 7.6% (5th) 
EU: 2.5% (8th) 
China: 62.3% (1st) 
Russia: 15.9% (2nd) 
EU: 3.9% (4th) 
Uzbekistan  Russia: 27.6% (1st) 
EU: 17.9% (2nd) 
China: 16.3% (3rd) 
Russia: 25.3% (1st) 
EU: 11% (2nd) 
China: 6.1% (6th) 
Russia: 26.7% (1st) 
EU: 15.2% (2nd) 
China: 12.2% (3rd) 
Tajikistan   China: 26% (1st) 
Russia: 24.5% (2nd) 
EU: 6.4% (5th) 
EU: 24.7% (1st) 
Russia: 15.7% (2nd) 
China: 1.7% (9th) 
Russia: 22.6% (1st) 
China: 20.8% (2nd) 
EU: 10.3% (3rd) 
Turkmenistan  Russia: 16.6% (1st) 
EU: 15.7% (2nd) 
China: 14.7% (3rd) 
EU: 25.8% (2nd) 
Russia: 0.9% (11th) 
China: 0.3% (16th) 
EU: 22.5% (2nd) 
Russia: 6.0% (5th) 
China: 6% (7th) 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/trade-statistics/, October 2009. 
2.4  Security threats and challenges 
There are few classic, external security threats in Central Asia. Nor are 
there outstanding unresolved territorial border issues with the 
neighbouring states, with China having agreed its borders with 
Kazakhstan, Krygyzstan and Tajikistan amicably in recent years. Only the 
maritime borders of the Caspian Sea remain the object of continuing 
debate, in particular between Turkmenistan and Iran, and Turkmenistan 
and Azerbaijan. Kazakhstan, for its part, has negotiated the distribution of 
its Caspian assets and their common exploitation with Russia. The 
militarization of the Caspian Sea, especially the development of a Kazakh 
naval fleet, is supposed to respond not to classic military attacks, but to 
non-traditional threats, including the possible terrorist attacks on oil rigs 
and tankers.25  
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Drug trafficking, however, is a major concern. Central Asia now 
ranks third after Iran and Pakistan on the list of export routes for Afghan 
opium. The civil war in Tajikistan (1992-1997) hastened the region’s entry 
into drug trafficking, used by the Islamic opposition as its source of finance. 
In 2008, UNODC estimated that 121 tons of heroin and 293 tons of opium 
passed through the region, but the amounts are probably far greater.26 
While the main productive regions are situated in the south of Afghanistan, 
the border provinces with the former Soviet Union, Badakhshan, Balkh, 
and Badghis, have also seen a rapid increase in production levels. Until the 
end of the 1990s, the role of Central Asia in worldwide drug trafficking was 
that of a transit space. This situation has gradually changed so that today 
the five states are also becoming sites for its production, transformation, 
and consumption. As in the tribal zones of Pakistan, Central Asia has seen 
a rapid development of its transformation laboratories, which enable 
enormous profits to be amassed locally before stocks are transported to 
Russia and Europe. The trade explosion with China plays a major role in 
the development of these laboratories, since China’s chemical industry is 
the primary supplier of the chemical products required to transform opium 
into heroin, in particular anhydride acetic. Central Asia is thus situated at 
the crossroads of two flows; those of the raw product of opium from 
Afghanistan and those of the chemicals required for its treatment from 
China.27 
The drug trade that passes through Central Asia is mainly headed 
towards Russia and Western Europe, but equally seems to be making 
inroads into the Chinese market. Production also takes place in the region: 
the Chui Valley region of Kyrgyzstan where it is reported to produce 
annually close to 5 million tons of hemp capable of yielding close to 6,000 
tons of hashish, and more than 2,000 of poppies yielding 30 tons of opium 
per year. One third of the drugs that pass through Central Asia are 
destined for domestic use, for about 500,000 drug-addicted people. In 
Kazakhstan, the cases of drug addiction are rising quickly, in particular 
among the youth. In the other republics, in particular in Tajikistan, the local 
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populations are hostage to the drug trade: they produce the drugs in their 
raw state, in the least profitable way, and above all serve as couriers, a 
poorly paid and very dangerous activity, often undertaken by women and 
children. The organization of the drug trade is in fact embedded in the 
social structure of these countries, using segments of the population that 
have no other economic alternatives.  
In much of Central Asia the shadow economy, essentially drug 
trafficking, reaps important revenues and finances sections of the ruling 
circles. While the leaderships of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are to be 
credited with waging war against the drug mafias in their countries, 
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and even more so Tajikistan can be regarded as 
quasi narco-states. A number of state representatives, at each 
administrative level, from directors of kolkhozes to regional authorities and 
the highest-ranking state officials, are directly involved in the drug trade. 
This has corrupted the entire state functioning, in particular customs 
officers and the police corps. The Islamist movements also profit from this 
revenue source. In 1999-2000 the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan brought 
attention to itself by transferring great quantities of raw opium into 
Tajikistan, in its border bastions with Kyrgyzstan.28 
The fact that in the worst cases both the political leadership and 
Islamist circles, ostensibly wholly opposed to one another, receive 
considerable revenues from similar drug-related sources and markets 
makes it extremely difficult for the international community to propose 
effective measures against the drug trade. Moreover, it is important to 
highlight the longstanding rivalries between the services and the army 
corps. On one hand, the traditional army, which is under the jurisdiction of 
the Defence Ministry, is loyal to the state, and is relatively neutral 
politically. On the other, the special units of the Interior Ministry, of the 
Ministry of Emergency Situations, of the National Security Committee 
(KNB, the successor of the KGB), the Border Guard Service, not to mention 
the presidential guard, are all very close to the circles of power. These 
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security service units are often involved in lucrative illegal activities. In 
such circumstances, the Central Asian intelligence system reveals its 
complexity: the rivalry between the various corps impedes their good 
functioning, exchanges of information, and their capacity to conduct 
collective operations; the units are very often involved in the operations 
against which they are supposed to be fighting. 
Other non-traditional threats endanger the countries of the region, in 
particular from an ecological and pandemic viewpoint. The Soviet legacy 
has contributed to a general deterioration of the ecological situation: the 
Aral Sea catastrophe; massive increases in soil salinity, in particular in 
Uzbekistan; retention of polluting chemical industries with detrimental 
effects for public health; deterioration of access to potable water and of 
water quality; poor upkeep of irrigation structures and of major hydraulic 
dams, etc. Though Central Asia has not yet experienced great waves of 
ecological refugees, parts of its population may well soon find the living 
situation in some regions increasingly impossible; a danger to which the 
present governments are powerless to respond given the current state of 
affairs. These tensions are aggravated by the ominous lack of cooperation 
over cross-border water management between upstream and downstream 
states, which come close to the point of inter-state conflict (see below, 
section 2.5).  
Concerning pandemics, the dismantling of the health systems 
inherited from the Soviet Union have heightened the fragility of the 
populations: low life expectancy, lower epidemiological supervision, 
growing cases of malnutrition in rural areas, a rise in at-risk pregnancies 
among women, renewed outbreaks of pathologies that had supposedly 
disappeared such as tuberculosis and cholera, an upsurge of cases of STD, a 
possible epidemic of HIV Aids, etc.  
The presence of clandestine Islamist movements was openly 
confirmed back in the 1990s, with various assassinations, bomb attacks, 
suicide bombings and attacks against foreign embassies during the last 
decade.29 Since spring 2009, renewed outbreaks of Islamist activism have 
been noted in areas where militants are historically rooted: the Uzbek-
Kyrgyz border, the Batken region in Kyrgyzstan, the Gharm region, and the 
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Karategin valley in Tajikistan. This can probably be connected to 
developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as to domestic issues. 
Though a large part of Central Asia’s population seems to remain in favour 
of a secular state, political and social tensions have sparked the emergence 
of Islamist movements. Today the dominant movement is the Hizb ut-
Tahrir, which officially endorses non-violent methods of acceding to power 
and recruits by spreading educational and moral precepts, as well as by 
giving charity to underprivileged milieus. Although its leadership militates 
in favour of a world caliphate, the Hizb ut-Tahrir activists are focused on 
national and policy questions: in Uzbekistan, they demand Islam 
Karimov’s resignation and the liberation of political and religious 
prisoners; they ask for Islam to be made the country’s official religion and a 
key element of national culture, and want economic rules set up that are 
inspired by Islam and the respect for small Islamic entrepreneurship. 
Although it is much closer to the model of “Islamo-nationalism” than to 
Jihadism, the Hizb ut-Tahrir appears to be encountering competition due to 
a revival of internationalised groups like the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan, the Islamic Jihad and others, though not all radical by 
definition.  
In Uzbekistan, the elimination of all secular opposition contributes to 
making the Islamists appear to be the only possible recourse. Some of the 
merchant classes are convinced that a ‘purification’ of the economic system, 
with the establishment of faith-inspired deontological rules, and a 
conjunction between personal enrichment and charitable activities is a 
model to follow.30 T h r o u g h o u t  t h e  r e g i o n  i t  i s  o b s e r v e d  t h a t  t h e  
presidential families have significantly appropriated the resources of the 
state in a process that has led to high levels of top-down corruption of the 
state edifice. This, together with growing social disparities, pauperisation 
in certain regions, and the criminalisation of state structures, all contribute 
to pushing rural groups into the arms of Islamism. This is also the case for 
the intellectual professions that were suddenly devalued such as teachers 
as well as, and increasingly starkly, the young educated generations 
without work prospects.31 Lastly, the authorities’ fearfulness of any 
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uncontrolled form of Islam, even non-politicised, and of any overly public 
expression of piety has led many believers to frequent clandestine places of 
worship. These individuals are not necessarily politicised or even Salafist, 
but they contribute to developing a critical stance on official Islam, which is 
considered too subordinate to secular power.  
2.5  Regional cooperation and tensions  
The Central Asian states have never displayed a great eagerness for 
collaboration. All the attempts at regional alliances, principally economic 
ones, have stumbled on national sensitivities, on the competition between 
leaders, and on struggles for influence, in particular between Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan. The main regional cooperation mechanisms have been 
driven by Russia and China, through the CSTO and SCO (see sections 3.1 
and 3.2 below) and the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC). In 
addition the Asian Development Bank has achieved results in the transport, 
trade, and energy sectors under the CAREC programme,32 and the EU 
through its BOMCA border security programme.33 However regional 
cooperation remains difficult, which is highly detrimental for the economic 
development of the whole region. 
Border relations are generally tense, with the exception of those 
between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, whose checkpoints are by and large 
open and demilitarised. In Central Asia borders are part and parcel of the 
regime-sustaining logic and a symbol of independence, despite hampering 
international trade. Since 2002, Tashkent’s isolationist policies have 
complicated all regional relations and rendered the border crossings 
extremely difficult for the local populations. The borders between 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, despite slight improvements in 2008, 
remain difficult to cross even for the border populations who, in theory, are 
endowed with special permits. Each year there are occasional clashes 
between the populations and the customs services on the borders between 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, owing to multiple forms of trafficking. The 
border relations between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as between 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan continue to deteriorate. In the Andijan-Osh-
Khudjand-Batken area, the border crossings remain a constant subject of 
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tension, all the more so as the zone is a major centre of drug trafficking. 
From the territorial standpoint, only Kazakhstan has settled its border 
issues with all its neighbours. For a decade, the Uzbek-Tajik border has 
been mined due to Tashkent’s stance. Despite the fact that the deaths 
number in the tens each year, no solution is in sight. Between Tashkent and 
Bishkek, apart from the four Uzbek exclaves on Kyrgyz territory, more than 
400 km of borders are still under dispute. For Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 
many border zones in the mountains are not delimited and the two 
countries cannot agree on a border demarcation treaty. Clashes between the 
populations are regular and the relations between border posts tense. 
For some years, the question of migration flows has become an 
important element in the relations between the Central Asian states. After 
Russia, Kazakhstan has the second largest in-take of migrants and is likely 
to receive increasing numbers from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as 
from Tajikistan. According to official reports, the country hosts between 
half a million legal and one million illegal migrant workers. Taking 
seasonal flows and shuttle trade into account, however, a more plausible 
figure is about two million.34 For Central Asian migrant workers, living 
conditions in Kazakhstan are affordable and good for maintaining close 
family relations. In the Uzbek-Kazakh border regions, more and more 
Uzbeks work on the Kazakh side during the day and return in the evening 
to sleep at home: these daily migrations partly explain the tensions that 
erupt when the border is closed or crossing it is made more difficult.  
One of Kazakhstan’s main difficulties is the implementation of 
legislation that is consistent with migrant supply countries; an agreement 
of 1994 on cooperation between CIS states concerning work migration 
never entering into force. In 2008, Astana initiated new discussions which 
led to an agreement among CIS countries about the protection of migrant 
workers, but it has yet to be ratified.35 In June 2009, another agreement was 
                                                      
34 E. Eshamanova, “Tendentsii i puti sotrudnichestva Kazakhstana i Rossii v 
reshenii problem trudovoi migratsii iz stran Tsentral’noi Azii” [Tendencies and 
paths of cooperation between Kazakhstan and Russia in resolving the problem of 
work migration from Central Asia], Informatsionno-analiticheskii tsentr izucheniia 
obshchestvennykh politicheskikh protsessov na postsovetskom prostranstve, 5 March 2008 
(http://www.ia-centr.ru/expert/578/). 
35 Consult the text online at 
http://www.base.spinform.ru/show_doc.fwx?Regnom=4873. INTO EURASIA - MONITORING THE EU’S CENTRAL ASIA STRATEGY | 33 
 
signed concerning individual entrepreneurial activities undertaken by 
Kyrgyz citizens in Kazakhstan, which has now been made easier, in 
particular at the bazaars. Uzbekistan, however, which in recent years has 
been the main migrant supplier to Kazakhstan and Russia, has refused to 
negotiate any agreements on the issue.36 
However, today it is the question of water management which most 
clearly jeopardises relations between Central Asian states.37 Although 
theoretically very complementary, with three gas and oil producing states 
and two hydroelectricity producing ones, cooperation on energy issues 
between Central Asian states has proved more than difficult. Negotiations 
to exchange water for oil and gas regularly broke down, with each of the 
participants undermining the terms of engagement. The five states are 
divided over issues of how to use the water: for irrigation in summer or for 
heating in the winter? In November 2009, the common electricity grid 
disintegrated with the withdrawal of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, meaning 
that all will have to be come increasingly self-sufficient - at a price.  
Many regional structures have been created in order to facilitate 
cooperation in water management, such as the Water Energy Consortium 
(WEC), which was part of the Central Asian Cooperation Organization 
(CACO) that merged in 2005 with EurAsEC. Until now regional initiatives 
have been largely ineffective. The International Fund for the Aral Sea 
(IFAS) struggles to function as a common regional cooperative organisation 
for water management, although the move of its headquarters to Almaty in 
2009 may mark a new beginning. The two upstream states, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, both want to expand their hydroelectric capacities. The Uzbek 
authorities have thus far succeeded in blocking several projects for Tajik 
hydroelectric stations, in particular the Zaravshan project, which was to be 
constructed by the Chinese company Sino-Hydro.38 The largest projects, 
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namely Rogun in Tajikistan, and Kambarata I in Kyrgyzstan, are extremely 
costly and geopolitically complex, and have therefore been delayed for 
several years.39  
Besides the absence of regional cooperation on water management, 
the lack of investment, outdated infrastructure and bad governance are also 
the cause of current shortages. The questions of water management and 
electricity are intrinsically linked to the issue of food security.40 The UN 
food program has stated that 2.2 million Tajik citizens are in a situation of 
food insecurity, representing 34 percent of the rural population and 37 
percent of the urban population, and with 800,000 directly threatened by 
famine.41 In Kyrgyzstan, the number of people subject to food insecurity is 
reportedly one million.  
To conclude this sketch of the situation in Central Asia, the 
highlighting of certain positive points is also warranted. Except in the case 
of Tajikistan in the 1990s, the region has been able to avoid conflicts 
associated with independence; the populations are peaceful and virtually 
unarmed. In the 2000s poverty rates dropped, wages and household 
incomes partly recovered from the very low levels of the 1990s, while trade, 
transport, and investment improved. Kazakhstan is becoming a significant 
actor in the Eurasian space. Kyrgyzstan still enjoys a freedom of press that 
is unique in the region. Uzbekistan has managed to maintain its school 
system relatively well, compared to its Tajik and Turkmen neighbours. A 
new generation of children from the middle and upper classes study 
abroad, which contributes to opening up the region intellectually. The 
death penalty is abolished in some states. Central Asia possesses valuable 
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resources (hydrocarbons, minerals, hydroelectricity, agriculture), and a 
strategic geographical position ensures important revenues linked to the 
transit of goods. If well-managed and redistributed, though this is not 
presently the case, these assets can help to secure the future of the 
populations. All these points underline the case for a stronger EU 
involvement, given also that the states of the region are keen for Europe to 
play a more active role. 36 | 
 
3.  ROLES OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS 
3.1  Russia 
Russia is not a power like the others in Central Asia, as it is the region’s 
former coloniser. This legacy has its positive and negative aspects: positive 
insofar as the long period of Russo-Central Asian cohabitation bequeathed 
elements of a common language, culture, history and feelings of common 
belonging; but negative insofar as it involves the political sensitivities and 
cultural misinterpretations of the coloniser-colonised relationship. Russian-
Central Asian relations are therefore complex, with both actors having 
highly emotional perceptions of relations to the other.42  
Since 2000, the Russian influence on Central Asian policy-making has 
become more direct. Russia has once again become the primary political 
reference for Central Asian regimes, which are attracted neither to western 
parliamentary systems nor to Chinese mono-partyism. The Central Asian 
leaders did not wait for the Putin period to limit political expression and 
the autonomy of civil society, but they have been able to draw additional 
arguments of legitimation from the Russian example.  
Moscow’s three main practical concerns in the region are political 
influence, economic presence, especially gas and oil exports from Central 
Asia, and security issues. In the economic domain, Russia has regained 
ground in the 2000s, although losing several important economic battles.43 
In the economic domain, Russian-Central Asian trade bounced back at the 
start of the 2000s and tripled between 2003 and 2007, from $7 to $21 billion, 
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a third of which is in the hydrocarbon sector.44 Since 2006, Russia became 
Kazakhstan’s main import partner, and its third largest export partner after 
the European Union and China. It is now once again Uzbekistan’s premier 
commercial partner, accounting for more than a quarter of its total foreign 
exchange earnings (more than US$3 billion in 2007). In addition, Moscow 
has become Kyrgyzstan’s second largest trade partner after China but 
remains Tajikistan’s largest partner, with China second. However, in the 
trade sector in Central Asia, Russia will in all likelihood be overtaken by 
China.45 Russia’s role has been heavily concentrated in the energy sector, 
but even here it is facing serious Chinese competition, as evidenced by the 
oil and now also gas pipelines from Kazakhstan into China, and the 
opening in December 2009 of the gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China 
via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. 
Despite the predominance of the energy issue, Russia’s trade with 
Central Asia involves other important sectors of cooperation: uranium, 
electricity, construction, telecommunications, transport, railways, banks, 
the military-industrial complex, and lastly certain agribusiness sectors. It is 
an important actor in heavy industry and infrastructure. But it is a 
relatively modest and rather uncompetitive actor in the areas of consumer 
goods, small and mid-sized enterprises and new technologies. This 
stratification offers a more general reflection of the Russian economy as a 
whole, which still has difficulty diversifying itself. But it is also explained 
by the state of the Central Asian economies, in which small and mid-size 
enterprises and new technologies struggle to find a place. These economies 
have roles as transit zones for Russo-Chinese trade, hence the emphasis on 
infrastructure and freight-related services.  
The economic crisis has paradoxically helped Russia reinforce its 
influence and stakes in its neighbouring countries. While the Russian 
rouble and currency reserves were weakened, the Central Asian states were 
even more vulnerable. The Kremlin decided therefore to set up a 
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stabilisation fund of $10 billion to help its neighbours, of which it will 
finance three-quarters. For example Kyrgyzstan has been promised $2 
billion, of which part was emergency aid but most has been earmarked for 
the Kambarata hydroelectric station and the reconversion of Kyrgyz public 
debt into a Russian holding in the main Kyrgyz military-industrial 
enterprise.  
The second key aspect of the Russian presence in Central Asia is that 
of regional security, which has been the primary driving force behind 
Moscow’s continued interest in the region since the early 1990s. However, 
since 2000, the mechanisms of this collaboration have been transformed. 
The security challenges for Russia in Central Asia are multiple and 
complex. Any destabilization in the weakest (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) or the 
most central (Uzbekistan) states would have immediate repercussions in 
Russia. The threats include Islamist infiltration in the Volga-Ural region 
and the North Caucasus, indeed in the whole of the country; an increase in 
the inflow of drugs reaching the Russian population; loss of control over 
the export networks of hydrocarbons, over uranium sites, strategic sites in 
the military-industrial complex, and electricity power stations; a drop in 
trade exchanges; a loss of direct access to Afghanistan; an uncontrollable 
surge of flows of migrants, in particular of refugees. For Moscow, the 
security of the southern borders of Central Asia is seen as a question of 
domestic security. The 7,000 kilometres of Russo-Kazakhstan border are 
virtually impossible to secure. This means that clandestine traffic has to be 
better controlled ‘upstream’ before the border, which goes to confirm 
Central Asia’s role as a buffer zone for Russia.  
Russo-Central Asian regional collaboration is organised mainly in the 
framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Apart 
from its role in the elaboration of collective strategies to counter terrorism 
and drug-trafficking, the CSTO is the only regional institution with a 
genuine military dimension.46 The Collective Rapid Deployment Force for 
Central Asia, consisting of Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Russian, and Tajik units, 
totalling around 4,000 troops, is the only trained armed force capable of 
intervening in real time, and will probably be upgraded to 15,000 soldiers. 
CSTO common military exercises, carried out annually in one of the 
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countries members, simulate terrorist attacks or anti-narcotics operations. 
However, bilateralism dominates in the domain of security. Russia has kept 
or regained numerous military and research facilities in Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, has gained two military bases in Kyrgyzstan at 
Kant, in Tajikistan at Aini, with the possibility of a further in Kyrgyzstan at 
Osh.47 The second largest domain of cooperation, which assures Russia its 
dominant role in the military sector, is personnel training for hundreds of 
Central Asian officers trained each year in Russian military academies. 
Moreover, the FSB border service plays an advisory role and provides 
technical assistance to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. And Russia offers the 
preferential sale of military material at domestic Russian market prices to 
Central Asian states, and has revived cooperation between military-
industrial complexes. 
Despite its ‘return’ to Central Asia in the 2000s, Moscow no longer 
has a monopolistic hold over the region. The Kremlin has not tried to 
reintegrate with the Central Asian states politically.48 Though Moscow 
wishes to remain Central Asia’s ‘number one’ partner, it no longer 
imagines that its presence can be exclusive. Russia’s return has been a 
partial success insofar as it has again become accepted as an important 
partner and a legitimate ally. Despite its large presence in the domains of 
strategy and the military, Russia is without a strategic solution for the 
potential risks of destabilisation facing Central Asia, be it those related to 
Afghanistan (Islamism and drug trafficking), or those internal to Central 
Asian societies, which have to do with their difficult social and economic 
situations. For the present, the Kremlin is content to exercise its influence at 
the political, economic, cultural and individual levels as best it can, 
although some of its foreign policy actions have not helped (notably its 
invasion of Georgia and the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 
2008 was viewed very negatively in Central Asia).  
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3.2  China 
In less than two decades, Beijing has managed to make a massive and 
multi-faceted entry onto the Central Asian scene. Having resolved border 
issues with its direct Central Asian neighbours, it has proved itself a loyal 
partner on the level of bilateral diplomacy. China has become a leading 
trade partner as well as in investment in hydrocarbons and infrastructure, 
and has succeeded in turning the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO) into a regional structure appreciated by its members. At the same 
time is has learned how to negotiate its advances in the region with Russia, 
the second major member of the Organization.49 Both China and Russia 
share a common interest in preserving the political status quo in Central 
Asia. Both consider the established regimes to be stabilising elements.  
Trade between China and Central Asia has been booming for almost 
a decade, and is profoundly changing the economic status quo in the 
region.50 In 2007, Sino-Central Asian trade reached at least $18 billion, 
compared to $21 billion for Russia.51 The trade gap between Russia and 
China is thus reducing to the advantage of the latter, whose commercial 
development seems exponential. Taking into account shuttle trade, China’s 
economic presence in bordering countries like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
is already greater than Russia’s.52 However, there is a particular lack of 
diversification in Central Asian exports to China, composed mainly of raw 
materials. Conversely, Chinese finished products account for more than 90 
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percent of Chinese exports to Central Asia,53 and the region seems bound to 
experience a reinforcement of its economic specialisation in raw materials.  
The energy issue is of course one of the driving forces of Sino-Central 
Asian economic relations. In less than a decade, Chinese companies have 
successfully launched themselves in the Kazakh market, and by 2006, they 
were managing about 24 percent of Kazakh production.54 The Chinese 
strategy is to connect all the acquired fields with the giant Sino-Kazakh oil 
and gas pipelines, which is presently under construction, and which will 
connect the shores of the Caspian to Dostyk/Alashankou border post in 
2011. Secondly, China is interested in the gas deposits in Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan. In spite of the challenging regional situation, it has 
succeeded in building a gas pipeline at great speed from Turkmenistan 
across Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan into China, which began to operate in 
December 2009,55 and also inaugurated a gas pipeline from Kazakhstan in 
January 2010. Beijing is further interested in the Central Asian 
hydroelectricity sector, in the mineral industry, in road and railways 
infrastructures, and in telecommunications.  
The long-term implications of China’s engagement for landlocked 
Central Asia in terms of transit and transport will therefore partially 
determine the future of the region. Chinese investments in infrastructure 
will enable the Central Asian states to escape from their dependence on the 
deteriorating Soviet-era infrastructure networks. China supplies many 
consumer products that suit Central Asian demands, including the 
growing technology consumption needs of the middle classes, in particular 
in Kazakhstan. The re-exportation of Chinese goods has also become one of 
the largest economic activities of Kyrgyzstan,56 offering a new range of jobs 
in the tertiary sector. If Beijing has not yet managed to develop a cultural 
                                                      
53 V. Paramonov and A. Strokov, Ekonomicheskoe prisutstvie Rossii i Kitaia v 
Tsentral’noi Azii, op. cit., p. 5. 
54 But this proportional share of total Kazakh oil production will decrease in the 
forthcoming years as the exploitation of Tengiz and Kashagan increases the size of 
the pie to China’s disadvantage.  
55 “Turkmenistan: gas pipeline to China is ready”, Asia News, 22 August 2006 
(http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=6997). 
56 G. Raballand and B. Kaminski, “La déferlante économique chinoise et ses 
conséquences en Asie centrale”, op. cit. 42 | ROLES OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS 
 
diplomacy, it has nonetheless undertaken to strengthen its linguistic 
influence in Central Asia. This has been well-received among the younger 
generations seeking profitable career opportunities. Fluency in Chinese also 
guarantees a quick rise up the social ladder in both the public 
administration (especially in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and the 
private sector (especially the sectors relating to trade, transit, freight, legal 
supervision, translation, etc.).57 
In the security domain the SCO has helped to defuse a number of 
potential conflicts, especially those along borders. However it has no 
defined military structure like the CSTO, nor does it seek to create 
multilateral military units. It did establish the Regional Anti-Terrorist 
Structure (RATS) in Tashkent in 2004, which is meant to develop common 
approaches to combat terrorist movements.58 Now that the SCO has passed 
a certain threshold of political development the organisation faces new 
challenges, since its manifold activities amount largely to declarations of 
intent. The financial resources of the SCO are small, and its bureaucratic 
structures weak.  
The extension of the SCO, particularly to the economic sector, elicits a 
debate among member states that reveals their often-contradictory 
interests. China is obviously the main driver in favour of an economic 
reorientation of the SCO, regarding it as an opportunity for the 
development of its own ‘Far West’. Given China’s booming development, 
both Moscow and the Central Asian states are apprehensive about Chinese 
economic domination and argue that a free trade zone is possible only 
between countries that are on the same economic level. However, some 
sectors seem to be increasingly favoured in the multilateral framework of 
the SCO, such as transport corridors between China and the Caspian Sea 
that run through Russia and Central Asia; agreements on exporting 
electricity; and developing structures to coordinate the trade and transit of 
hydrocarbons among the SCO member states. However the SCO has failed 
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to coordinate joint activities against drug-trafficking or to become a 
platform for discussion on the water issue. Despite the fact that Dushanbe, 
Bishkek and Tashkent call for the SCO to mediate their water conflict, 
China has always refused to become involved, possibly because of 
sensitivities around its two rivers that flow into Kazakhstan.  
The Central Asian region has a particular strategic importance for 
Beijing because of its proximity to Xinjiang. Any extension into Central 
Asia of the violence and instability observed in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
could impact upon China’s north-west. For the time being, China and 
Russia share similar geopolitical objectives in Central Asia: both of them 
desire stability on their borders, are concerned about the ability of the 
Central Asian states to withstand destabilisation (whether from civil war, 
Islamist insurrection, popular uprising, or palace revolution), and to 
control drug-trafficking from Afghanistan. Both also reject the notion that 
the West ought to have any right to oversee the Eurasian space, and see 
advantages in the present cooperation, as in the SCO. Beijing seems little 
inclined to get more involved in the domestic politics of the Central Asian 
regimes. The Chinese authorities are aware of their limited ability to 
manage their own unstable border regions, especially after the events of 
spring 2008 in Tibet and those of July 2009 in Xinjiang. Beijing’s Central 
Asian policy has therefore, first and foremost, been aiming at pragmatic 
results.  
3.3  The United States 
In the early 1990s, American involvement Central Asia initially sought to 
prevent the proliferation of nuclear arms and weapons of mass destruction, 
and particularly focused on helping Kazakhstan proceed with the 
dismantling of its nuclear arsenal. Meanwhile the United States mainly 
financed development programmes for civil society and for the transition 
to a market economy, including the Freedom for Russia and Emerging 
Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act (making the 
remarkable acronym ‘FREEDOM’), the Central Asian-American Enterprise 
Fund (CAAEF), etc. Each American visit to the region was accompanied by 
reminders about democratic norms. Trade relations nevertheless remained 
minimal and mostly centred on cotton (for example the latter represented 
nearly 90  percent of American purchases in Uzbekistan). American 
companies were scarcely interested by Central Asian markets, despite the 
presence of several large enterprises.  44 | ROLES OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS 
 
In 1997, Zbigniew Brzezinski signalled a strand in US geo-political 
thinking with his remark that Eurasia remains the chessboard on which the 
combat for global primacy is played out.59 More operationally, in 1998-1999 
changes in the zones of responsibility of the major American military 
commands moved Central Asia out of Eucom (European Command) and 
into Centcom (Central Command), thus no longer mapped as part of the 
post-Soviet space but rather as part of the so-called Great Middle-East. 
Uzbekistan was quickly perceived as a first-order ally in the region. This 
was reinforced after the events of September 11, 2001. The resolutely pro-
American commitment of the Uzbek authorities highlighted the idea, in 
Washington, that Uzbekistan could be the centrepiece in the fight against 
Islamism and a special ally in Central Asia.60 Washington concentrated on 
military cooperation with Tashkent, in particular in the struggle against 
Islamic terrorism, and on democratisation projects in Kyrgyzstan. The 
United States seemed at the apogee of its influence after September 11, 
2001, when it acquired two military bases, namely Karshi-Khanabad in 
Uzbekistan and Manas in Kyrgyzstan, with the tacit agreement of 
Moscow.61  
However, relations were far from being settled. The Central Asian 
regimes publicly rejected interference carried out in the name of human 
rights and civil society, and did not appreciate Washington’s antagonistic 
relations with Russia, forcing them to take a stance one way or the other.62 
In addition, the Uzbek alliance turned out to be more complicated than 
expected, culminating in its geopolitical turnaround in 2005, with the 
closing of the American base. Moreover the re-centring of American foreign 
policy on the Middle East disappointed the Central Asian states, who felt 
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abandoned. The Iraq war heightened the negative image of the United 
States in the region.63 
On the economic level, American influence remained quite limited. 
The United States encouraged the accession of Central Asian states to 
prepare for accession to the World Trade Organization and signed a multi-
party Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in 2005 with the 
five countries.64 It also extended the benefits of the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) to products from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan, has Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) with Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, and has signed a BIT with Uzbekistan, which has not yet 
entered into force. However, trade relations remain slight. The United 
States is Astana’s fifth largest trading partner, the seventh largest of 
Turkmenistan, the ninth of Kyrgyzstan, the tenth of Uzbekistan, and the 
twelfth of Tajikistan.65 Even at the level of energy, the ledger is meagre: if 
the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzerum 
(BTE) gas pipeline have opened up the Caucasus to the Turkish 
Mediterranean, but for Central Asia this has meant only a secondary export 
route for Kazakh oil that is trans-shipped across the Caspian.66 The 
American projects hoping for an opening into India and Pakistan, with 
Afghanistan as a transit zone, have failed thus far (e.g. the proposed 
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline), or have only been 
realised to a limited degree (e.g. for the export of electricity). 67 
American aid for the democratisation of Central Asia was focused on 
the promotion of civil society mainly through NGOs, rather than on state 
reform. Here, too, the balance-sheet is modest. Since state-to-state relations 
on matters of democracy were difficult to construct and effectively put 
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aside, the result was support for a myriad of NGO’s and individuals with 
the skills to access the financing on offer. But this led the United States to be 
seen as supporting actors that were in the eyes of the population associated 
with state weakness, implying the illegitimacy of the state apparatus, and 
indeed a dangerous conjunction between the market economy and social 
chaos. This was the perception of the authoritarian regimes of the region, 
such as that of President Karimov in Uzbekistan; whereas the counter-
example of Kyrgyzstan, initially a quite open society, became less and less 
distinguished from the region’s prevalent authoritarianism.68 
As regards military cooperation, in 2003 the United States launched 
the Caspian Guard, a training programme for a network of special and 
police forces of Caspian countries that would enable rapid and effective 
reaction to emergency situations, in particular to terrorist threats against oil 
industry installations.69 The ambitious final objective is reportedly to 
establish an integrated regime of air, sea and border control. The Caspian 
Guard principally concerns Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Since 1990s Astana 
has hosted many US coastguard delegations and has acquired military 
patrol boats. The United States’ financial, technological and training 
assistance to the Kazakhstani navy increased in the 2000s, when Astana 
resolved to create a significant naval force.70  
At the outset of the Obama administration Washington’s influence in 
the region was at its lowest ebb.71 The White House’s declared objective is 
today to reconstruct its relations with the region. The priority concern over 
Afghanistan and Pakistan also presumes a strengthening of relations with 
Central Asia since of the four major roads leading to Kabul only the 
northern one from Central Asia crossing the Panshir Valley is secured. The 
United States has succeeded in obtaining from Tashkent and Dushanbe an 
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agreement on the transit of non-lethal supplies to Afghanistan via rail, 
road, and air72 and is preparing two particular supply routes into 
Afghanistan from the north: Lithuania-Russia-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan and 
Georgia-Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan. Rapprochement with 
Uzbekistan is progressing but its prospects are limited to the security 
domain. In summer 2009, the United States crystallised these ideas in 
establishing the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), as a series of 
logistic arrangements linking the Baltic and Caspian ports with 
Afghanistan via Russia and the Central Asian states. This will lead to a 
strengthening of the partnership between the United States and Central 
Asia and increase the stakes for Central Asian interests in Afghanistan.73 
The US has more generally adopted a wider regional view linking Central 
Asia strongly with the South Asian region, as highlighted by the choice of 
the State Department to group these regions together in their internal 
organigramme, thus disconnecting Central Asia from the rest of the former 
Soviet Union.  
3.4  Turkey, Iran, Japan, India 
While Turkey, Iran, Japan and India may be far behind the major players in 
Central Asia in terms of geopolitical influence and economic relations, their 
presence is still significant and permits the states of Central Asia to 
diversify their partnerships and to cooperate in specific domains without 
geopolitical complications. 
With the independence of the Central Asia states at the start of the 
1990s Turkey sought to play up their cultural affinities with the region.74 It 
hoped to get actively involved in the political construction of the states 
through the introduction of the Turkish model of democracy, secularism, 
and modernity. However, a certain naive optimism in the early years led 
Turkey to make cultural misinterpretations that were particularly badly 
viewed by the new states: the discourse about the unity of the Turkic world 
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was quickly denounced as a ‘big brother’ manoeuvre from Ankara.75 While 
Ankara might have failed to entrench the idea of Turkic unity, intellectual 
exchanges, in particular for students, and the networks of Turkish schools 
and universities have become real marks of Turkish presence in Central 
Asia.76 In addition, Turkey has adjusted its policies and objectives to a more 
modest reality. On the military level, Ankara has become one of the 
turntables of the NATO Partnership for Peace, hosting many Central Asian 
officers for training. On the economic level, Turkey is one of the major 
partners of Turkmenistan, and has seen its trade levels with Kazakhstan 
grow rapidly. However, Turkish companies occupy no more than a few 
secure trade niches: construction, textiles and foodstuffs. Their presence in 
other sectors such as energy, transport infrastructure, telecommunications 
and banking suffer strong competition from other players; China in 
particular.  
Despite its proximity, in the years following independence the 
Iranian leaders lacked specific ideas about the region and did not consider 
it a priority.77 Tehran only adopted a substantial Central Asian policy when 
Mohammad Khatami came to power in 1997. Confronted by Western 
pressures in the Middle East, Iran sought to reinforce its Asian identity. For 
their part the Central Asian states were hesitant in relation to Iran, which 
they suspected of wanting to promote radical Islam, in part because of its 
support for the Party of Islamic Rebirth of Tajikistan.78 While religion-based 
accusations frequently recur, the relationships have changed with the 
process of ‘de-ideologicalisation’ of much of Iranian foreign policy.79 The 
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Central Asian states for their part are generally pro-Israeli and reject 
Iranian discourses on this topic. Since the early 2000s, Iran has seemed a 
reliable regional partner, even if the sole collective regional organisation 
which they share with Central Asia, the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO), plays a marginal role in the development of Iranian-
Central Asian trade exchanges. Tehran has become an ally of the Turkmen 
government and one of its main electricity and gas clients, although 
relations have been deteriorating since 2008. Kazakhstan and Iran have set 
up an oil trade swap system: Kazakh oil is transported to the Iranian port 
of Neka via the Caspian, while Iran sends equivalent volumes to 
Kazakhstan’s commercial partners from its terminals in the Persian Gulf. 
While relations with Uzbekistan are relatively poor, its linguistic proximity 
to Tajikistan has made Iran one of its premier political allies and economic 
partners. The Central Asian and Iranian governments hope to develop 
common transport networks in order to activate economic activity, whose 
levels have remained modest. However, there remain tensions, namely 
over legal the status of the Caspian Sea and the division of its waters, and 
over Iran’s nuclear ambitions, which unsettles the Central Asian capitals.  
Confronted with an exponentially growing Chinese presence and the 
preservation of a strong Russian influence, Japan has difficulty in 
establishing its place in Central Asia.80 Between 1992 and 2004, Tokyo spent 
more than $2 billion in the form of credits, subsidies for specific projects, 
and technical cooperation, to bolster the development of the Central Asian 
states. Despite this substantial aid, Japan remains rather invisible as a 
partner, illustrating the difficulties involved in projecting soft power in a 
region where precepts of spheres of influence and geopolitical rivalry are 
dominant.81 Tokyo privileges long-term development as a way of 
contributing to global regional stability. Despite the pro-active discourses 
of Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto on Japan’s new “Eurasian 
diplomacy” in 1997, it was not until 2004 that any real impulse was 
observed. To this end, Tokyo has proposed the creation of an initiative 
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called “Central Asia + Japan”, modelled its relationship with ASEAN. This 
would be designed to shift from bilateral relations to a multilateral 
dialogue on complex subjects such as economic cooperation, the joint 
management of energy resources, trade development through regional 
transport, the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking.82 While Japan 
struggles to establish a significant role in the region alongside Russia and 
China, Japanese investments are quite diversified, from oil and gas projects 
to the management of natural catastrophes, the supply of food and 
agricultural aid, and support for schools. Major Japanese companies such 
as Mitsubishi, Marubeni, Toshiba, JGC, Itochu, etc., are prepared to invest 
substantial sums in strategic domains such as access to hydrocarbons, the 
construction of refineries, and uranium. Indeed, Kazakhstan is in the 
process of becoming one of Tokyo’s major partners in the nuclear domain.83  
Central Asia is of increasing interest to both Islamabad and New 
Delhi, which also means a new space of competition between India and 
Pakistan.84 The Central Asian regimes, for their part, favour the entry of 
both these two states into their markets, seeking in particular to avoid 
being caught up in the stresses of Russian-Western or Russian-Chinese 
relations, and to facilitate their own geopolitical openings. However, 
despite the official discourses that vaunt the development of cooperation, 
Central Asia has not become a priority for either India or Pakistan.85 For 
their part the states of Central Asia do not consider these two countries to 
be political models: Pakistan is perceived as an unstable state and a 
potential Islamist threat, while India’s democratic system is hardly more 
attractive. India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear status and their refusal to join the 
nuclear non-proliferation treaty also displeases the Central Asian regimes. 
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Moreover, relations between the two regions – Central and South Asia - are 
hampered by a multitude of factors, due not so much to geographical 
distance (the gap separating them is only some several hundred kilometres, 
and even less along the Wakhan corridor which links the Tajik Pamir to the 
north-west regions of Pakistan), as to Afghanistan’s chronic instability.86 
Nonetheless, for some years several factors have emerged that are 
favourable to the development of Indian-Pakistani-Central Asian 
relations.87 New Delhi and Islamabad are both interested in Central Asian 
energy resources, through a proposed electricity transmission link (the 
CASA 1000 project) going from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan through 
Afghanistan to Pakistan and India, and through the proposed TAPI gas 
pipeline link (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India). A certain 
number of sectors have been identified for the development of trade 
exchanges between Central Asia and India: energy of course, but equally 
the pharmaceutical market, information technology, expertise services, 
textiles, and mechanical construction. Indo-Kazakhstan and Indo-Tajikistan 
military cooperation is also in full development, as is that between Astana 
and Delhi in the spatial sector.  
Table 8. Turkey, Iran, Japan and Indian bilateral trade with Central Asia, 2008 
(€ million) 
 Kazakhstan  Kyrgyzstan  Uzbekistan  Tajikistan  Turkmenistan 
Turkey  4th (2,105)  5th (172)  5th (611)  6th (223)  4th (736) 
Iran  6th (1,209)  17th (14)  13th (131)  7th (119)  3th (1,155) 
Japan  8th (689)  14th (26)  9th (253)  29th (1,3)  14th (56) 
India  19th (139)  20th (7)  16th (59)  22th (6,7)  20th (36) 
Source: Table compiled on the basis of official figures available for each country at 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/data.htm. 
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3.5  International organisations 
(OSCE/UNDP/NATO/ADB/EBRD/IBRD) 
Activities of the OSCE centres in Central Asia depend on the mandate 
formulated between OSCE and the individual member states. This does not 
leave much room for activities in the human dimension, especially in 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, where they focus on security questions 
(fight against trafficking in small arms, drugs, people, nuclear and chemical 
substances, etc) and on the environment (liquidation of the stocks of waste 
left over from the Soviet regime, prevention of and preparation for natural 
catastrophes, access to environmental information). In Kazakhstan, on the 
other hand, the OSCE has more diversified programmes, including police 
training, support to NGOs and media development, presence in the 
universities to promote the institution, reinforcing the axis against human 
trafficking, gender issues, and improvements in the transparency of the 
electoral system. In Kyrgyzstan, the OSCE is more focused on questions of 
development, with support to small business and youth entrepreneurship, 
improvements in migrants’ rights, assistance to municipal services to 
attract investments and aid in poverty-stricken areas. It also runs an anti-
corruption and anti-money laundering programme, and another for the 
reform of the legal system, in particular for the humanisation of laws 
(abolition of the death penalty) and for a better treatment of prisoners. In 
Tajikistan, its tasks are similar, including help for development via the 
amelioration of the economic and investment climate; the securing of the 
borders and combating trafficking; gender studies; and media 
development. In May 2009, the OSCE opened a border staff training centre 
in Dushanbe whose mission is to enhance cross-border and inter-agency co-
operation in the region, between the Central Asian states and with 
Afghanistan.88 Overall the results of these programmes are difficult to 
gauge. The most political measures (human rights, media rights, electoral 
reforms and fight against corruption) are those which have the least 
success, and OSCE is constantly criticised by the Russian and Central Asian 
governments for these democracy promotion initiatives. Security domains 
such as the prevention of ecological risks, the protection of women, etc., are 
more readily accepted by local actors.  
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Though the UNDP is less focused on political questions than the 
OSCE – although it does have a programme for the promotion of 
democratic government – it pursues a similar programme in the area of 
development aid. Until December 2009 it executed the EU’s 
BOMCA/CADAP programmes for border management and anti-drug 
trafficking. The UN Centre for Preventive Diplomacy, opened in Ashgabat 
in 2008, focuses on conflict prevention capacities through enhanced 
dialogue between the five Central Asian states and organises competence 
building in the struggle against organised crime, drug trafficking, and 
environmental degradation. The UNDP has also set up measures to fight 
against poverty (micro-finance, etc.), against the HIV Aids epidemic, 
against malnutrition, and for the protect i o n  of  g r o u p s  a t r i s k  ( m i g r an t s ,  
prisoners, prostitutes). The UN agency also has a large ecological 
programme providing education in environmental issues, as well as help in 
natural risk prevention and in safeguarding biodiversity in fragile areas 
(deserts and mountains), the establishment of protected zones, and the 
promotion of renewable energies, etc. The UNDP works in partnership 
with the national governments and is therefore focused on specific topics in 
accordance with the requests of the beneficiary states.89  
NATO activity in Central Asia is relatively sparse. However, the five 
states belong to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and to the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP). NATO’s aim in Central Asia is not to prepare 
states for membership but to keep the lines of communication open with 
the local governments by involving them as much as possible in activities 
such as common planning, joint exercises, and information exchanges. The 
organisation also offers educational facilities, with some Central Asian 
officers trained at the NATO Defence College and the NATO School. The 
PfP is officially not concerned about the democratisation of the Central 
Asian regimes, but foremost about defence cooperation. Some of its 
objectives, however, such as the reform of civil-military relations and the 
safeguarding of democratic control of armed forces are however discussed 
with Central Asian states, although mostly in multilateral settings within 
the PfP.90 Cooperation in relation to the war in Afghanistan, and the use of 
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military bases, is of key importance. Apart from the American base in 
Manas, NATO member states have three other military bases in the region 
geared to supplying operations in Afghanistan: Germany in Termez, France 
in Dushanbe, and the US at Kuliab. Kazakhstan is the most advanced in 
terms of cooperation with NATO: it has an IPAP which involves legislative 
reforms and a greater democratic opening up in defence management. It is 
the only country in the region to have created a joint intervention force 
with NATO troops under a UN mandate, Kazbrig. It participates in the 
Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism, which foresees the sharing of 
information with NATO about counter-terrorism and border security. And 
it also hosts the annual joint counter-terrorist exercise “Steppe Eagle”.91 In 
years to come, Kazakhstan hopes to officially become the first Central 
Asian state with NATO interoperability. Relations with Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan are more limited, in great part due to the weakness of their 
national armies. Relations were almost completely cut off with Uzbekistan 
after Andijan but have partly resumed since 2007, while relations with 
Turkmenistan are very thin.  
The Asian Development Bank (ADB), very present in Central Asia, 
specialises in supporting schemes relating to transport, trade, and energy, 
in particular via the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) 
programme, whose secretariat is provided by the ADB, and is supported by 
six multilateral institutions: ADB, EBRD, IMF, UNDP, the Islamic Bank of 
Development, and the World Bank. Inclusion of the EU was considered at 
one stage but not pursued, but this could be reconsidered now in the light 
of its Central Asia strategy and the mandate given to the European 
Investment Bank. CAREC has developed a comprehensive set of road and 
rail transport corridors, and has organised a strong consortium of 
international financial institutions to co-finance multi-billion dollar 
infrastructural investments, the largest part of which cross Kazakhstan. 
Kazakhstan works in partnership with the ADB in other areas, including 
support to the private sector, sustainable development projects, and 
improving the supply of drinkable water in rural areas. Uzbekistan has 
been granted a total of $1.2 billion in loans and $37 million in technical 
assistance, principally in the education sector (publishing of textbooks), 
agriculture (restoring of irrigation networks), and in the transport sector 
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(principally railways). Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are among the ADB’s 
largest aid recipients and enjoy special loan conditions given their weak 
income levels. The aid to Kyrgyzstan is principally earmarked for the 
agricultural, educational, and transport sectors, with the greatest part of 
ADB assistance going to the latter. Tajikistan, in addition, has been the 
beneficiary of more traditional programmes, namely a post-conflict 
portfolio centred on poverty reduction and the repairing of infrastructure 
destroyed during the civil war.92 Turkmenistan is the country that is least 
involved in the ADB and, in 2009, had not yet been given a specific 
programme, even if several technical assistance programmes have been 
realized, in particular the coordination of a study for the Turkmenistan–
Afghanistan–Pakistan–India Gas Pipeline project. 
The EBRD is the largest investor outside the oil and gas sector in 
Kazakhstan. The Bank focuses on promoting domestic and foreign 
investment, anti-money laundering schemes, supporting the financial 
sector, small and medium-sized enterprises, and public sector 
infrastructure. The EBRD supports the government’s efforts to improve the 
investment climate and to diversify the economic structure, and cooperates 
with the state sovereign wealth fund, Samruk-Kazyna, to achieve corporate 
governance and operational improvements. It aims to promote transparent 
practices and fight corruption to improve the business environment. In 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the EBRD is helping to ensure that the private 
sector plays a prominent role in the economic development by focusing on 
small and medium-sized enterprises and strengthening the banking sector. 
In Dushanbe, recent EBRD loans have also assisted in road rehabilitation 
and construction. Relations are less developed with Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan. With Ashgabat, the EBRD is trying to develop the local private 
sector and to dialogue with the government on issues such as the need to 
unify the dual exchange rate, to restructure the Foreign Exchange Reserve 
Fund, and to improve the provision of economic data. With Tashkent, the 
EBRD maintains continuous policy dialogue and encourages economic 
reforms and institution-building, but has stopped intervention in cotton-
related projects due to malpractices in this sector (child labour).93 
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The World Bank (IBRD) has very different level of interaction with 
the Central Asian states. In Kazakhstan, the Country Partnership Strategy 
does not focus on financing but on helping the country build a modern, 
rapidly growing and diversified economy. In Kyrgyzstan, the World Bank 
works with the Asian Development Bank, the Swiss Development 
Cooperation, Germany, the UK Department for International Development, 
the EU and the United Nations Agencies on a core strategy to support the 
Kyrgyz’s development agenda to improve the environment for business 
and economic growth and the quality of access to basic services (health, 
education, water and sanitation). In Tajikistan, the World Bank 
concentrates on three goals: improving business opportunities in rural and 
urban areas; enhancing the quality of the human capital; and exploiting the 
country’s hydropower potential. As for other international actors, relations 
with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are more difficult. In 2007, Ashgabat 
and the World Bank renewed their dialogue after many years of cold 
relations. The Bank has since been supplying technical assistance for anti-
money laundering schemes, the countering the financing of terrorism, 
human pandemic preparedness, the modernising the hydro-meteorological 
services, revenue management, and statistical capacity building. In 
Uzbekistan, the previous framework for policy dialogue proved largely 
ineffective but Tashkent and the World Bank have reached a consensus on 
the need to address poverty reduction and persistent socio-economic 
inequalities.94 
Lastly, the role of some other significant external actors should be 
noted, including Switzerland, which has a significant and successful 
engagement in Central Asia, and some international non-governmental 
actors, in particular the Open Society Institute (OSI), which is influential 
through local offices in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan where it 
focuses on civil society, education, human rights and governance 
programmes. Though not present in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, OSI 
closely monitors developments and works through advocacy campaigns. 
The Aga Khan Foundation for Development (AKDN) is another non-
governmental actor in Central Asia that is based on the principle of 
solidarity of the Ismaili community, but extends its operations far more 
widely in poor countries of Muslim culture. Some political circles in 
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Central Asia are quite concerned about the growing presence of the Aga 
Khan Foundation, seeing it as potential political competition, but they all 
collaborate with it nevertheless. The foundation has three main priorities: 
long-term economic development, the improvement of social 
infrastructure, in particular in the sectors of tourism and health, and 
providing support to cultural and educational activities. The AKDN is 
focused on the reduction of poverty through development. It endorses a 
partnership between the state and the private sector and considers that the 
absence of links between the government, civil society and the business 
sector forms a major obstacle to the development of the regions concerned. 
It promotes an ideology of private entrepreneurship that encourages 
isolated and impoverished communities to participate in their own 
development. Firmly established in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, less so in 
Kazakhstan, it supports extremely varied projects ranging from energy 
autonomy (hydroelectric stations in the Pamir) and mobile telephony, to 
the granting micro-credits for the diversification of agricultural production 
and breeding, support for mountainous communities, the promotion of 
tourism and cultural riches, and the co-financing of regional cooperation 
projects (bridges between Tajikistan and Afghanistan), etc.95 Its ambitious 
plan to set up a University of Central Asia, with campuses in three states, 
seems to encounter delays in getting off the ground.  
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4.  THE EUROPEAN UNION 
IN CENTRAL ASIA 
4.1  Presence of the EU and member states since independence 
The EU member states recognised the independence of the five Central 
Asian states without delay in 1992, and later opened negotiations to place 
its bilateral relations with each state in the framework of Partnership and 
Association Agreements (PCAs). Programmes of technical assistance 
(Tacis) were opened with all five states at an early stage. Progress in 
completing the PCA agreements has been long and chequered, with 
disruptive political developments in several instances. In the cases of 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan the PCAs entered into force after 
ratification in 1999. However the PCA with Uzbekistan was partly 
suspended by the EU in 2005 in response to the Andijan events, and this 
was only lifted in 2008. The PCA with Tajikistan was signed only in 2004, 
essentially because of the state of civil war that had prevailed during much 
of the previous decade, and was finally ratified in September 2009. The 
PCA with Turkmenistan was signed in 1998, but ratification has been not 
been competed on the EU side by two member states (France and UK) 
because of the political nature of the regime, but completion is expected in 
2010.  
In general the PCAs with the Central Asian states follow a similar 
model, with agreement to extend to each other most-favoured nation 
(MFN) treatment for trade tariffs. The EU also offers tariff preferences 
under the General System of Preferences (GSP) regime. The PCAs also set 
out a loose commitment for the Central Asian states to pursue regulatory 
approximation on EU standards, which has however seen a very thin 
application in practice. The agreements also provide for regular bilateral 
meetings at the foreign minister level in Cooperation Councils, and at 
senior official level in various sectoral committees and sub-committees. In 
the case of Kazakhstan it is now envisaged in the context of the Central 
Asia strategy to negotiate a new more advanced framework agreement, 
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being negotiated with Ukraine in the context of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. Kazakhstan is thus being treated as front-runner of 
the states of the region.  
The diplomatic presence of the EU member states sees embassies in 
all five central Asian capitals only from Germany and France, with the UK 
present in four. Eighteen member states have embassies in Kazakhstan, and 
ten in Uzbekistan, with many of these ambassadors having multiple 
accreditation in other Central Asian states. The nine member states that 
have no embassies in the region are generally represented by ambassadors 
accredited with the Central Asia states but resident in their home capitals.  
The Commission has so far only a fully fledged Delegation in 
Kazakhstan. It has Delegations also in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, but the 
position of Head of Delegation and Ambassador had up to the end of 2009 
been assumed by the Head of Delegation to Kazakhstan, with only chargés 
d’affaires and other staff resident. By early 2010 the missions to Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan were in the course of being upgraded, with resident Heads 
of Delegation/Ambassadors having been appointed. In Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan the Commission is represented only indirectly by so-called 
‘Europa Houses’, which are staffed by contracted consultants and lack full 
diplomatic status and political responsibilities. It is expected that a 
Delegation in Tashkent will be established in a not distant future, whereas 
the opening of a Delegation in Turkmenistan will have to follow later 
depending on budget priorities. 
The European Commission’s technical assistance and other aid 
programmes are the largest compared to the actions of the member states 
(for detail see section 4.3 below). The numbers of projects in Table 10 show 
that of projects currently in operation or planned the Commission accounts 
for somewhat more than all the actions of the member states together (data 
on the total monetary value of member state programmes is not available). 
Moreover some of the relatively important contributions by member states 
are being ended. The Swedish SIDA is withdrawing from the region and 
the UK’s DFID agency is intending to withdraw after the end of its current 
multi-year programme. However Finland starts a new programme of 
development projects covering East Europe and Central Asia, with €64 
million committed for this wider region for 2009-2013 (figures for Central 
Asia alone not available). On the other hand there are some interesting 
initiatives by new member states. The most striking is a scheme for 
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many as 800 scholarships, reaching out in particular to the significant 
Polish diaspora in the region, especially in Kazakhstan. 
Table 9. Diplomatic representation of the EU in Central Asia as of 2009 
Country 
 
Representation 
KZ KG  UZ  TJ  TR 
 
 
European 
Commission 
* 
Delegation 
with chargé 
d’affaires, 
currently 
being 
upgraded 
Europa 
House 
Delegation 
with chargé 
d’affaires, 
currently 
being 
upgraded 
Europa 
House 
Austria  *      
Belgium  *      
Bulgaria  *   *     
Czech Republic  *   *     
Finland  *      
France  * *  *  *  * 
Germany  * *  *  *  * 
Greece  *      
Hungary  *      
Italy  *   *     
Latvia  *   *     
Lithuania  *      * 
Netherlands  *      
Poland  *   *    * 
Romania  *   *    * 
Slovakia  *   *     
Spain  *      
UK  *   *  *  * 
Without embassies 
Cyprus, Denmark, 
Estonia, Ireland, 
Malta, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Slovenia, 
Sweden.  
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Among the contributions of the member states the operations of 
Germany in all five states are by far the most substantial. Germany’s 
commitment dates back to the reunification of Germany and the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, when Chancellor Kohl undertook to launch 
a substantial programme of aid to the transition process in all former Soviet 
republics. In the case of Central Asia there was also an historic ethnic 
German diaspora in the region, many of whom subsequently have 
migrated to Germany. With Embassies in all five countries and additional 
offices of the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), the German 
Development Service (DED) and the German Development Bank (KfW) in 
most Central Asian countries, it employs more staff in the region than the 
EU. German assistance amounts to around €60 million a year,96 which 
amounts to about two-thirds of the annual expenditures of the Commission 
planned for 2007 to 2013. Close co-operation between the German 
embassies and agencies and the EU presence is therefore a must if the EU 
and its member states’ efforts are to be seen as a coherent whole.  
The war in Afghanistan has impacted on the presence in Central Asia 
of some member states. Germany has located in the Uzbek town of Termez, 
which lies on the frontier with Afghanistan, its logistic hub for supplying 
its troops in Afghanistan. France has used the airport of Dushanbe in 
Tajikistan as its air base for operations in Afghanistan, including for some 
time the basing there of a squadron of fighter-bombers (the base is 
currently used only for logistic supplies).  
It is generally recognized that the Commission’s staffing in its 
Delegations is overstretched in relation to the magnitude of the operations 
they are charged to manage, and by comparison with most member state 
embassies. The staff-budget ratios in the member states’ embassies are 
probably of the order of at least twice as high, as also in the case of USAID 
offices in the region. With the passing of the Lisbon Treaty the 
Commission’s Delegations will be converted into European Union 
Delegations of the European External Action Service (EEAS), mandated 
therefore to represent the entirety of EU competences. This will require 
expansion of their staffing on political questions, notwithstanding the 
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stated resolve of the Council to give birth to the new External Action 
Service on a budget-neutral basis.  
Table 10. Total number of projects in Central Asia by country and by EU member 
state underway or planned in 2008 
 Number of projects by CA country  Total by 
member state 
Member state 
KG KZ TJ  TR  UZ  
D  20 16 16 11 24 87 
UK  3 7 5 8 7 30 
Nl  4 4 4 5 4 21 
Fl  4 3 5 4 3 19 
Fr  3 7 2 1 4 17 
Sw  8 0 7 1 1 17 
It  3 2 3 3 3 14 
Irl  3 2 3 2 2 12 
At  4 1 2 1 2 10 
Cz  3 2 1 1 1 8 
Lat  3 1 1 1 1 7 
Cy  1 1 1 0 1 4 
Ro  0 1 1 1 1 4 
Sk  1 3 0 0 0 4 
Lx  0 1 0 0 1 2 
Bg  0 1 0 0 0 1 
Be  0 1 0 0 0 1 
Lit  0 1 0 0 0 1 
Pl  0 1 0 0 0 1 
Pt  0 1 0 0 0 1 
Total by 
member states 
60 56 51 39 55 261 
European 
Commission 
75    64 64 50 50 303 
Source: Based on EU strategy documents. 
With the launch of the Central Asia strategy the Commission’s aid 
programmes are programmed to double in amount to €719 million for the 
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future External Action Service have the predominant role in executing the 
Central Asia strategy, with only Germany having a substantial operational 
presence in all five states of the region. The division of labour between the 
EU and its member states is thus quite different to major capitals such as 
Washington, Moscow and Beijing where most or all member states have 
full diplomatic presence. This in turn means that for the credibility of the 
Central Asia strategy it is vital to complete a full set of five adequately 
staffed Delegations.  
Given the thin or zero representation of many member states in much 
of the region, taken together with the imminent creation of the External 
Action Service, the scene is set for considering initiatives to arrange 
common services for the EU as a whole in the future EU Delegations. The 
easiest development would be to have the Delegations supply political 
intelligence systematically to all 27 member states as well as the EU 
institutions. Over time this could lead to an increasing reliance on the EU 
for such services, with more member states cutting down on duplicative 
reporting. Another field would be for consular services. This could see the 
EU delegations provide certain consular protection services to EU citizens. 
A more fundamental and logical development would be a common service 
to issue Schengen visas to visit all such member states, either initially for 
member states without consulates or for the whole of the Schengen area. 
There is already results a patchwork of ad hoc cooperative arrangements in 
Central Asia, with for example the German and French consulates also each 
issuing visas also for a few other Schengen states on an ad hoc basis. The 
logic of the Schengen area, with no frontier checks between member states 
and the availability of the Schengen Information System (negative visa list 
of high risk individuals, illegal migrants, criminals, suspected terrorists), 
makes common services for the issuance of visas a natural next step. 
Central Asia could be a plausible region for a first experimental trial of 
common visa services located in the EU Delegations. This would be a step 
of more than administrative advantage, and would help boost the image of 
the EU quite noticeably.  
These needs for more adequate representation are amplified by the 
poor level of knowledge of the European Union in the region. We heard 
regularly the comment that officials in the five capitals have difficulty in 
understanding what the EU is, which is understandable given the poverty 
of information sources available in these countries in locally used 
languages and the complexity of the EU as a political institution. Also 
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EU relations with Central Asia. For example the East European and South 
Mediterranean neighbourhood relationships are both now seeing a 
technically advanced electronic information service (www.enpi-info.eu), 
available in the East in both English and Russian. Such information efforts 
should complement reforms in aid management procedures to make them 
more user-friendly (see further below).  
Evaluation: The upgrading of the EU’s own diplomatic presence, and 
its staffing for aid operations, are necessary steps for the effectiveness and 
credibility of the Central Asia strategy. This is planned but is far from 
completed. Arrangements for some common consular services should be 
developed, including most importantly an experimental innovation for 
common visa services for Schengen states, located in the EU Delegations. A 
first-class electronic information service about the EU and its actions in 
Central Asia, in English and Russian, is called for, together with reform of 
aid management procedures (see further below).  
4.2  The EU Central Asia strategy since 2007 
The EU’s increasing interest in Central Asia was first seen in the 
appointment in June 2005 of the first Special Representative for the region, 
with the position held since October 2006 by Ambassador Pierre Morel. 
Already in the early autumn of 2005 the German foreign ministry and the 
EU institutions began preparing for the strategy, and Germany’s interest in 
promoting the topic was also heightened by its impending EU Presidency 
in the first half of 2007. The proposed strategy was duly presented by 
Germany to the EU Council in June 2007, and adopted at summit level by 
the European Council in July 2007.97 The political atmosphere surrounding 
its adoption was heavily influenced by three entirely separate factors: the 
logistics of supplies for the ongoing war in Afghanistan, the Andijan 
uprising in Uzbekistan May 2005, and concern for the diversification of 
energy supplies following the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of January 2006.  
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4.2.1  Political dialogue 
There have already been regular annual meetings bilaterally at foreign 
minister level in the framework of the PCAs, where these have entered into 
force. Since the start of the Central Asia strategy the main innovation has 
been the holding of regional-multilateral meetings at foreign minister level 
between the five Central Asia states and the EU Troika. The first such event 
was in September 2008 in Paris and focused on security issues. The second 
was in Brussels in September 2009 in Brussels, when a wider agenda was 
discussed, including regional security issues, energy, water, environment 
and the global economic and financial crisis. The EBRD and EIB were also 
represented, which should facilitate the integration of financing with policy 
directions decided by ministers. The form of regular annual regional-
multilateral meetings seems to have become established.  
The EU’s Special Representative, Ambassador Pierre Morel, has been 
regularly present in the region, holding consultations up to the highest 
level. His work is in general highly appreciated in EU diplomatic circles 
and the foreign ministries of the Central Asian states. He has also been 
characterised as a necessary ‘lightening conductor’ in dealing with sensitive 
matters such as the EU sanctions on Uzbekistan and the big regional water-
hydro power questions. Human rights organisations in the region regret, 
however, that they have not been able to hold consultations with him on 
the occasion of his visits to the governments, and that he positioned himself 
so clearly in favour of lifting the Uzbek sanctions even though the EU did 
not get its conditions accepted. Another concern is that Ambassador Morel 
has in the last year also been charged with the Georgia peace process, 
diluting his work in Central Asia.  
Inter-cultural dialogue was announced as a topic in the 2007 strategy 
document, but little appears to have been done so far. There could be 
useful political dialogue on Islamist movements and parties, and this may 
start soon in the case of Tajikistan. The EU and its Mediterranean 
neighbours have ongoing concern for the political participation of 
moderate Islamist parties, the absence of which can be viewed as a factor 
aggravating the problem of radical Islam in Central Asia as in the Arab 
world. 
Evaluation: the process of political dialogue has been established, but 
has not got beyond rather general discussions and does not yet have a 
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4.2.2  Human rights and democracy 
One of the first results of the Central Asia strategy has been the 
establishment of a highly structured Human Rights Dialogue process, with 
annual meetings at official level, with, in principle, civil society seminars in 
between at which human rights lawyers and NGOs from the Central Asian 
states and the EU meet together to prepare detailed materials. The process 
has now been underway for two yearly cycles in 2008 and 2009. There have 
been two official rounds of dialogue, and one so far of the civil society 
seminars. There is now a standard template for this activity, although it 
only fully works for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, with problems 
in the case of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to which we return in a 
moment. The official dialogue sessions involve on the EU side the human 
rights officials of the Commission and the Council Presidency and 
Secretariat, and on the Central Asian side officials from relevant 
departments such as ministries of the interior and justice.  
There is a standard agenda template, which goes through recent and 
current developments in the human rights situation in the Central Asia 
state, a list of key topics such as the judicial system, penal system, civil 
rights and freedoms, cooperation with relevant international organisations, 
cooperation projects supported by the EU, and finally lists of individual 
cases of concern (e.g. human rights defenders subject to detention or 
imprisonment without due legal process). As regards individual cases the 
EU side typically hands over to the Central Asian side a short document 
identifying around five cases and presenting the reasons for the EU’s 
concern. The EU side meets with human rights activists the day before the 
official dialogue sessions when these are held in the Central Asian state.  
The civil society seminars assemble large gatherings in the cases of 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan of around one hundred human 
rights activists and NGOs and legal experts, with academic and NGO 
counterparts from the EU. The example of the Kazakhstan civil society 
seminar in July 2009 in Almaty may be described more precisely to 
illustrate the nature of the activity. The seminar assembled around 100 
participants for two days, under the title “Judicial System and Places of 
Detention: towards European Standards”, producing jointly many pages of 
detailed recommendations on the independence of the judiciary, court 
efficiency, jury trial, the execution of court decisions, conditions of penal 
detention, and the regulation of administrative responsibility. The agenda 
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officials. The subject matter was mostly about rather technical matters of 
legal processes, and by agreement with the Kazakh authorities avoided 
debate on individual cases. While there was an official EU presence in the 
seminar, there was no official Kazakh participation. However the 
Commission subsequently tabled the recommendations at the official 
dialogue that followed in October 2009. The Kyrgyz and Tajik civil society 
seminars held in March and July 2009 respectively had comparable civil 
society participation, but also (unlike the Kazakh case) saw participation by 
senior officials of these two countries. The Kyrgyz seminar concentrated on 
prisoners’ and children’s rights; the Tajik forum on the right to fair trial and 
independence of the judiciary.  
The detailed recommendations and conference reports, in English 
and Russian, are in principle public documents, and we give our own 
EUCAM internet links to them here in footnote,98 since the documents do 
not yet seem to be available on the websites of the Commission and its 
Delegations, which is disappointing. A year-by-year monitoring of results 
observed in relation to the recommendations, with substantial continuity in 
the experts involved, could become a useful benchmarking mechanism to 
the official human rights dialogue.  
This standard template of official and civil society dialogue seems to 
be functioning in a relatively satisfactory manner in the cases of 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In these three states there is at least 
some open space for civil society in the human rights field. Although the 
official sessions are not open, we hear largely consistent reports that the 
dialogue process is engaged in detail, with both sides exchanging seriously 
prepared positions in a largely constructive atmosphere. But the limits of 
the process are also clear: it is a process of dialogue and not one of 
negotiation. However, it could be given more structured substance by 
                                                      
98 Final report from the 1st EU – Kazakhstan civil society seminar on Judicial 
System and Places of Detention: Towards the European Standards 
(http://www.eucentralasia.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/CS_seminars__final_repor
ts/eu_kazakhstan_seminar_final_report_sept_2009_en.pdf).  
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Trail and the Independence of the Judiciary 
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exploiting the benchmarking potential of the recommendations coming out 
of the civil society seminars.  
The cases of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are much more difficult. 
These are among the most repressed states in the world, with no open 
space for civil society or NGOs to work on human rights issues. The official 
human rights dialogues with these two countries follow the same formal 
template. However, the tone of the sessions is by all accounts difficult, 
described as ‘evasive’ on the side of Turkmenistan, and ‘aggressive’ on the 
side of Uzbekistan. In particular the Uzbek side has insisted that the 
dialogue be a symmetrical one, with a place on the agenda for discussion 
on the human rights situation in the EU, leading to various criticisms of EU 
treatment of various minorities (e.g. Russian-speakers in the Baltic states) 
and of Islamophobia in Europe. The pressure for symmetry in the dialogue 
process should be acceptable as a matter of principle, and explanations of 
how the EU, member states and the European Court of Human Rights 
address problem cases within the EU could only be beneficial. 
In the case of Turkmenistan there has been no civil society seminar, 
because there is no independent civil society. There is an ‘Institute for 
Democracy and Human Rights’ in Ashgabad, but this is a government 
agency which is the main Turkmen representative in the official dialogue. 
In the case of Uzbekistan there was one civil society seminar, at which the 
Uzbek side was represented only by GONGOs (government organised 
NGOs). A more recent attempt to organise a second meeting encountered 
such difficulties and obstacles from the Uzbek side that the process was 
abandoned.  
The EU side says that the process is still at an early stage, and in 
particular that the building of trust between the parties is somewhat fragile. 
The EU representatives are of the opinion that only a rather soft approach 
is possible if the process is not to be aborted, and that there has to develop 
a sense of common purpose. Is such activity contributing to the cause of 
improving human rights in these two states, or is it merely a pretence on 
both sides to be engaging in the intended activity? European diplomats in 
these capitals say that at present the process is moving forward as far as is 
feasible. To push harder with benchmarking or conditionalities would, in 
this view, abort the process. But the risk here is not just that of minimal 
impact but of a counterproductive effect, through appearing to legitimize 
activities that are no more than public relations efforts by the repressive 
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The interaction between the official dialogue and the civil society seminars 
could be strengthened, for example. In particular, the civil society seminars 
could be tasked with a continuous monitoring of developments, the 
establishment of benchmarks for this purpose, and the publication of their 
analyses. 
In October 2009 the EU closed the episode of sanctions against 
Uzbekistan in response to the brutality of the suppression of the Andjian 
uprising in 2005 (the details of which are given in Box 1). There have been 
no comparable cases since then in any Central Asia state, even if some of 
the regimes are extremely repressive. The effectiveness of the Andijan 
sanctions, and the wisdom of lifting them, is contested. Some observers of 
Uzbekistan judge that the sanctions served their purpose in inflicting 
reputational damage on the regime internationally, and even if this led to 
no evident reforms, the likelihood of a repeat of atrocities at this level may 
have been reduced. Others criticise the lifting of the sanctions on the 
grounds that the announced conditions for this were not met, and which 
therefore has given the wrong message to the regimes of Central Asia. 
While these are matters of conflicting judgements, the EU has lessons to be 
taken on board. The first of these is that if the EU is to engage in such 
measures it has to be disciplined and unified. Naturally this is a topic for a 
range of political positions in democracies such as the EU, but when the 
decision is made it has to be loyally backed by all, otherwise the operation 
and the EU itself is discredited.  
The EU will surely continue to be confronted with specific cases of 
human rights abuse requiring urgent response outside the regular annual 
cycle of the Human Rights Dialogue. A very recent example has been the 
case of Evgeniy Zhovtis, a Kazakh human rights defender, which was the 
subject of an official EU foreign ministers’ statement of concern and 
disappointment at the OSCE, a few days before Kazakhstan acceded to the 
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Box 1. EU sanctions on Uzbekistan after Andijan 
After the massacre of over 700 protestors in May 2005 in the city of Andijan, the 
EU requested Tashkent to accept an international investigating commission. As 
President Karimov refused, in November 2005, the EU imposed a three-tier 
sanction package against Uzbekistan:* a visa ban against twelve Uzbek officials 
who had direct responsibility for the killings; an embargo on European arms 
sales; the cessation of high-level bilateral relations, which meant a de facto 
partial suspension of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with 
that country. The Council also laid out benchmarks for those measures to be 
reviewed, the clearest among which was the Uzbek government’s cooperation 
with “any independent, international rapporteur appointed to investigate the 
disturbances in Andijan”. That was the first time that the EU had partially 
suspended a PCA with a partner country. 
The sanctions were well received among human rights defenders, all the 
more so since the European Union was the only regional body that reacted so 
strongly. The Bush administration was very careful not to follow the European 
example and Russia later signed a new defence agreement to help secure 
Karimov’s regime in case of internal troubles.  
Nevertheless, not all the EU member states were behind this common 
position. Discussions in the Council were robust each time the measures came 
u p  f o r  r e n e w a l  b e t w e e n  c o u n t r i e s ,  l e d  b y  G e r m a n y ,  w h o  w a n t e d  t o  d r o p  
sanctions altogether and those, led by the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK,  
wanting to maintain them. The Council unwound the sanctions step by step. 
- November 2006, lifting of partial suspension of PCA, arms embargo renewed. 
- May 2007, four officials off the visa ban list.  
- November 2007, visa ban suspended.  
- November 2008, visa ban ended  
- October 2009, arms embargo lifted. 
Each step was accompanied by language along the lines “welcoming 
progress achieved in Uzbekistan with regard to respect for the rule of law and 
protection of human rights,” although the Commission had a hard time 
reporting on any real progress in its human rights dialogue with Tashkent. None 
of the steps towards easing the sanctions were really matched by serious steps 
from Tashkent, beyond the freeing of a few human rights defenders from Uzbek 
jails. In particular Tashkent never acted on the European demand for an 
independent investigation into the Andijan events. Uzbek diplomacy sought to 
convince the EU that sanctions would not work. These efforts betrayed 
Karimov’s deep annoyance with the European sanctions.  
____________________ 
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For the EU, human rights and democracy are part of a single 
normative continuum. In the present state of affairs in Central Asia, 
however, effective democracy is nowhere on the agenda. As elsewhere in 
regions dominated by authoritarian regimes, North Africa for example, the 
EU is not currently pursuing any significant democracy promotion agenda. 
The accent is on human rights and aspects of ‘governance’ including the 
rule of law. The EU seems to be saying that the improvement of human 
rights is a practical matter to be pursued ahead of, and maybe many years 
ahead of, any notional timetable for political reforms bringing in pluralistic 
democracy. In general the promotion of democracy worldwide is 
experiencing a crisis of confidence over what can effectively be done, 
although for the near European neighbourhood European standards are 
understood to be and remain the normative reference. There is a range of 
views between those who consider that human rights situations can be 
improved to a rather acceptable quality, even under authoritarian regimes 
(in a new version of the ‘enlightenment’), and those who would argue that 
democracy, civil liberties and human rights are a package that cannot be 
taken apart and pursued selectively with wide sequencing margins 
between the components. Similarly, there is a range of views between those 
who would advocate parallel economic and political liberalisation 
processes, and those who see the need for a long period of gradual 
economic and social advance before democracy can become an effective 
form of government. In any case, in Central Asia it seems clear that there is 
currently no movement towards political democracy, with contrary 
movements seeing the contraction of civil liberties, for example in 
Kyrgyzstan, and with the post-Niyazov succession in Turkmenistan failing 
to bring a significant advance in civil liberties. 
Evaluation: The establishment of the Human Rights Dialogue with all 
five Central Asian states is one of the innovations of the Central Asia 
strategy, which involves civil society as well official meetings. For 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan the process is engaged with 
seriously structured and prepared agendas, including detailed reviews of 
human rights situations and the tabling by the EU of individual cases of 
greatest concern. The process is one of dialogue, however, not of 
negotiation, and results are not visible in the short run. There is a danger of 
the process falling into an inconsequential routine. For this to be avoided 
we advocate that the EU raise the bar carefully, for example by inviting the 
civil society seminars to draw up benchmarks for monitoring progress, and 
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level of each individual state. We regard the use of sanctions, as seen in the 
Andijan episode, as being a necessary last recourse in the event of extreme 
circumstances, but the EU has its lessons to be learned about the necessity 
for manifest unity of purpose in such cases.  
4.2.3  Rule of law 
The Rule of Law Initiative is one of the regional priority projects of the 
Central Asia strategy, intended to “support ongoing modernization of the 
legal sector, as part of a more comprehensive strategy to foster stability, 
prosperity and respect for human rights”.99 While the EU lacks an active 
democratisation agenda for the region, the current work on rule of law – 
which is more acceptable to the Central Asian authorities – is important as 
an intertwined element of EU engagement in good governance and human 
rights. The initiative proceeds at two levels, with high-level political 
dialogue and specific technical assistance programmes.100 The official 
launch event was a ministerial conference in Brussels in November 2008, 
which agreed to hold two subsequent conferences, which have now been 
held in 2009, with one in Bishkek organised by Germany and the other in 
Tashkent organised by France. While the work at the regional level seeks to 
address similar problems shared by the five states, the state-specific activity 
is adapted to the different stages of development of the legal systems of 
each country. The modernisation of legal systems is relatively more 
advanced in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In these two states and 
Uzbekistan the emphasis is on reform of the judicial courts, in 
Turkmenistan on training, and in Tajikistan on penal reforms.  
The initiative builds on a number of pre-existing projects, notably by 
the German GTZ agency, which has emphasised trade and commercial law, 
and the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe which addresses 
issues of constitutional law. Both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have 
observer status with the Venice Commission. The work of the Venice 
Commission in the context of the Rule of Law initiative is now launched, 
and is being co-funded by France, Germany and the European 
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Commission. Other member states have been supporting various bilateral 
projects in the broad rule of law domain. 
It is still too early to allow an evaluation of results. It should in 
principle lead to a clearer strategy for the many projects and sub-projects in 
this field, and better synergies in the results. But there should be no 
illusions over how challenging the task is when the authoritarian 
leaderships of all five states control their judicial institutions as part of the 
single power structure. Whether it is going to be possible to see a higher 
degree of independence develop for the legal system is not clear. Some 
examples exist in other countries where the judiciary maintains its 
independence in an authoritarian state; the case of Egypt comes to mind. 
On the other hand it has to be noted that Uzbekistan in December 2008 
required all lawyers to apply to be re-qualified for the bar in an obvious bid 
to secure their political compliance.  
The rule of law initiative is notable as an example of where two 
member states, France and Germany, co-fund with the Commission and 
take on responsibility for executing a project that is explicitly part of the EU 
strategy, rather than running their bilateral programmes. This is not such a 
minor administrative point as it might seem. The quest for getting 
synergies out of the combined efforts of the EU and its member states is 
important for the effectiveness and credibility of the EU’s external actions, 
serving to counter the image of the member states and the EU being often 
out of step with each other. In addition, with the EU institutions generally 
overstretched with their operational commitments, one can welcome this 
mobilisation of the extra diplomatic convening capacity of the member 
states.  
Evaluation: While it is too early to evaluate the initiative, a recent 
study concludes with a call for such work to be sustained over a long-term 
period, since short-term results cannot be expected, and for the formulation 
of clear and practical benchmarks to evaluate progress, since such 
benchmarks are so far absent from the EU documents.101 The full 
development of the regional EU Initiative on Rule of Law is important as a 
values-driven commitment to the region, especially taking the absence of 
an active democratisation agenda into account. Cooperation and assistance 
in this field of normative EU principles should be geared at promoting rule 
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of law as closely intertwined with good governance and human rights. The 
mobilisation of member states (France and Germany) in support of an 
element in the common strategy is to be welcomed. 
4.2.4  Education 
The state of education systems in Central Asia is generally highly 
problematic, with a widespread collapse of funding at all levels; contraction 
of secondary education with closure of vocational schools; falling standards 
of literacy in schools and widespread corruption in higher education 
(buying of access and even of degrees). But there is also a wide range of 
performance between the states of the region, ranging from the former 
president of Turkmenistan’s bizarre policies of curtailing schooling, and in 
the case of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan the closure of schools in winter when 
electricity supplies fail, whereas Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are making 
major investments in the education infrastructure. For example, 
Kazakhstan now invests $500 million in a new technical university in 
Astana, which will teach in English and employ foreign professors. There 
are some important education reforms underway, with both Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan converging on the Bologna system for the structuring of 
Baccalaureat-BA-MA-PhD studies, which is necessary inter alia for 
international recognition.  
The Education Initiative, announced as one of the strategy’s 
priorities, has two main dimensions: a policy dialogue called the EU-
Central Asia Education Platform, and operational programmes including 
Tempus, Erasmus Mundus, the Bologna Process, vocational education 
supported by the European Training Foundation, CAREN and various 
bilateral initiatives of member states.  
These activities are described and evaluated in some detail in a 
supporting Working Paper.102 The Education Platform is planned to have a 
series of regional meetings at both high-level and technical working 
groups, and national level dialogues. These meetings have begun to take 
place, but it is not yet evident whether the process is becoming meaningful 
in practical terms. The operational activities are largely continuing pre-
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existing projects, with a rebranding under the Education Initiative label. 
The Bologna Process and Tempus can be seen as complementary activities, 
with the former providing the strategic structure for higher education 
reform, whereas Tempus provided expertise for practical curriculum 
reform at the university level. The Tempus has a long experience behind it, 
and seems to be appreciated as an instrument basically devoted to 
curriculum reform, for which there is a manifest need.  
The Erasmus Mundus facility is new to the Central Asian region since 
2007. The three years 2007-9 have seen the organisation of six consortia 
(‘lots’), three led by the Eindhoven University of Technology and three by 
the Erasmushogeschool of Brussels (we interviewed the latter). Each 
consortium consists of about 8 EU universities and 6-10 Central Asian 
universities. The numbers of Central Asian universities participating have 
so far been 26 from Kazakhstan, 14 from Uzbekistan, 6 from Kygyzstan and 
4 from Tajikistan, and (reflecting its very closed political order) only 1 from 
Turkmenistan. The essence of Erasmus Mundus is mobility exchanges, with 
602 individuals programmed under the six consortia to spend periods of 
usually around one year (actually between 6 months and in some cases 3 
years). Of the total number of individuals mobilised, three-quarters are 
Central Asians spending time in the EU, and one quarter Europeans in 
Central Asia. An interesting feature is that for each of the six consortia a 
Turkish university has been co-opted on the European side, since most 
Central Asian students can easily achieve good Turkish language skills. 
Otherwise almost all of the EU universities teach in English, for which the 
language competence of most students seems to be adequate. Lithuanian 
and Bulgarian universities in the Brussels-led consortium teach in Russian 
as well as English. The scale of funding for Erasmus Mundus is currently 
being doubled from €5 to €10 million per year, although surprisingly there 
is no evaluation of the first years yet available. There are arguments being 
made that Erasmus Mundus is not yet sufficiently adapted to Central Asian 
realities. In particular, the programme has been seen to work best 
elsewhere in the world where there are comparably high standards of 
universities on both sides, which is not so with most of the state 
universities in Central Asia. In this situation the standard Erasmus Mundus 
package needs amendment, and proposals are made below.  
The CAREN project installs a high speed terrestrial broadband 
network for students and researchers from 200 Central Asian universities 
and research institutes with a commitment of €5 million from the EU over 
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There was mention in the 2007 Central Asia strategy document of 
creating a European Studies Centre, and supporting existing European 
higher education initiatives, such as the Kazakh-British and Kazakh-
German universities in Almaty, or the Westminster University in Tashkent. 
These intentions have not yet been followed up in practice, however. In 
earlier years the Commission supported the start-up of the KIMEP business 
school and Social Science University in Almaty teaching in English, which 
has now grown to a substantial size (6,000 students). There are some other 
independent international universities in the region, including in Bishkek 
an American University, while the Aga Khan Foundations plans an 
ambitious University of Central Asia which would have three campuses (in 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). These various independent 
universities are of particular value because of the serious problems of low 
standards and corruption in many state universities. They also could 
provide a potential base for the EU to make a more visible contribution to 
the education sector, branding itself as promoter of a cluster higher 
educational centres of excellence in the region. This could consist of several 
initiatives, some of which would require innovations in the Commission’s 
operating instruments: 
-  Scholarships for European/international universities in the region. At 
present only students from rich families can attend these elite 
institutions. Scholarships for students from families of modest means 
would be an effective measure to reduce glaring inequalities. Such 
scholarships would be for a full university degree course, and the 
Erasmus Mundus programme could thus be extended to include 
scholarships for full course of study as well the conventional 
Erasmus-mobility year in the EU. 
-  Creation of a faculty or course for European Studies in an 
independent university, which we understand to be under 
consideration by the Commission, supported by a Jean Monnet chair 
for which there is an open world-wide invitation to tender. 
-  Creation of a Central Asia Public Policy Research Centre, with both a 
central office in a leading city and a network structure in the other 
states, possibly to be located in a major independent university. 
-  Creation of a number of multi-lingual ‘European Schools’ to provide 
the last two years of high school teaching reaching international 
baccalaureate standards, to ensure a more adequate supply of 
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-  Exploration of how the EU could contribute to the success of 
Kazakhstan’s major new technical university, where the problem is 
going to be the efficient mobilisation of university expertise rather 
than funding. A possible link to the new European Institute of 
Technology in Budapest could be examined. 
The member states are formally part of the Education Initiative, and 
several have significant programmes underway. A new compendium of 
study opportunities in the EU, with website accessibility, is part of the 
initiative.  
There is also a question of administrative organisation within the 
Commission which seems to merit reconsideration. Responsibility for the 
Education Initiative for Central Asia has been entrusted to the EuropAid 
Cooperation Office (AIDCO), whereas formerly such operations were 
managed by the Education and Culture directorate general (EAC), and 
which has the main professional experience in education policy. The EAC 
retains responsibility for the education platform of the Eastern Partnership, 
which addresses the needs of these former Soviet republics. It would seem 
natural for the Central Asian Education Initiative to be run alongside that 
for the Eastern Partnership, given some commonality of challenges coming 
from the Soviet legacy.  
Evaluation: The Education Initiative so far mainly repackages existing 
programmes, but with a significant increase in funding, with both Tempus 
and Erasmus Mundus now to receive doubled funding from €5 to €10 
million annually. This increased prioritisation of education within the total 
aid effort is to be welcomed. However the Commission should now 
evaluate the first results of the Erasmus Mundus programme, and 
undertake an education strategy review for Central Asia. Consideration 
should be given to other projects (examples given above) with a view to a 
clearer branding of the EU as promoter of a cluster of high-quality and 
independent education and research institutions, as well as supporter of 
reform of the basic education systems. There are also some changes in the 
management of the Education Initiative within the Commission that seem 
to be warranted. 
4.2.5  Energy – oil and gas 
The EU’s energy policy initiatives in the region started already in 1995 with 
the Inogate programme of technical assistance projects, later boosted in 
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Caucasus and Caspian regions in a multilateral policy dialogue. In Central 
Asia specifically the EU has initiated energy policy dialogues with 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. However these various initiatives have 
hardly got beyond limited technical projects and general policy dialogue.  
The current context for the EU’s interests in Central Asia oil and gas 
production is defined in its Strategic Energy Review documents, of which 
the second was published in November 2008, and which identifies the 
priority infrastructures needed for the diversification of gas supplies. These 
are to consist of LNG supply systems, the completion of electricity and gas 
networks in the EU and its near neighbourhood, and the creation of a 
Southern Corridor for gas supplies from the Caspian and Middle East 
regions. The urgency of these projects has been spurred by the continuing 
concern over the reliability of Russian gas supplies transiting through 
Ukraine.  
The Kazakh oil sector is growing very fast, with various EU 
companies participating as investors. The agenda of the energy policy 
dialogue is wide-ranging, with discussion for example of infrastructures, 
renewable energy supplies, energy efficiency, and in a long-term 
perspective, possible supplies of gas that would transit the Caspian Sea. 
Kazakhstan wishes to have multiple export outlets for oil and gas, 
diversifying its prior reliance on routes through Russia. It is expanding its 
shipments of oil by tanker across the Caspian Sea to Baku, from where it is 
transported either by pipeline (to the Mediterranean by the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan pipeline, or to the Georgian Black Sea coast) or by rail (so far to 
Georgia’s Black Sea coast, but there is a new rail line from Georgia to Kars 
in Turkey under construction). These supplies are of considerable and 
growing importance, but there is no big policy issue here for the EU. 
Kazakhstan diversifies its outlets of its own volition, and oil is in any case a 
competitively distributed world market product.  
By contrast the issue of gas supplies from Turkmenistan does pose an 
issue of policy choice for the EU, since these supplies could become a major 
component of the proposed Southern Corridor.103 A start was made in 
April 2008 in a MoU signed between the Commission and Turkmenistan 
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envisaging the supply of 10 bcm of gas to be exported to the EU. Since then 
contacts with the EU have intensified within the framework of the energy 
policy dialogue. The Commission is endorsing the Caspian Development 
Corporation, which has been established as a consortium of gas companies 
(including the Austrian OMV and German RWE) capable of aggregating 
the needs of different EU gas distribution companies for imports from 
Turkmenistan. At the time of writing there is a feasibility study being 
prepared for the Commission evaluating technical options for proceeding 
with such a consortium, which should meet conditions of EU competition 
policy as well as the interests of the Turkmenistan government. The two 
companies OMV and RWE have also formed the Caspian Energy Company 
together, which will examine the technical and legal possibilities of 
building a trans-Caspian pipeline and other related gas transport 
infrastructures.  
There possible gas supplies would feed into the planned Southern 
Corridor. The Nabucco project, initially proposed in 2002, is being designed 
to link the EU to Turkey with a capacity of up to 31 bcm seems to advance, 
albeit all too slowly. In July 2009 the project saw the signing of an inter-
governmental agreement by Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and 
Turkey. There is also a White Stream project under consideration and 
subject to a feasibility study, which would see a sub-sea gas pipeline with a 
capacity of up to 32 bcm under the Black Sea from Georgia to Romania, 
meaning that Turkey would not have a monopolistic hold over the 
Southern Corridor. A variety of gas supplies could feed into these 
pipelines, including Azerbaijan, Iraq and other Middle East suppliers. 
However a key initiative would be the making of a large offer (30-40 bcm 
for many years) to buy gas from Turkmenistan, to be sent across the 
Caspian Sea, with several options for its transport including LNG, Gas to 
Liquids (GTL), Compressed Natural gas (CNG) as well as sub-sea 
pipelines. This would rely in part on off-shore gas, but more substantially 
on supplies from gas fields in east and south-east Turkmenistan, which 
would be brought to west Turkmenistan by a new east-west pipeline with a 
capacity of 30 bcm, and which was put out for tender in 2009. From there 
the gas could in part flow north to Russia via Kazakhstan along the east 
Caspian coast, and in part flow west across the Caspian to connect with the 
EU promoted pipelines.  
While the EU has been considering the Nabucco project for seven 
years without yet laying a first pipe, China opened in December 2009 its 
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to Western China. While initial flows of gas may be of the order of 6 bcm 
when the pipeline builds up to full capacity output by 2012 it will be 
supplying 40 bcm of gas to China (by way of comparison the EU’s total gas 
imports have in recent years been around 140 bcm. The project took 3 ½ 
years from signing of the preliminary agreement to its opening, with China 
bringing 8,000 of its own workers to do much of the construction work.  
If the EU made an important bid for long-term gas supplies from 
Turkmenistan it would presumably seek to coordinate commercial and 
political objectives with a sustained emphasis on progressive corporate 
social responsibility, transparency and accountability in the energy sector. 
The (outgoing) Commissioner for energy, Andris Piebalgs, has indicated 
his support for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), 
which is the new global standard for transparency in the extractive 
industries, in order to enhance public finance management and 
accountability, and create a stable environment for investment. This is a 
multi-stakeholder initiative, advanced by civil society as well as 
government, the corporate sector and multilateral institutions such as the 
World Bank and the EBRD. Azerbaijan was the first country to start 
implementation of EITI in 2009, followed by Kazakhstan in 2005, with 
Tajikistan moving in this direction in 2009. The prospects for Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan joining this initiative are unclear at this point. The 
Commission as well the IFIs operating in Central Asia are in a position to 
support the EITI. 104  
Evaluation:  The energy dimension to the Central Asia strategy is 
potentially important, although the relationship with Kazakhstan as a 
major supplier of oil is unproblematic from the policy standpoint, and 
more a matter for corporate interests to pursue. However the issue of 
securing large supplies of gas from Turkmenistan is not only an important 
option in the EU’s strategic diversification objective, but also requires a 
strong coordination on the part of the EU, its member states and the major 
energy companies. The EU has indicated its support for the Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative, and should back this up in its energy 
policy dialogues and operational projects. While the EU has been 
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considering the Nabucco project for seven years, China has actually built a 
strategic gas pipeline from Central Asia over thousands of kilometres in 
half that time. The EU has in this and other cases to make up its mind 
whether it is to become come a viable international actor, or see the world 
leave it behind. 
4.2.6  Water and hydro-energy 
The major issue is the present tension and potential conflict between the 
upstream states over their plans to expand their hydro-electric capacity, 
and the downstream states that fear loss of summer water supplies for 
agriculture.105 Tajikistan seeks to complete the Rogun damn, which at 335 
metres would be the highest in the world. Kyrgyzstan builds the 
Kambarata II damn with Russian financing and would like to follow with a 
bigger Kambarata I dam. However the water sector has many more 
complex dimensions to it, including the need for better basic data on water 
flows, modern water use and management policies, repair of ageing 
irrigation infrastructures, reform of water-intensive agriculture, renewal of 
some major turbine/power generating equipments, etc.  
At the institutional level the International Fund for the Aral Sea 
(IFAS) provides in principle the structure for regional cooperation by the 
five states at both political and technical levels. So far this has been a 
largely dysfunctional organisation, with its offices being rotated regularly 
between capital cities. However there are hopes for its reform following its 
installation in January 2009 in Almaty with new leadership, although the 
current disintegration of the regional electricity grid is a new setback for 
regional cooperation in the energy sector (see further below).  
The EU’s activity in the water area proceeds at two levels, firstly 
political level dialogue sessions currently being organized by Italy, with a 
third high-level conference held in Rome on 4-5 November 2009. The Rome 
conference had an agenda focused on climate change, environmental 
governance and water. The conclusions of this meeting refer mainly to 
procedural steps for establishing a Working Group on Environmental 
Governance and Climate Change, re-activating an EU-Eastern Europe, 
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Caucasus and Central Asia (EECCA) Working Group, and also a Joint 
Platform for Environment and Water Cooperation, with meetings of senior 
officials and ministers now scheduled for 2010, 2011 and 2012. To the 
external observer it is not yet possible to judge whether this extensive 
diplomatic activity will lead to operational results; so far it has not done so 
and EU representatives are adopting a low profile on key issues.  
At the second, more technical, level the Commission undertakes 
several projects coordinated by its Delegation in Almaty, notably one on 
‘Water Governance in Central Asia’. There are several other international 
aid efforts underway, including those of the World Bank, Germany’s 
‘Berlin Process’, Switzerland (SDC), and the UN Regional Centre for 
Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia in Ashgabad. As project of the 
‘Berlin Process’, executed by GTZ, has an expert embedded in the IFAS, 
who is able to advise directly on this organisation’s efforts to develop a 
more effective cooperative regime. The experts employed by these various 
organisations assemble valuable expertise and meet together in working 
groups organised mainly in Almaty, and ensure at least a sharing of 
information with a view to ensuring rational divisions of labour. The EU’s 
main technical assistance project at present on Water Governance involves 
three states, with the conspicuous and unfortunate absence of Uzbekistan 
(this country also blocks the initiation of a project on cross-border aquifers) 
and Turkmenistan. The Water Governance project is rather heavily 
concerned on water quality standards, which seems to be a rather 
secondary matter in the region by comparison with problems around the 
volume of water supplies, although the project also deals with vital water 
use and management issues.  
There seems to be a robust case technically and economically for the 
expansion of upstream reservoirs and hydro capacity.106 The major hydro 
investments, actual and proposed, are in cascade formation in major river 
basins, the Naryn in Kygyzstan and the Vakhsh in Tajikistan, which flow 
into the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers respectively. The cascade 
structure of multiple dams in the same river basin can reconcile the 
interests of the downstream states in summer water flows for irrigation and 
the upstream states for winter power generation: the higher dams can 
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release water in winter, which the lower damns hold back until the 
summer. There are two further factors that strengthen the case for 
investment in increased reservoir and power generating capacity. Climate 
change threatens both more erratic climatic extremes and desertification of 
downstream Central Asia, and these factors militate in favour of bigger 
reservoir capacity upstream.107 In addition South Asia (Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, India) have big demands for summer electricity supplies (to keep 
cool), which is consistent with downstream demands for summer water, 
and for which the World Bank has a project at concept stage for a 1000MW 
power transmission line (CASA 1000).108 This project would of course 
depend also on adequate security conditions in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
prevailing in due time. These technical arguments are also consistent with 
the political need for investments in conflict prevention (war over water is 
not inconceivable). Therefore the EU should move into a more pro-active 
role in favour of a global diplomatic initiative of all regional and global 
players to pursue a comprehensive plan of cooperative actions to avert 
economic and social disasters in the upstream states, and the risks of 
conflict with downstream states. Moreover, the current reform of the 
International Fund for the Aral Sea (IFAS) provides a regionally owned 
organisation within which to embed future agreements.  
On the other hand there are disturbing signs that existing cooperation 
through the regional electricity grid is being broken up, Kazakhstan having 
announced in November 2009 its intention to withdraw, and Uzbekistan 
announcing its withdrawal as of 1 December. This means each state of the 
region will now seek to become self-sufficient in electricity (at a price), with 
the temptation then for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to manage their hydro-
electric potential with a view to national needs exclusively (i.e. neglecting 
downstream interests in summer water release). The situation in Tajikistan 
has become desperate to the point that the president has called upon all 
Tajik citizens except the poorest to transfer salary income into the purchase 
of shares in the Rogun dam; meanwhile a Russian-owned hydro-power 
plant, Sangtuda 2, is cutting electricity supplies to the Tajik state energy 
company because the latter is unable to pay its bills. This is a highly 
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perilous scenario for the stability of the region, quite apart from its 
economic wastefulness. It intensifies the need for the EU and other external 
influences to try, urgently, to shift the action back to cooperation strategies.  
Pending advances on these strategic but controversial investments 
there is a large agenda for ‘no regrets’ actions, including investments in 
solar and wind power for which the EU has strong industrial capacities, 
assistance to water management practices, and small and medium sized 
hydro-electric plants that can be useful elements for local development 
efforts.  
Evaluation: The EU seeks to facilitate the development of political will 
and trust among the states of the region in favour of cooperative solutions 
to the dramatic problems of the water sector. So far however, the EU 
abstains from taking any substantive position on the main variables of 
possible solutions. A more pro-active position could be taken in favour of 
investments in upstream increased reservoir and hydro-electric capacity, 
which could be beneficial to both upstream and downstream states alike. 
The EU is not in the position to lead this process, however, and should ally 
with other international partners, notably the World Bank and the UN, to 
prepare and advocate fundamental solutions, inter alia by funding a 
feasibility study to demonstrate the potential benefits to both upstream and 
downstream states of cooperative solutions. There is also in any case a large 
agenda for ‘no regrets’ investments in renewables and modest sized 
hydroelectric facilities.  
4.2.7  Transport corridors 
The maps of EU-sponsored transport strategies (Traceca and Trans- or Pan-
European corridors/axes) are in need of revision.109 The Traceca (Transport 
Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia) programme was initiated by a 
multilateral agreement signed in 1998 between the EU and 14 other states 
as a comprehensive road, rail and sea transport corridors to link the EU 
from Southeast Europe through the South Caucasus into Central Asia. The 
Traceca programme consists of a large number of technical assistance 
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projects with some investment financing spread across a map of priority 
routes. There is a permanent secretariat of Traceca in Baku since 2001, 
which has a coordinating role, and whose effectiveness is questioned. The 
political premises of Traceca were that the states of the Caucasus and 
Central Asia would be open to cooperative transport strategies, and that it 
would be good to diversify away from the Moscow-centric routes of the 
Soviet Union (Traceca routes do not pass through Russia). Both of these 
premises are now questionable. 
More recently with the enlargement of the EU into Central Europe 
the EU has promoted a set of Trans- or Pan-European corridors and axes, 
which extend beyond the enlarged EU into Belarus, Ukraine and Russia. 
For example Corridor II consists of road and rail links along the line Berlin-
Minsk-Moscow-NizhnyNovgorod-Ekaterinburg. The whole set of Trans-
European corridors and axes is estimate to have cost €126 billion up to 
2007, and to cost a further €150 billion until 2013, and a further €120 billion 
up until 2020, with substantial funding coming from the European 
Investment Bank.110 Most of this funding goes to investments within the 
EU, but the EIB now has a new mandate to invest in Central Asia together 
with its longer-standing mandates to operate in Russia and Ukraine.  
Up to a point the Traceca’s southern routes that bypass Russia, with 
the Trans-European Corridors’ northern route that extends from Moscow 
across the Urals on into Siberia, can be considered to be technically 
complementary. However both of these strategic maps have been prepared 
in the context of integrating the wider European neighbourhood, virtually 
ignoring the Asian dimension and in particular the rise of Chinese trade 
and investments. Since 1997 the Asian Development Bank has with strong 
Chinese support been promoting the Central Asia Regional Economic 
programme (CAREC), which brings together all four Central Asian states111 
together with Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China and Mongolia, and is further 
supported by the World Bank, EBRD and IsDB. In November 2008 they 
announced a $6.7 billion programme of investments of major transport 
projects in the region, including a “West China – West Europe Corridor 6”, 
which crosses Kazakhstan with key road and rail routes, to which the 
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World Bank is contributing its biggest ever loan of $2 billion. In addition 
the CAREC corridors include road and rail routes to South Asia to 
disenclave the land-locked Central Asia with access to the Gulf and Indian 
Ocean via Afghanistan and Iran or Pakistan. India, Russia and China wish 
to improve this transport axis. But also the US, NATO and EU are 
interested in improved access to Afghanistan for Central Asia to its north, 
either today for wartime logistics or hopefully tomorrow as an investment 
in economic development. As noted above (section 3.3) the US is currently 
launching a Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to route supplies to 
Afghanistan via Central Asia, with routes that link either to the Black Sea or 
through Russia to the Baltic coast. 
These developments call for revision of the EU’s priority corridors to 
its East. The European and Asian transport strategies have been drawn up 
without coordination, and see in fact some incoherence. The new West 
China – West Europe Corridor 6 route for rail and road, promoted by 
CAREC, strikes a path to the west that passes north of the Caspian Sea, 
roughly halfway between the southern Traceca route which crosses the 
Caspian Sea and the Northern Trans-European Corridor II passing through 
the Urals, and connects with neither. There is a case for an extension of this 
Corridor 6 from west Kazakhstan into southern Russia (in the vicinity of 
Astrakhan, Volgograd and Rostov), passing on through Ukraine into the 
EU for both road and rail. There could also be a strategic crossover point in 
West Kazakhstan between this East-West corridor and enhanced North-
South corridors, with new rail connections currently being built along the 
East Caspian coast from Russia through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to 
the Middle East and South Asia. The EU (the Commission’s Transport 
directorate and European Investment Bank), should approach the CAREC 
consortium with a view to prepare a unified map of priority corridors, in 
consultation of course with Russia, Ukraine and the Central Asian states. 
With the European Investment Bank now newly mandated to invest in 
Central Asia the coordination or integration of EU operations with those of 
CAREC has an obvious rationale. Moreover the Commission’s grant-
funded technical assistance resources could also be brought alongside the 
huge loan funding of CAREC and its associated IFIs. The Traceca 
secretariat could be discontinued, in favour of joint project preparation 
with CAREC.  
Evaluation. The EU Central Asia strategy so far largely ignores the 
need for updating and revision of transport strategies involving Central 
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infrastructural investments coming into the region from West China. A 
rationalisation of EU and Asian priority corridors should see the tracing of 
a Central Trans-Eurasian Corridor that would have an optimal connection 
through southern Russia and Ukraine into the EU, with a strategic 
crossover with a north-south corridor in West Kazakhstan. The EU 
(Commission and European Investment Bank) should approach CAREC 
and its supporting IFIs to concert such plans together, with operational 
collaboration over technical assistance and infrastructural investments. The 
case for coordination also with the new US Northern Distribution Network 
deserves consideration.  
4.2.8  Security and border management 
Central Asia faces a broad range of security challenges. Due to the region’s 
position at the crossroads between Russia, China, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Iran and the Caspian Sea it is confronted with a range of trans-national 
issues such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, organised crime and 
terrorism. Central Asia also encounters specific regional threats including 
(as discussed above) scarcity of water resources for generating power and 
irrigation purposes. At the national level the poorest Central Asian 
republics face the threat of instability due to a combination of bad 
governance and the harsh impact of the economic crisis.  
In the Strategy the EU argues that security and stability are its main 
strategic interests. Thus much of the activity from political dialogue to 
assistance programmes is part of the Strategy’s security objective; in most 
cases indirectly (good governance programmes etc.) and in some cases 
directly (border control). In September 2008 the French EU Presidency 
organised a Minister of Foreign Affairs level Security Forum that focused 
on Afghanistan, terrorist threats and trafficking. This was followed up a 
year later in September 2009 by the Swedish Presidency with a Ministerial 
Conference discussing regional security issues, water, energy and the 
impact of the economic crisis. This seems to shape a patter of an annual 
ministerial dialogue between the EU and Central Asian states on security 
issues. Meanwhile the EU Special Representative Pierre Morel maintains a 
continuous high-level dialogue with the region’s leaders, inter alia on 
security issues.  
The EU’s main operational activity in the security field has consisted 
of two substantial projects concerning border management (BOMCA – 
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Drug Action Programme). Both were already in place before the launch of 
the EU Strategy for Central Asia and both are multi-year projects executed 
for the Commission by the offices in the region of the UNDP.  
BOMCA’s aims have been described as a Sisyphean task.112 The 
programme seeks to upgrade the capacity of border services, with their 
customs and immigration services, and mobile command and control 
centres, with a view to combating cross-border crime and trafficking in 
drugs, arms and human beings, and at the same time to facilitate trade and 
transit. BOMCA’s achievements have included supplying modern 
equipment to border posts, the building of some large infrastructure 
projects at border points, militating in favour of revising obsolete laws 
governing border controls, and engaging usefully even with the region’s 
most closed states. There have been training courses for hundreds of 
officials but BOMCA has not uniformly fulfilled its entire action plan. 
BOMCA’s capacity and budget for training are limited, and can provide 
classes and workshops for only a small portion of eligible border officers. 
The new OSCE Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe, launched 
in May 2009, should help take up the slack in training. 
However the BOMCA programme appears as a sound model for 
border control assistance. It is more coordinated and comprehensive than 
other border management assistance initiatives in the broader Eurasian 
region. U.S. assistance to the region, for example, tends to be more 
piecemeal and focused on paramilitary training. Additionally, BOMCA is 
inexpensive relative taking into account to its geographic span and 
thematic scope, covering the Central Asian region for over half a decade for 
less than 50 million Euros. But the EU could do more to enhance BOMCA’s 
work, for instance by enhancing coordination with other border 
management assistance sponsors such as the OSCE and SCO. Also BOMCA 
should create synergy with members of the international community that 
are currently reforming and expanding training efforts for the Afghan 
border police and border authorities. A good example of linking border 
control support in Afghanistan and Central Asia is the Border Management 
Badakhshan (BOMBAF) programme which has also been largely EU 
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funded and implemented by UNDP, and which is focused on building 
three border crossing points on the Tajik-Afghan border while also training 
Afghan border guards and providing equipment. 
These border management activities necessarily intersect with 
counter-narcotic programmes. Drug trafficking networks ferry Afghan 
opiates across the region to markets in Russia and Europe, a trade whose 
export value across the region approximates several billion euro. Counter 
narcotics assistance is the purview of Central Asia Drug Assistance 
Programme. CADAP is run by the same five in-country teams which run 
BOMCA and officials of the two programmes share the same offices and 
often work on both programme action plans. CADAP has provided 
airports and border crossings with drug detection equipment, legal 
assistance and training to Central Asian drug enforcement agencies, and 
training of drug-scenting dogs. The de jure separation of the two 
programmes keeps BOMCA’s public profile insulated from the issue of 
cross-border drug interdiction, a task that is fraught with pitfalls given the 
difficulty of interdiction and massive corruption generated by the drug 
trade across the region. 
An aspect of BOMCA and CADAP that is subject to comment among 
EU embassies in the region is the use of UNDP as executive agency for the 
Commission. There is concern for the loss of visible EU identity for these 
important projects, while this should now be alleviated by the CADAP 
programme now to be executed by EU member state agencies. The OSCE is 
also active in these fields with funding support from some EU member 
states, and there is an obvious need here for efficient complementarity of 
efforts.  
Besides border control the EU has so far been barely engaged in 
Security Sector Reform (SSR)113 in Central Asia. However, some initiatives, 
such as a project on human rights awareness in the Kyrgyz police forces or 
assistance to judicial reform in Kyrgyzstan and (as proposed for) 
Kazakhstan are part and parcel of the SSR concept, although they may not 
be presented in this way in Brussels. It would be worthwhile to use the 
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BOMCA experience and try to transfer the model to other parts of the 
security sector in Central Asia. The EU could consider applying the 
integrated border management approach to less politically sensitive sectors 
such as the handling of emergency situations, which also demands the 
involvement of a host of security services and ministries.  
Although all five Central Asian states have strong presidential 
regimes, there are substantial differences between them in the degrees of 
permitted political freedoms and participation, and the possibilities for 
security sector reform. In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan there 
might be interest in EU-supported small-scale projects on SSR that touch on 
governance and even democratisation aspects. Radical reform projects are 
unlikely but smaller civil society driven projects, with support through 
EIDHR, the Non-State Actors/Local Authorities Development programme, 
and especially through EU national government funding, should be taken 
up and supported. An additional option would be increased support to the 
OSCE field offices through funds for specific projects. This would be a 
viable way for the EU to get increasingly involved in SSR through a joint 
effort of OSCE member states and by using OSCE ‘eyes and ears’ on the 
ground. In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan prospects are for the time being 
dim for EU involvement in SSR and governance support. Nonetheless, the 
EU should make an effort to closely liaise with NATO, which maintains 
reasonably positive diplomatic and military contacts with these countries. 
Cooperation with the OSCE Project Coordinator in Tashkent and the OSCE 
Centre in Ashgabat could also be useful, for instance in the form of jointly 
organising modest public discussion sessions.  
Evaluation: fostering security and stability lie at the core of the EU 
Strategy for Central Asia but most EU programming is not directly 
security-oriented. The EU’s flagship projects in the domains of border 
management (BOMCA) and hard drugs (CADAP), and these have achieved 
a certain profile in the region, and receive favourable comments. Both have 
been executed so far by the UNDP. However CADAP will now be executed 
by EU member states, which may enhance EU visibility. In addition OSCE 
develops related activities in these domains, with which the EU should 
obviously coordinate. The positive experiences should be translated into 
the expansion of these programmes and investigating possibilities of using 
the BOMCA model in other fields of the security sector (police reform or 
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4.3  EU assistance114 
EU assistance to Central Asia is a complicated affair, with insufficient 
analysis made publicly available by the Commission. In 2007 the European 
Commission presented two assistance documents: an overarching Regional 
Strategy Paper for assistance to Central Asia over the period 2007-2013 
(RSP)115 and a more detailed and programme-orientated Central Asia 
Indicative Programme (IP) valid from 2007 until 2010116 The EU’s 
budgetary grant commitments allocated for the period 2007-2010 initially 
totalled €314 million (to which has been added a further €42 million of 
advance commitments for the period 2011-2013, giving a total of €356), with 
the breakdown by sector and recipient shown in Table 11. In the most 
recent revision of these figures the amounts allocated to education under 
the regional programme have been substantially increased. 
The total commitment for the entire seven year budget planning 
period 2007 to 2013 is €719 million, which means the pace of annual 
commitments will rise substantially from present levels to what is planned 
for the last years covered, hence the statement that the EU’s budget 
commitment to Central Asia is being roughly doubled since the beginning 
of the Strategy.  
The policy for EU assistance for Central Asia is shaped through the 
Commission documents drafted by RELEX, the Directorate General dealing 
with external relations, while implementation is the responsibility of 
AIDCO (EuropeAid Cooperation Office) and the EU Delegations in the 
region (where these exist).117 Until 2006 the bulk of EU Assistance for 
Central Asia was delivered through the Technical Assistance Programme to 
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the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS). In 2007 TACIS was 
replaced by the Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI) with a view 
to establishing a closer connection to the Millennium Development Goals 
and as part of a broader overhaul of EU assistance instruments. This is 
reflected in the priorities set for 2011 to 2013, as in Table 12. Previously 
agreed TACIS projects have been running since 2007 in parallel with DCI 
assistance although most TACIS work has been concluded by now.  
Table 11. EU grant aid to Central Asia in 2007-20010 
Regional Cooperation: 30 % of total resources (2007-2010), € million 
Focal sectors 
•  Education 
•  Energy 
•  Transport 
•  Environment 
•  Border management 
Indicative budget (€) 
65 
29 
12 
10 
13 
Total Regional Central Asia  136 
 
Bilateral cooperation: 70% of total resources (2007-2010) 
National programmes 
•  Kazakhstan 
•  Kyrgyzstan 
•  Tajikistan 
•  Turkmenistan 
•  Uzbekistan 
Indicative budget (€) 
44 
55 
66 
22 
33 
Total Bilateral Central Asia  220  
Source: European Commission. 
The DCI operations can be divided into thematic and regional 
programmes. In the case of Central Asia relevant thematic programmes 
include the Food Security Programme (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and the 
Non-State Actor/Local Authorities Programme. Regional programmes in 
Central Asia include, for example, the business programme Central Asia 
Invest; the energy and transport programmes INOGATE and TRACECA; 
the education programmes TEMPUS and ERASMUS MUNDUS; and the 
security oriented programmes of BOMCA (border control) and CADAP 
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Table 12. Central Asia Indicative Programme for Technical Assistance 
(2011-2013, draft) 
Priority area 
 
Focal priorities  Relevant 
countries 
Regional and local community development  KG, TR UZ 
Sector-specific reforms, agriculture and land 
reform 
TR 
Social sector reforms  TJ 
Health TJ 
Poverty 
reduction, 
improving 
living 
standards 
Energy development  TR 
Democratic development and good governance 
All CA 
countries 
Rule of Law, legal and Judicial Reform  KZ, KG, UZ 
Public administration and Public Finance 
management 
KZ 
Private Sector Development  TJ 
Improvement of human capital development  TR 
Support for 
good 
governance 
and 
economic 
reform 
Enhancing trade, business climate, SMEs 
development 
UZ 
Sustainable regional development (energy; 
environment, water) 
Border management and fight against trafficking 
Promotion of 
regional 
cooperation   Educational, scientific and people-to-people 
cooperation 
All CA 
countries 
Source: European Commission. 
The most recent data on aid commitments and disbursements (Table 
13) show annual amounts in the range of €60 to 80 in 2007 and 2008 under 
the DCI instrument. Given that the total for the seven year period 2007-
2013 amounts to €719 million, the rate of annual expenditures appears set 
to rise to well over €100 million towards the end of the period. In particular 
the expenditures for Uzbekistan are very low, given that it is the most 
populous state of the region, and not endowed with anywhere near as rich 
natural resource endowment as Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan. Of course for 
aid programmes to Uzbekistan to rise to its full potential would depend on 
a positive development of the political relationship with the EU.  
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Table 13. Commitments and payments to Central Asia under Tacis and DCI 
programmes, 2004 to 2008 (€ million) 
Commitments TACIS  DCI 
   2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Total 
Kazakhstan  9.46  12.99  12.26  19.00  0.00  53.71 
Kyrgyz Republic  6.55  24.82  16.51  13.60  17.00  78.48 
Tajikistan  13.05  27.42  25.50  23.10  9.00  98.07 
Turkmenistan  2.20  5.75  3.50  6.00  4.15  21.60 
Uzbekistan  11.00  9.25  8.70  0.10  4.20  33.25 
CA Regional  n.a.  n.a.   n.a.  18.90  29.01  47.91 
TOTAL  42.26  80.23  66.47  80.70  63.36 333.02 
        
Payments TACIS  DCI 
   2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Total 
Kazakhstan  8.24  5.97  9.84  6.70  10.80  41.55 
Kyrgyz Republic  18.44  14.37  9.54  13.42  21.50  77.27 
Tajikistan  9.35  13.12  14.83  7.61  16.83  61.74 
Turkmenistan  0.24  0.78  1.42  1.52  2.10  6.06 
Uzbekistan  2.45  7.28  10.04  6.98  6.74  33.49 
CA Regional  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  21.88  21.52  43.40 
TOTAL  38.72  41.52  45.67  58.11  79.49 263.51 
n.a. not available 
Source: European Commission. 
Monitoring aid programmes. At the level of individual projects the 
Commission arranges for monitoring reports to be prepared by external 
consultants, generally at least once a year. A standard grid of criteria and 
ratings is used, the criteria being relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact 
and sustainability, with the ratings of A (very good), B (good), C 
(problems), and D (serious deficiencies). The monitoring system seems 
itself to work effectively. These reports, which we have been able to see in 
some cases, are not published. However it would seem desirable in the 
interests of transparency and accountability for the data base of reports to 
be made available on the Commission’s website for the use of the European 
Parliament and independent analysts. The monitoring reports are 
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which implies a certain hazard for the monitor, who may be inclined to 
report what the contractor wants. In other organisations such as the World 
Bank the project evaluation function is undertaken by a department that is 
independent of the operating department. In the EU context it is for 
consideration whether the monitoring function should be contracted by, or 
undertaken at least in association with the European Parliament.  
As regards the substantive ratings there is a strong concentration of 
results for a collection of one hundred project monitoring reports in the two 
middle categories of ‘good’ and ‘problems’, with very few excellent or 
disastrous ratings. It may be disappointing that there are not more excellent 
results, but not surprising that there are frequently encountered problems 
given the poor professionalism and endemic corruption in the public 
administrations of the region. The results for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan seem to be more favourable than for Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan, or for regional projects.  
These substantial investments in monitoring reports represent a 
considerable resource, but so far as we can see they are used mainly for 
management checks on whether projects are proceeding according to 
contracted terms. This is in itself a necessary function, but it is 
disappointing that this mass of information is not regularly translated into 
an analysis relevant for broader policy assessments. Answers to basic 
questions about which groups or types of project are achieving relatively 
good or poor results seem not to be available. We see no policy-oriented 
synthesis or summary analyses being published or evidence of them being 
undertaken. This task of evaluation is not easy, since it requires distillation 
of huge amounts of information. If the Commission staff are so heavily 
occupied with their basic management duties to do such analyses, then the 
monitoring reports could be made available on a Commission website, 
allowing independent analysts to make such assessments. For our part we 
would have been ready to invest time in attempting such an analysis if the 
documentation had been freely available. We consider that the European 
Parliament might make such a request in line with the principles of 
transparency of information, to which the Commission is in principle 
committed.  
We note ongoing changes in the structure of Commission aid to 
Central Asia, with less weight now to be given to the general category of 
individual technical assistance projects, and more weight to be allocated to 
two categories: first, sectoral programmes that combine budget grants with 
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this reflects judgements that the first category mentioned (individual 
technical assistance projects) were not giving the best results, but this is not 
transparent to us. Overall we are concerned that the EU is trying to 
prioritise too many ‘focal’ areas, with projects and programmes aiming at 
all seven priorities of the EU strategy, justified mainly by the need to ‘tick 
all the assistance boxes’ indicated by the Strategy.  
Sectoral & budget support grants. An increasingly important element in 
the EU’s aid to the region consists of sectoral budget support grants to 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the two poorest states of the region, with 
conditions that aim to ensure their allocation to various social and food 
security policy objectives. This method is controversial. Some observers 
point to the fungibility of budget resources, which is especially hazardous 
in states with endemic corruption; others defend the system on the grounds 
that the delivery conditions can get real leverage, alongside the conditions 
for IMF and World Bank aid, and that the programmes are always 
accompanied by actions to reform public finance management.  
These programmes have been subject to detailed monitoring reports, 
which we have been able to study as regards operations up until 2006.118 In 
Kygyzstan the Commission has been sustaining grants under a Food 
Security Programme continuously from 1996 to 2006 at a rate of between 
€8.5 to 10 million per year. In Tajikistan the Commission has sustained 
Food Security Programme grants also from 1996 to 2006 with more variable 
amounts, but from 2004 to 2006 at a constant rate of €11 million. 
The grants to Kyrgyzstan were assessed by the monitors as being 
highly relevant, but with a limited effect on reducing extreme poverty. 
While the execution of the budget payments was correctly done technically, 
it is pointed out that the fungibility of funds in the budget means that the 
earmarked use of the funds cannot be guaranteed. There were confusions 
in the complex conditionalities. As regards impact and sustainability it was 
noted that the government was reverting to practices that undermined the 
efforts of the EU and other donors to install sound private market 
mechanisms in the food and agriculture sector.  
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For Kyrgyzstan the most recent sector support programme for the 
years 2007-2009 targets social protection and public finance management, 
with a total budget of €25.5 million, and for which we have also been able 
to see detailed monitoring reports.119 The budget provides for two 
instalments per year in the range of €3 to 5 million. There are multiple 
conditions to be fulfilled, concerning 1, social protection strategy, 2, 
macroeconomic stability (linked to IMF operations), 3, improved public 
finance management, 4, internal audit, 5, improved annual budget process, 
and 6, improved targeting of social assistance, and 7, improved actions for 
vulnerable families. In 2008 part of the planned disbursements were not 
made because of incomplete compliance with the conditions. The monitors 
have in 2009 found full compliance with the conditions, recommending 
payment of instalments. We observe however that this is a long, and maybe 
excessively long, list of both general and specific conditions.  
In Tajikistan the Food Security Programmes were also highly relevant 
after the end of a prolonged civil war. The grants were correctly executed 
from the technical budgetary standpoint, but again with no possibility to 
control their fungibility inside the government budget. There was little sign 
that the objective of sustainable land reform was advanced, with problems 
of overly complex conditions leading to elements of leniency in application 
of conditions for the release of funds.  
For Tajikstan the current 2007-2009 programme, which has been 
extended to 2011, targets social protection with a total budget of €23 
million. It aims to help the government improve the design and 
effectiveness of social protection policies and strengthened public finance 
management in this sector. The funds are disbursed upon fulfilment of 
three sets of conditions, regarding macroeconomic stability, public finance 
management, and social protection policies (labour market, social 
assistance). Disbursements are typically made in amounts or €2 or 3 million 
twice a year, with disbursement decisions taken by the Commission 
(AIDCO) in Brussels after receiving recommendations from the Delegation 
in Dushanbe on the basis of detailed monitoring. We have not seen the 
monitoring reports for this programme, although we note that it was 
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suspended for one year because of misreporting by the Tajik authorities to 
the IMF, which implies that the conditionalities are not taken for granted 
and there is coordination with the IMF over their programmes.  
We find it difficult to make a firm assessment of these budget support 
programmes which involve considerable sums of finance. We would need 
to get closer to (and indeed inside) the operations in order to do so. This is 
also a reason to argue for more transparency concerning the conditions 
established between the EU and recipient states, including reporting and 
publication of the results.  
The general proposal to move away from isolated technical assistance 
projects to programmes targeted and conditioned on specific policy 
priorities, and combining budget and project support, seems in itself a fair 
idea. Success in such operations has however to overcome formidable 
obstacles in the shape of poor governance in the recipient states, and the 
monitoring of conditionalities has to be a very serious exercise. The 
Commission’s Delegations have to be adequately staffed to do this, and 
Brussels has to be willing to suspend payments when the conditions are not 
met.  
Reforming procedures for small grants to civil society. The European 
Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the EU’s specific tool 
for supporting democracy, protecting human rights and funding civil 
society directly is mostly active in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
On a regional basis EIDHR provides specific funding for the civil society 
seminars in all five Central Asian republics. The regional rule of law 
initiative, one of three flagship initiatives under the political Strategy for 
Central Asia, was allocated €600.000 in 2009.  
The EIDHR has allocated €9 million of grants to Central Asia for the 
period 2005-2011 in a total of 54 projects, or around €160,000 on average. 
These are relatively much smaller than the typical Tacis or DCI technical 
assistance projects which tend to be in the range of €1 to 5 million. This 
links to the issue of the EU’s notoriously burdensome regulations and 
procedures governing aid expenditures. The EU’s financial regulation gives 
absolute priority to avoidance of risk of financial irregularities. These 
requirements are maybe understandable for large projects, but for small 
projects, such as for the EIDHR they are disproportionately onerous, and 
result in long delays, discouragement of the partners and unfavourable 
comparisons with other donors which are no less interested in financial 
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donors who are equally concerned for financial rectitude (USAID and the 
UK’s DFID) as being ‘reasonable’, whereas those of the EU are ‘impossibly 
onerous’. The question is posed therefore how this unfortunate situation 
might be reformed.  
Table 14. European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) 
ongoing projects, 2005-2011 (as of 5 March 2009) 
  Number of projects  Amount in € 
Regional 3  1,020,686 
Kazakhstan 16  1,743,552 
Kyrgyzstan 16  2,895,763 
Tajikistan 19  3,481,018 
TOTAL 54  9,141,019 
 
We would take up the question at the level of the standard regulatory 
requirements for project tendering, contracting and financial reporting, and 
then the case for simplified procedures for small projects. As regards the 
standard system the Commission is under the control of the Council and 
European Parliament, with the latter having famously dismissed the whole 
of the Santer Commission in 1999 on grounds of financial irregularities. As 
has been pointed out since by independent scholars, this episode was more 
about party political competition in the European Parliament than about 
the only slight and exceptional financial irregularities found in the 
Commission.120 However the repercussions of this institutional crisis to this 
day extend all the way to harming the efficacy of EU aid instruments in 
Central Asia as elsewhere in the world, where the Commission has been 
obliged to adopt zero-risk procedures that are ill-adapted to operating 
conditions, especially for small projects in countries where aid beneficiaries 
have limited administrative skills. In Central Asia we hear the consequent 
criticisms, especially from civil society organisations that are beneficiaries 
of EIDHR grants. There have been attempts at reform in recent years, but 
these have produced only minor results. The member states in the Council 
and European Parliament have their responsibilities for facilitating 
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necessary reforms, rather than indulge in easy criticisms of the over-
bureaucratic Commission. 
With respect to small projects we advocate the re-establishment of an 
ultra-simple instrument for very small projects, like the one set up in the 
early 1990s in the Moscow Delegation of the Commission, and later also 
applied in Ukraine. This ‘Bistro’ instrument allowed the Head of 
Delegation to authorise grants in the range of €5,000 to €10,000 to civil 
society actors on the basis of just two pages of paperwork, relying 
essentially on the programme officer’s personal judgement of the applicant. 
Such tiny sums can be extremely valuable in poor societies where civil 
society activists have the greatest difficulty to survive. Small grants are of 
course proportionately expensive to administer, but it would be worth 
employing one local agent in each delegation in Central Asia to work as 
very small project manager. Standard regulations governing procurement 
rules and co-financing should not apply in such cases. Simplified rules 
could also apply for somewhat large EIDHR projects up to €50,000 for 
example. An alternative approach would be make block grants to 
independent international NGOs with experience on the ground in Central 
Asia, and let them administer sets of small grants. There do seem to be 
some movements in this direction in Commission practice, but without 
apparently easing the burden of paper work.  
The Instrument for Stability (IfS) is a third EU instrument that could be 
used in Central Asia, next to DCI and EIDHR. The IfS is generally intended 
to respond to the needs of civil crisis or conflict situations, especially in 
very weak or failing states.121 In the IfS Indicative Programme 2009-2011 
only one project area concerns Central Asia; ‘fighting organised crime on 
the heroin route: Phase II the Black Sea Basin and the Western Balkans’.122 
Over three years the IfS planned to spend €5-8 million on this programme, 
of which only a small part will reach Central Asian countries’ security 
sectors.  
The European Parliament has its role to play in the democratic scrutiny 
of EU assistance as joint authority on the EU budget and direct 
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representative of the European taxpayer. As part of its political powers the 
Parliament has demanded right of oversight of programming documents – 
including those pertaining to Annual Action Programmes which are 
ordinarily subject of bilateral financing agreements between the European 
Commission and the beneficiary government (with some scrutiny by the 
Member States Management Committee). In the case of the Annual Action 
Programme 2007 for Uzbekistan, which proposed to provide equipment to 
the Parliament of Uzbekistan as well as to the National Association of 
NGOs, Parliament blocked this funding, although the project was 
resubmitted and passed through the Parliament in the following year. The 
Parliament should naturally be interested in the monitoring and evaluation 
process already discussed. 
Aid and the petro-states. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan need technical 
assistance for supporting reform efforts, but not financial assistance. 
Recently Kazakhstan has made an agreement to fund USAID with $20 
million in order to procure technical assistance and training services. The 
EU should examine the possibility to do the same, with the offer to 
redistribute the funds received in additional assistance to Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan. Uzbekistan remains a difficult case for EU assistance since 
Tashkent is mostly interested in security cooperation. Meanwhile the 
absence so far of an EU Delegation makes project identification and 
implementation extremely difficult. 
Evaluation: EU aid to Central Asia is in the course of being doubled in 
amount. This naturally calls for analysis of the results being obtained by 
existing programmes. There is a thorough monitoring process for all 
projects, which should provide the basis for such analysis and evaluation. 
However the monitoring reports are not published, nor are there any 
published policy-oriented analyses of the aid programmes to Central Asia 
so far. More transparency is needed in the monitoring and evaluation 
process, which would help the European Parliament fulfil its role. The 
Commission is currently shifting the emphasis away from isolated 
technical assistance projects in favour of both education for the region as a 
whole, and for the poorest countries of the region (Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan) sectoral programmes that combine conditional budget and 
project support. We see the case for these developments, but caution that 
conditional budget support is a hazardous process in very problematic 
governance environments. EU contracting procedures need to be lightened, 
especially for small projects involving civil societies in the region. Grants to 
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with concentration on educational programmes, while Uzbekistan will 
need to show a more active interest to cooperate before increased EU 
assistance should be forthcoming.  
4.4  Differentiated policies towards the Central Asian states  
4.4.1  Kazakhstan 
There are now major opportunities for Kazakhstan and the EU to deepen 
their bilateral relationship with the objective of bringing the rapid 
economic development of this rich country into a process also of political 
and social progress, and participation in an enlightened conception of 
international relations. At present there is only limited space for political 
democracy and civil society, and the workings of the state security system 
is similar to other Central Asian countries (viz. the incarceration of human 
rights defenders). The workings of the state power system are complex and 
see different factions acting in different directions. However the leadership 
has a determined modernization strategy, and its multi-vector foreign 
policy includes a European vector, and a clear wish not to be over-
dependent on a duopoly of its two big neighbours, Russia and China.  
The markers of the European dimensions to its foreign policy are the 
‘Path to Europe’ white paper adopted early in 2009 and its OSCE 
Presidency for the year 2010. The ‘Path to Europe’ is an action plan 
reminiscent of those produced by the European Union. It has 86 action 
points, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs monitors implementation every 
six months. At the last count in October 2009 18 actions had been 
completed and 32 were work in progress. It is too early to say how the 
OSCE Presidency will work out, but one priority theme is to work for better 
cohesion between the EU and CIS states. If Kazakhstan hosts an OSCE 
Summit (as some reports suggest - the last one took place in 1999) this 
could provide an occasion for the EU, that makes up the bulk of OSCE 
membership, to closely work with Kazakhstan on strategic issues for the 
wider European area. 
The EU and Kazakhstan envisage the negotiation of a new 
Agreement, which would replace the existing PCA. The content of the new 
Agreement could be much more developed than the PCA, and take as a 
reference the structure of the new model Advanced Agreements of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy/Eastern Partnership, which has been 
completed in the case of Morocco and is well advanced in the case of 
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the whole range of the EU’s competences (the old EC competences as at the 
time the PCAs were negotiated, plus now justice and home affairs and 
foreign and security policy). However the trade policy content will be 
limited by the fact that Kazakhstan joins now with Russia and Belarus in a 
customs union, which excludes the possibility of a free trade agreement 
with the EU unless done by all three together. The EU can also consider 
how close Kazakhstan could be brought towards or into the Eastern 
Partnership. There are two options. The first, which could be activated 
already now, would be to invite Kazakhstan to join in the work of the 
region-multilateral working groups of the Eastern Partnership, for which 
there is already provision for 3rd country participation on an ad hoc basis. 
The second more ambitious option would be to invite Kazakhstan to join 
fully the Eastern Partnership. 
Kazakhstan seeks to develop its relationship with the Council of 
Europe, acceding to some of its Conventions, but not those for Human 
Rights Conventions since this would entail the jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Human Rights and full membership of the Council of Europe. It 
seeks observer status at the Parliamentary Assembly, but this should be 
conditioned on steps in favour of political freedoms. Overall the EU should 
encourage Kazakhstan to aim as high as it wants to in terms even 
ultimately of Council of Europe membership, which would be conditioned 
on serious democratic development and naturally meeting the Council of 
Europe’s human rights requirements.  
The EU has established an energy dialogue with Kazakhstan, which 
in any case is diversifying its oil export routes across Caspian Sea to Baku.  
The state budget of Kazakhstan is now sufficiently rich that the EU 
should no longer consider it to be a recipient of aid, except for a restricted 
category of operations, mainly in the education and civil society fields. As 
regards technical assistance, for which Kazakhstan has big needs, the 
Commission should explore the model between Kazakhstan and the US 
noted above, whereby Kazakhstan funds USAID with $20 million for 
USAID to procure the needed expert services. The Commission should aim 
at this same model, providing no funding, but arranging access to 
European suppliers of expertise, which the TAIEX bureau could help 
arrange. This would have the double advantage of saving EU funds and 
allowing Kazakhstan to access European expertise without all the burden 
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The education sector deserves priority support from the EU in ways 
that go beyond existing programmes such as Tempus, which however is 
well placed to help Kazakhstan’s move to align higher education on the 
norms of the Bologna process. Kazakhstan is due to open in 2010 a major 
new technical university in Astana, with an initial budgetary endowment 
of $500 million, and to teach entirely in English and to be staffed with 
foreign professors. The Commission should arrange for participation of EU 
universities in this important project in whatever way is suitable, i.e. not 
restricted to some Erasmus scholarships. Kazakhstan also has in Almaty 
several private universities, which assure European level higher education 
(see section 4.2.5). These universities have to charge fees which only the 
rich families of Kazakhstan can afford. The EU could devise a scholarship 
scheme for children from families of modest means to go to these 
universities, which would be a contribution assuring greater equality of 
opportunity in Kazakhstan. 
The human rights dialogue with Kazakhstan is well engaged, but 
needs to become more rigorous with identification of feasible benchmarks 
for monitoring progress, or its absence (see Box 2). As already remarked the 
EU foreign ministers have felt it necessary to issue a statement in December 
2009 on the case of Evgeniy Zhovtis, whose treatment by Kazakhstan’s 
judiciary is out of line with its international commitments, and notably so 
in view of its OSCE chairmanship in 2010.  
Box 2. Agenda for the human rights dialogue with Kazakhstan 
-  Strengthening of judicial authorisation of arrest (approval of arrest warrant).  
-  Non-interference of the state into legal profession  
-  Protection of rights during pre-trial stages of prosecution 
-  De-criminalisation of slander and insult 
-  Further development of the legislation on freedom of assembly  
-  Legislation for freedom of association in line with international standards  
-  Promotion of the freedom of expression, liberalisation of legislation on media  
-  Strengthening the Ombudsman office 
4.4.2  Kyrgyzstan 
Relations with the EU are positive, and in the course of being reinforced by 
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The economy of Kyrgyzstan is extremely weak, with much activity in 
the capital city revolving around a huge wholesale market for the transit of 
Chinese goods into Kazakhstan and Russia, which may now be 
undermined by more rigorous border controls by these two countries upon 
introduction in 2010 of their customs union.  
The hydro-electric power resources are considerable, and new 
investments are being made, yet even this sector has serious problems. The 
water reserves of the huge Toktogul reservoir were depleted to 
dangerously low levels in 2008, but have partly recovered in 2009. The 
major power generating infrastructures date back to the 1970s and are in 
urgent need of renewal.  
In the early years of independence in the 1990s Kyrgyzstan had a 
much more open civil society than other parts of Central Asia, as witnessed 
by active NGOs and the development of private universities. However the 
space for civil society, the freedoms of assembly and media, and political 
pluralism is currently contracting, after the so-called ‘tulip revolution’ of 
2005 turned out to be no more than the replacement of one ruling clan by 
another. Political opposition is being harassed and effectively marginalized. 
These unfavourable tendencies make the EU’s human rights dialogue 
highly relevant, as long as it can get engaged with the key issues (see 
below), identify practical benchmarks to monitor and help reverse the 
current negative trend. 
The government seeks to implement an education reform with 
introduction of Bologna curriculum structures for higher education, and 
this can be supported by the EU Tempus programme. Budget assistance 
from the EU is presently targeting the social sector, but we understand that 
education is a potential new sector for this instrument.  
The private university sector has achieved a certain regional niche, 
with an American University and an OSCE Academy that offers post-
graduate course in disciplines relevant to OSCE core values (conflict and 
peace studies, political science democracy, and next year a course in 
European studies). There is an ambitious plan by the Aga Khan Foundation 
to establish a University of Central Asia, headquartered in Kyrgyzstan, 
with campuses also in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, with a specialization in 
studies for mountain societies. These various initiatives should be 
considered by the EU as bases for supporting the development of a modern 
and incorrupt education sector. 
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Box 3. Agenda for the human rights dialogue with Kyrgyzstan 
-  Cessation of harassment and persecution of opposition members  
-  Liberalisation of law restricting freedom of assembly 
-  Cessation of government harassment of human rights groups and activists  
-  Independent investigation of allegations of deaths and injuries from torture 
in police custody 
-  Cessation of violence against journalists; guarantees for their safety 
-  Cessation of government intimidation of NGOs 
4.4.3  Tajikistan 
Tajikistan may be regarded as a fragile but not failed state. This very poor 
country suffers grave hardships through extreme poverty, compounded by 
breakdowns of electricity supplies in winter, despite its endowment with 
huge hydro-electric power potential. Takijistan is also highly sensitive to 
the risks of spillover of the war and chaos in Afghanistan, where its co-
ethnic Tajik population accounts for 35% of the total, and thus number far 
more than in Tajikistan itself.  
Relations with the EU are good. The European Commission’s 
Delegation has a substantial programme of operations, with its staff due to 
be beefed up in 2010 from 12 to 24 persons, and with appointment of a 
resident Ambassador/Head of Delegation. The Commission and Germany 
are together representing the bulk of aid from Europe. The EU’s aid aims at 
poverty reduction and avoidance of state collapse, with sustained budget 
support for social welfare programmes. As already discussed (section 4.3) 
this is a controversial programme, with diverging views between those 
who applaud this attempt to help the country in its huge difficulties with a 
programme model that involves an integrated package of sectoral policy 
advice and conditions, capacity building and delivery of social 
benefits/projects, through to those who doubt that budget support for such 
a corrupt regime can reach its intended beneficiaries. The EU and other 
European donors support the local development work of the Aga Khan 
Foundation which has a remarkable network of local experts to execute 
projects reaching up into the Pamir mountain villages.  
There is a certain space open for civil society, and this makes the EU’s 
human rights dialogue potentially meaningful, even if there are signs that 
these existing civil liberties are under threat. The civil war of the 1990s 
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but there remains a necessary place for the Islamist political party, and the 
EU is invited to include support for political dialogue with the Islamists as 
a project. This is highly desirable, alongside the tendency in much of 
Central Asia to brand Islamist tendencies as radical terrorists, which has a 
counter-productive effect. 
The government’s major economic priority is completion of the 
Rogun damn, for which it would welcome a consortium of international 
investors. As noted above (section 4.2.7) this could be linked to investment 
in high voltage power lines into South Asia, through Afghanistan into 
Pakistan and India. While this project is extremely ambitious it deserves 
support by the EU since it offers both some chances of advance for the 
economy, together with regional links to South Asia which could become 
part of a post-war regional economic recovery.  
Box 4. Agenda for the human rights dialogue with Tajikistan 
-  Open access to prisons for civil society organisations and the Red Cross. 
-  Ratify the Optional Protocols to the Convention Against Torture, and  
-  ... to the Convention on Discrimination Against Women 
-  De-criminalise punishment for defamation. 
-  Stop the use of child labour on cotton fields. 
-  Introduce an article on torture in the Criminal Code. 
-  Reform the system of free legal aid to the low-income population.  
-  Compensation for forced displacement of people due to state needs.  
4.4.4  Turkmenistan 
Modern Turkmenistan, and in particular its capital Ashgabad, has to be 
seen to be believed. The scale of monumental investments in the last 
decade in giant marble palaces housing the government’s offices and the 
private accommodation of the enriched elite surrounding the leadership, 
and in extravagant monuments celebrating the state and its former 
president, must have been accounting for a large share of the nation’s GDP 
and revenues from gas sales. The population is also supplied with free gas 
and electricity, which is much appreciated, especially when comparisons 
are made with neighbouring Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The new president 
has made some positive moves, but only very limited ones, over the record 
of his notorious predecessor. The population now has freedom of 
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reversal of the former president’s idiosyncratic education policy of 
reducing schooling from 11 to 9 years, and university from 3 to 2 years. But 
still this remains a tightly controlled state, with zero possibility for political 
opposition, media freedoms, or NGOs concerned with political or human 
rights questions. The only NGOs are for family problems and citizen’s 
advice bureau. How repressed are the people? Experienced observers say 
that the people know full well what the rules are, what can and cannot be 
done. So self-enforcement of the rules is the main mode, with zero 
manifestations of political debate or opposition. The system is endemically 
corrupt, and those who get imprisoned are those who fail to make the right 
payoffs. Overall Turkmenistan enters the 21st century still largely cut off 
from the rest of the world, having wasted huge amounts of its natural 
resource wealth on grandiose construction in the capital city. 
In these circumstances the room for the EU to develop its relations 
with Turkmenistan is severely limited, even if an interim agreement on 
trade policy has now entered into force, and a human rights dialogue has 
been set in motion, for which some benchmarks are suggested below. The 
EU is still little known and understood in Turkmenistan, where publicly 
available information is in short supply. A first step to establish the EU’s 
credibility has to be a fully accredited Delegation. The present ‘Europa 
House’ exercises some functions of a delegation but on a small scale, 
without diplomatic accreditation, and staffed by contracted consultants.  
As regards aid activities the most plausible at this stage is to support 
scholarships for students to study in suitable universities necessarily 
outside the country, and this should include scholarships to the private 
universities that exist in Almaty and Bishkek, and not only in Europe (see 
section 4.2.5). However In the autumn of 2009 the Turkmen authorities took 
the extraordinary step of denying the exit of Turkmen students who were 
heading abroad for the beginning of the new academic year. Students who 
had already left earlier for universities in Kyrgyzstan and Bulgaria were 
forced to return to Ashgabat via pressurisation of their families by the 
security services, and have been black-listed (i.e. not able to travel abroad 
for at least 5-7 years).  
The main strategic question open at this stage is whether the EU will 
become a large scale buyer of Turkmenistan’s gas. As discussed above 
(section 4.2.6) the EU could become pro-active in offering to buy long-term 
a large quantity of gas, which would be transported across the Caspian Sea 
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the explosion of the gas pipeline to Russia in April 2009, due to a sudden 
reduction in Russian demand. While the pipeline has now been repaired, 
and a new commercial agreement made with Moscow in January 2010, the 
incident has made Turkmenistan increasingly interested in a multi-vector 
gas export policy. China has now inaugurated its gas pipeline link, with 
transit across Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, which may carry 40-50 bcm of 
gas per year when fully operational. Supplies through a pipeline to Iran are 
now likely to go up from 8 to 14 bcm. An internal West-East pipeline of 40 
bcm capacity is out for tender, which would take gas west to the Caspian 
coast, and thence either go north up the Caspian coast to connect with the 
Russian network, or cross the Caspian to connect with the Nabucco or 
Southern Corridor projects. The government says it is open to export in all 
directions: they will get the gas to the frontier. Turkmenistan says it can do 
all onshore development itself, but this is questionable. The next fields for 
development are deep down, and will need foreign technology, and 
Turkmenistan may be obliged to change its restrictive policy on foreign 
investment.  
Box 5. Agenda for the human rights dialogue with Turkmenistan* 
-  Stop collective punishment, release the family members of prisoners 
-  Stop recruiting prisoners to coercive labour that is hazardous to their health 
-  Create harmonious conditions for culture and tradition of national minorities 
-  Create conditions for independent mass media and outlaw state censorship 
-  Guarantee possibilities for independent public organizations, reform NGO 
law 
-  Stop the persecution of dissidents and civic activists 
-  Allow free entrance into and exit from the country, and notably for students 
-  Create standards of economic transparency for use of energy revenues 
____________________ 
* This list draws on A Common Vision for the Advancement of Human Rights in Turkmenistan, 
circulated by the Norwegian Helsinki Committee, 20 October 2009. 
4.4.5  Uzbekistan 
The lifting in October 2009 by EU foreign ministers of the remaining arms 
embargo sanction imposed after the 2005 Andijan events was a 
controversial decision. The EU hopes that this will be taken as 
encouragement for progressive reforms, whereas independent human 
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However the decision to end the sanctions has been taken, and this 
logically marks the switch to a mode of engagement, and the need to work 
out how to make this effective. The next step already envisaged will be to 
open a full EU delegation in Tashkent, which should incorporate a strong 
public information unit to make the EU better known and understood.  
As of today Uzbekistan remains an extremely difficult environment 
within which to work, given the omnipresent security services, exemplified 
by internal checkpoints at the frontiers of every oblast. However 
Uzbekistan has the ambition to be a leading player in the region and to 
regain international prestige. Its place as the most populous and 
geographically central state of Central Asia makes this a fair ambition. Yet 
this can only come with a greater openness for the movement of people and 
commerce across its borders, and profound reforms also for the 
liberalization of internal commerce and agriculture. The EU can in its 
political dialogue advocate this, and also try to persuade Uzbekistan to 
adopt a more constructive and modern attitude towards regional 
cooperation, first of all in the field of water. The EU has several technical 
assistance cross-border or regional projects in the field of water 
management, which Uzbekistan currently blocks or excludes itself from. As 
argues earlier (in section 4.2.7) there are benefits for downstream states on 
offer from objectively feasible cooperation schemes.  
The level of material prosperity in the main cities of Tashkent and 
Samarkand is quite impressive, in contrast at least to neighbouring 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, with evident investment in the car stock and 
buildings, including school and colleges of higher education. However, 
Uzbekistan’s industrial structure is dependent on heavy tariff protection 
(e.g. the automobile sector with 200% tariffs), except for free trade within 
the CIS from which it has evidently profited. 
There is a new rail link inside Uzbekistan reaching down to Termez 
on the border with Afghanistan, which then links with routes into Iran and 
down to the port of Bandar Abbas. Uzbekistan is concerned with disencla-
ving its economy to the south, and this can fit into the revision of the trans-
continental transport corridor strategies discussed above (section 4.2.8).  
There are almost no functioning EU projects in Uzbekistan at present. 
An exception is an EU funded (UNDP-executed) rural living standards 
project, which received favourable evaluation for getting to the grass roots 
of poverty reduction. Given the extreme difficulties for active operations 
within Uzbekistan the education sector provides a plausible sector for INTO EURASIA - MONITORING THE EU’S CENTRAL ASIA STRATEGY | 111 
 
concentrated effort. For example the British Council’s offices in Tashkent is 
a beehive of learning activity for Uzbek students, with a German cultural 
centre next door doing the same. In spite of the regime’s repression there is 
a private Westminster University flourishing in Tashkent, and support for 
ventures such as these with scholarships for studies at this local campus is 
desirable, complementing the Erasmus scheme for mobility to Europe.  
Box 6. Agenda for the human rights dialogue with Uzbekistan 
-  Release of human rights defenders and prisoners of conscience 
-  Liberalisation of accreditation and operation of NGOs  
-  Guarantee of freedom of speech and of independent media 
-  Implementation of conventions against child labour 
-  Alignment of election processes with OSCE commitments 
-  Cooperation with UN special rapporteurs on human rights issues 
-  Abolition of restrictions on free entrance and exit of the country 
-  Cessation of fabricated ‘terrorist threats’ for imprisoning religious leaders  
-  Independent investigation of allegations of torture in prisons, punishment 
for offenders 
-  Law to permit independent journalism in all areas (economic, political, 
cultural) 
-  Liberalisation of international cooperation of civic activists and organizations 
-  Legislation to regulate law-enforcement bodies (police) 
____________________ 
* The first six items come from the EU’s press release of 27 October 2009 announcing the 
lifting of the arms embargo. 
4.4.6  The regional dimension – from Central Asia to EurAsia 
The EU seeks to foster enlightened regional cooperation among the five 
states and allocates 30% of its budget to regional projects. It comes to 
Central Asia with a presumption in favour of regional cooperation, 
although the more ambitious concept of regional integration looks like 
remaining way beyond the political horizon for Central Asia for many 
years. But has the regional dimension to the EU Central Asia strategy been 
adequately conceived for the 21st century? The Eurasian landmass is 
witnessing huge changes with the rise of China and India, after the 20th 
century when Central Asia was a region integrated only into the Soviet 
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The EU Central Asia Strategy has already seen a significant 
development of the regional dimension to the processes of political 
dialogues between the EU and all five Central Asian states together, of 
which there are several circuits: foreign ministers concerned with broad 
political and security issues, and sector-specific dialogue circuits for 
education, water and environment, and the rule of law. These all involve 
structured meetings at various ministerial, senior official and expert levels. 
Concrete results from these activities are not so far visible, yet the EU seeks 
to promote a gradual movement of ideas among the Central Asian 
participants in favour of regional cooperation, even if there are some sharp 
contrary developments happening outside these meetings (e.g. the current 
breakdown of the regional electricity grid). The case in favour of this 
considerable investment in regional political dialogue with the EU is that it 
may produce a mutual learning process between the states of the region; 
and, as and when the participants see the case for regional cooperation, this 
will have to be based on common norms and rules. If this advances it will 
be a valuable systemic achievement.  
However the objective limits to Central Asian regionalism are 
evident, and this is reflected in a shift in EU spending, reducing the weight 
of regional programmes and increasing bilateral ones. At the same time 
there is also a case for a second concept of regional cooperation, which we 
may call ‘external’ rather than ‘internal’ regionalism. The external 
regionalism would involve cooperative activity with neighbours external to 
the region, whereas the internal regionalism is restricted to the five Central 
Asian states. With its modest population size the Central Asian regional 
cooperation does not have much potential if it is not part of a wider 
economic openness. While there are some activities which have intrinsically 
a cross-border regional cooperative dimension, such as border 
management itself, transport corridors and above all water management, it 
is nonetheless the case that all these three examples have vital cross-border 
dimensions linking to neighbours external to the region, with trans-
continental dimensions. Thus, border management concerns above all the 
trafficking of drugs where Central Asia is just a transit passage between 
Afghanistan and Europe, Russia and China. Transport corridors are 
essentially a trans-continental affair, with links form West China to West 
Europe being developed as well as North-South links down to South Asia. 
The water issue also, until now viewed as the quintessential Central Asia 
question, sees a possible South Asian hydro-electricity link option that 
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Asia has demand for summer electricity, which is when downstream 
Central Asia wants the water for agriculture). The Commission is seeking 
to develop linkages between the Eastern Partnership and Central Asia 
through regional projects joining the two regions, especially in the energy, 
transport and environment sectors. However what is lacking is a 
framework for wider EurAsian cooperative projects in which the EU’s 
activities in Central Asia would link also to Russia, or China, or South Asia, 
or combinations thereof.  
One may also look at the political priorities of the states of the region 
in this light. Kazakhstan looks west to Europe with its “Path to Europe” 
programme as a strategic move to avoid exclusive dependence on Russia 
and China, and as part of its modernization drive. Turkmenistan, while 
remaining a closed and repressive political system, nonetheless frames its 
development priority in the opening of gas pipeline connections towards 
all points of the compass, North to Russia, East to China, South to Iran, and 
potentially East across the Caspian Sea to Europe, if the EU were to make a 
credible and major offer. Kyrgyzstan’s economy is now substantially 
dependent on a transit trade function for Chinese goods to flow through to 
Kazakhstan and Russia. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are concerned to 
disenclave themselves to the south with transport corridors through 
Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan to the Gulf and Indian Ocean, and they are 
now inescapably affected by the Afghanistan drama, with their ethnic kin 
forming the most important minorities there.  
All these wider regional or trans-continental issues that involve 
Central Asia are also of concern to the EU, but in a much wider context 
than just Central Asia. For the EU there is a cluster of essentially EurAsian 
issues here, more than just Central Asian issues, with important long-tem 
implications for the EU’s relations with Russia, China, and India, as well as 
the shorter-term priority of finding some kind of political resolution of the 
Afghanistan imbroglio. The case for the EU making a move towards an 
EurAsian policy in cooperation with other major powers and multilateral 
institutions was already developed in 2006 by Linn and Tiomkin.123 One 
recent US-authored study suggests that the western policy makers should 
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regroup Central Asia with South Asia, rather than in a former Soviet Union 
group, and the US State Department has reorganised itself in this way.124 
The EU has moved partly in this direction by grouping Central Asia with 
the rest of Asia for the purpose of its aid administration, but we feel that for 
the EU a EurAsia frame is more suitable than just a link to South Asia.  
EU foreign policy has now to focus on the issues of the newly 
emerging multi-polar world, with China, India, Russia, and the EU itself as 
newly emerging or re-emerging major powers on the Eurasian land mass. 
The No 1 strategic challenge is to find ways to secure some kind of 
normative cooperative order across a host of economic, political and 
security issues, based on some mix of multilateralism and cooperative 
arrangements between the major players. In this context Central Asia is 
unique as a landlocked region sitting in the middle between the big four of 
EurAsia: Russia to its North, China to the East, India to the South and the 
EU to the West.  
Evaluation. The EU has reason to make a further step in its conception 
of the multiple regional dimensions of its foreign policy, which already has 
the Eastern Partnership, Northern Dimension, Union for the 
Mediterranean, Black Sea Synergy and now the Central Asia strategy. Each 
of these initiatives has its rationale. What is missing, however, is an 
overarching EurAsian dimension, looking for the ways to devise 
cooperative ventures reaching across these several regions into the wider 
Eurasian landmass, adapted to the needs of the emerging multi-polar 
world. Such an initiative would, inter alia, be a constructive move towards 
Russia after the awkward period in which the launch of the Eastern 
Partnership has been seen as deepening the segmentation of the post-Soviet 
space in EU policies.125 The present ‘internal’ regionalism of the Central 
Asian strategy would continue its role of facilitating political dialogue with 
and between the five states. But major issues should find their place in an 
‘external’ regionalism that could be framed as part of a wider EurAsian 
strategy.  
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5.  LOCATING CENTRAL ASIA IN A 
NORMATIVE GLOBAL STRATEGY 
his final chapter explores how the Central Asia strategy might fit into 
a global concept of EU foreign policy, which first requires some 
definition of the EU’s global strategy. The EU already has 
relationships with most of the world’s regions, including sub-Saharan 
Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America and Central Asia, as well as the 
European neighbourhood, and bilaterally through strategic partnerships 
with China, India, Russia and the EU. But what is it trying to do in all these 
places?126 Can there be a strategic coherence running through these 
operations in a very heterogeneous set of regions and major states, which 
would be the core content of an EU foreign policy?127 If so, how might a 
Central Asia Strategy fit in with this? 
One might wonder whether it is necessary to ask such questions for a 
region with a modest population size compared to the billions of people in 
the world’s main continental regions or states. However, it is an important 
special case, given that it sees the presence of virtually all the world’s 
global actors at a time when a new world order is in the making. The new 
assembly of major powers might as well try to come to terms with one 
another in this relatively simple and unthreatening case, since they will be 
faced with far more dramatic challenges elsewhere. In this respect Central 
Asia could be of some exemplary importance for the future world order. 
These broad questions are indeed of huge practical importance. The 
world leaves its US-dominated uni-polar episode in the last half century. It 
                                                      
126 The EU has produced some documents to answer these questions, notably: “A 
Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy”, submitted by 
Javier Solana to the European Council in December 2003. 
127 As is argued in Sven Biscop (ed.), The Value of Power, the Power of Values: A call 
for an EU Grand Strategy, Egmont Paper No. 33, Brussels: Academia Press, October 
2009.  
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is entering a new multi-polar epoch, with emerging or re-emerging major 
powers – China, India, Russia and Brazil, to which may be added the EU; 
or, according to some authors, it is becoming a non-polar128 or inter-polar129 
world. This confusing terminology only reflects the uncertainties 
surrounding the emerging world constellation. The fundamental question, 
which is as yet unanswered, is whether the new epoch is going to prove to 
be stable and enlightened, or anarchic, unstable and conflict-ridden. There 
are two extreme and alternative views on offer.  
The first one is a realist, hard power view of international relations, 
with a long historical reality behind it, reflecting the prevalence of balance 
of power politics in Europe over several centuries preceding the present 
epoch.130 Time and again situations with fragile balances of power between 
multiple great powers have broken down into violent struggles for power, 
a n d  c a t a s t r o p h i c  w a r .  I n  t h i s  v i e w  o f  h i s t o r y  t h e  u r g e  f o r  p o w e r  i s  t h e  
driver of international relations. Hegemonic orders have been seen to be 
quite stable. But multi-polarity, in this gloomy view, is condemned to be 
unstable because of the inherent problems of uncertainty over the 
intentions of different actors, and the dangers of strategic miscalculation. 
The current epoch may differ from earlier centuries in that China, India, 
Russia, the US and two EU member states all have nuclear capability, and 
so the nuclear logic of mutually assured destruction may help keep the 
peace. On the other hand, the real difficulties of achieving ordered world 
governance in the new multi-polar world are only now becoming clear, and 
the global economic and financial crisis and failure of the Copenhagen 
climate change summit show the enormity of the issues at stake.  
The alternative world view, which is today only partly a reality, 
advocates a rule-based, law-based and international normative world order 
with effective multilateral institutions. All the world’s major powers say in 
principle that they want this, but it is more easily said than done, as a 
review of the current and recent policies of China, India, Russia, the US and 
                                                      
128 Richard N. Haas, “The Age of Non-Polarity: What will follow US Dominance?”, 
Foreign Affairs, May-June 2008. 
129 Giovanni Grevi, The Inter-Polar World: a New Scenario, EUISS Occasional Papers, 
No. 79, Paris, June 2009. 
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also the EU actually shows.131 The EU declares that it wants to contribute to 
a normative world order, and indeed is now bound by the Lisbon Treaty to 
do so (see Box 7). However, other global actors are more focused on the 
exercise of power. This is certainly the case in Central Asia where the actual 
political environment is so distant from European values of human rights 
and democracy, and where Russia and China are now the most prominent 
external actors, with Russia pursuing an ultra-realist policy, and China 
very present economically but abstaining from any kind of normative 
influence beyond a general doctrine of political non-interference. 
Box 7. Lisbon Treaty - General Provisions on the EU’s External Action – Art. 21 
1. The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles 
that have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it 
seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality 
and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human 
dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of 
the United Nations Charter and international law. The Union shall seek to 
develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, 
regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first 
subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in 
particular in the framework of the United Nations. 
2. The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall 
work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in 
order to: 
(a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and 
integrity; 
(b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the 
principles of international law; 
(c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with 
the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, 
including those relating to external borders; 
(d) foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of 
developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty; 
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(e) encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including 
through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade; 
(f) help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of 
the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in 
order to ensure sustainable development; 
(g) assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made 
disasters; and 
(h) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation 
and good global governance. 
The actual world lies somewhere between these two poles. There is a 
growing body of international law governing political and security issues 
on matters of interstate relations and human rights, as well as commercial 
and economic affairs. There are significant multilateral institutions, all of 
which are active in Central Asia (UN, OSCE, World Bank, IMF, Asian 
Development Banks and EBRD), and important continental sub-systems 
with their own institutions and governing rules, of which the EU is the 
most developed example. The major powers work with and through these 
various institutions and bodies of international law, as well as bilaterally. 
But the  question that remains is the relative weight in the system between 
the realist power play, versus the international public sphere governed or 
seriously framed by international law, norms and values.  
How then might such an EU strategy be framed for the particular 
case of Central Asia, founded on norms of general validity for foreign and 
security policy?  
The approach can be framed in terms of two pillars:132  
-  Protection of the home territory from external threats, and  
-  Projection of a values-based order in the world outside.  
Both can be discussed from a normative perspective, which is more 
promising than to join in the stereotyped debate that opposes interests and 
values.133 Energy supplies and security concerns are cited as the key drivers 
                                                      
132 This again follows S. Biscop, op. cit.  
133 The frequently heard distinction between values and interests has been severely 
questioned in scholarly analyses, since the interpretation of a value is conditioned 
by underlying interests, or on the other hand values represent the conceptual 
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of realist geo-politics. Like everyone else, the EU has existential interests for 
its economy and society in reliable energy supplies and protection from 
various security threats. But there are different ways of securing these 
interests, in which a values-driven approach can still be of the essence.  
5.1  Protection from security threats 
The states of Central Asia and the EU share a highly developed normative 
code for international security in the basic principles of the Helsinki Final 
Act of 1995, now embedded in the OSCE. The Helsinki principles amount 
to a comprehensive normative security concept, aiming at conflict 
prevention and resolution.134 President Medvedev has been advocating a 
strengthening of the pan-European security order, “from Vancouver to 
Vladivostok”, in a draft Treaty for European Security published in 
December 2009. While there are discussions underway in the OSCE on this, 
it is not clear how this would be operationalised or mark an advance on the 
Helsinki principles. Its normative content is in fact much more limited than 
the Helsinki principles, excluding all that in OSCE terminology related to 
the human dimension. Discussions are ongoing, however, and 
Kazakhstan’s presidency of the OSCE in 2010 provides an opportunity for 
the EU to work with the Central Asian states towards a greater common 
interest in strengthening the effectiveness of the OSCE in the region. 
Concretely Central Asia presents no direct security threats to the EU. 
However it is relevant to three such threats. 
Insecurity of energy supplies. Central Asia can contribute to the 
expansion and diversification of supplies of oil, especially from 
Kazakhstan, and gas especially from Turkmenistan. The exploitation of 
energy resources can be framed by norms of environmental sustainability, 
corporate governance and income distribution – all considerations of first 
                                                                                                                                       
prism through which interests are prioritised. For a discussion see N. Tocci, op. cit, 
pp. 5-6.  
134 I. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty, II. 
Refraining from the threat or use of force, III. Inviolability of frontiers, IV. 
Territorial integrity of States, V. Peaceful settlement of disputes, VI. Non-
intervention in internal affairs, VII. Respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, VIII. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples, IX. Co-operation 
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rate relevance in Central Asia, for which the above-mentioned Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is relevant.  
Diversification of oil and gas supplies dilutes monopolistic 
concentrations of energy power, which is in principle desirable both as a 
matter of economic policy, and in order to lessen the hazard of energy 
supplies being used (as in practice by Russia) as a geo-political instrument. 
In the case of Turkmenistan it is sometimes argued that the EU should not 
try to buy its gas because of the extremely repressive nature of its political 
regime. But is it plausible to boycott its gas for this reason? If so what about 
supplies from Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Libya or Venezuela – all 
authoritarian regimes with varying degrees of political repression? The 
world’s hydrocarbon resources are concentrated in these places, and this 
may be no coincidence as extreme concentrations of such wealth induce 
concentrations of power. Under these conditions the normative energy 
policy can push for standards of corporate governance, transparency over 
the use of revenues and income distribution in the producing states as 
through the EITI, but the ultimate norm is that of environmental 
sustainability at the global level through reduced dependence on fossil 
fuels, i.e. climate change policy.  
Al Qaida and Talibanisation. Central Asia is adjacent to the war in 
Afghanistan, which is being fought to protect Europe and the world from al 
Qaida, with logistical routing of supplies for NATO forces through Central 
Asia. These routes have to be maintained, and can hardly be criticised as an 
unprincipled pursuit of interests. Central Asia is not, at least for the time 
being, seeing a spillover of Talibanisation as in Pakistan, but there are 
dangers of spreading Islamic radicalisation in Central Asia, with Europe 
inclined to advocate dialogue with moderate Islamist movements, and their 
inclusion in political processes.  
Drug trafficking. Central Asia is also part of the route for drug 
supplies from Afghanistan to Europe, which is a matter of vital concern for 
the public health of Europe and its society. The EU supports a sustained 
effort to combat drug trade and addiction in Central Asia, and should 
explore the means to extend this into effective cooperation with Russia and 
Eastern Europe.  
5.2  Projection of values 
How would the EU, as a global actor seeking to work towards a normative 
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values-based agenda, as can be extracted from official documents, is long 
and complex. One can discuss political values, yet for countries faced with 
huge economic development challenges the priorities most often begin 
with basic issues of poverty reduction, food security, economic 
development and environmental security. The EU has aid instruments 
aiming at several points in this agenda, but the scale is modest compared to 
the massive investments now being made by China in particular in 
economic infrastructures. This means that the EU’s efforts have to be 
profiled very distinctly, and here the grants towards social and educational 
programmes are examples. Expansion of the education programme could 
prove the most effective and durable way to introduce European civil, 
professional and cultural values and standards into Central Asia.  
Human rights. It is evident that the EU makes a substantial effort to 
help Central Asian states improve their highly problematic human rights 
situations. The legitimacy of this activity is based on the common 
normative principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948, to which all Central Asian and EU states have subscribed, 
coupled to the voluntary willingness of the Central Asian states to enter 
into human rights dialogue with the EU. The EU is well placed to do this, 
since the human rights Conventions of the Council of Europe, to which all 
EU member states adhere, are based on the Universal Declaration, and 
further developed though the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights. It is notable that no one else among the major external 
partners of Central Asia is willing or able to engage in human rights 
dialogue with Central Asian states, certainly not Russia of China, nor even 
the United States at present 
Democracy and the rule of law. Contrasting with human rights, 
democracy is not internationally codified legally. There are open questions 
concerning the length of the time horizon – from medium to long-term – 
over which major progress might be expected in Central Asia. The EU is 
cautious in pushing for Western-style democracy in political and cultural 
contexts which are very far from this, or where the basic needs of the 
population for survival and escape from extreme poverty are the first 
concerns of the population. Given that political change must necessarily 
come about bottom-up and from within, the major contribution of the EU 
at this stage would be to help create a rule-bound context in Central Asia 
conducive to political change. This relates, as we have seen, to one of the 
EU’s priority actions on the rule of law. Beyond domestic legal systems this 
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the bilateral relations the EU establishes with the Central Asian republics. 
The EU is well placed to do this given that its foreign policies are typically 
carried out through contractual relations with third states. The Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreements with the Central Asian states are the vehicle 
for this, and these agreements can be progressively renewed and deepened, 
as is planned with Kazakhstan in the first instance. This is because these 
contractual ties delve into a wide variety of policy areas and affecting a 
wide range of institutions, laws and administrative structures and 
procedures within neighbouring countries. While not amounting to 
democracy per se, the establishment of the rule of law is a necessary 
prerequisite for home-grown democracy to emerge from within.  
Regionalism. Central Asian regional cooperation should be supported 
where it can clearly deliver benefits, but the EU should not imagine some 
transplant of its own experience of regional integration. The Central Asian 
region is too small, heterogeneous and enclaved between very big 
neighbours for intra-regional cooperation to become a main driver of 
progress as has been the case in Europe. While there should therefore be no 
exaggerated or premature hopes for regional cooperation in Central Asia, 
the quest for a renewed and modern Central Asian regional identity is 
something that should be viewed sympathetically, with the chance that this 
would naturally lead to some authentic normative foundations. The 
development of the several regional policy dialogues between the EU and 
the five states together can help foster this. On the other hand, as argued 
above (section 4.4.6) the concept of regionalism advocated by the EU for 
Central Asia could be supplemented in a more outward looking or 
‘extroverted’ direction, in addition to the quest for intra-regional 
cooperation. This links to the issue of trans-continental cooperation around 
Central Asia or a EurAsian dimension to EU policies, and the quest for 
cooperative multi-polarity, to which we return in a moment.  
Multilateralism. The EU makes substantial use in Central Asia of 
international organisations such as the UNDP and Council of Europe for 
executing some important projects (e.g. border management, rule of law), 
and this helps take the pressure off the Commission’s limited 
administrative resources while at the same time supporting multilateral 
organisations which pursue the same normative objectives as the EU. OSCE 
could also be included in such cooperation; it already receives considerable 
project funding from EU member states bilaterally, but could also be 
supported by the EU itself. The EU can and actually does work 
cooperatively with the World Bank, IMF, and EBRD, with various funding INTO EURASIA - MONITORING THE EU’S CENTRAL ASIA STRATEGY | 123 
 
or co-funding operations. It is striking that these multilateral organisations 
are to a high degree staffed with European nationals, including now those 
from new member states who more often have Russian language 
competence. The EU should exploit these strengths, and regard it as part of 
its alliance building for values-based reform efforts.  
Multi-polarity. This is the new challenge, given the passing of the 
unipolar US-dominated epoch and the rise of the new or renewed major 
powers almost all of which are present in Central Asia. The challenge is of 
great difficulty given the different foreign policy philosophies currently on 
display, between on the one hand non-democratic Russia and China who 
join in the SCO club with the Central Asia states agreeing on a strong 
doctrine of political non-interference, versus on the other hand democratic 
EU, US, Turkey and India which are all inclined in maybe differing degrees 
to advocate a different normative foreign policy concept. The capacity of 
the major powers to work more cooperatively at the global level is 
uncertain to say the least. Yet this is where the case of Central Asia presents 
an opportunity. Could the several major actors work together in this region 
concretely as an example of global cooperation? There are at least three 
spheres of policy which could see this could be done. The first would be 
cooperation over common security threats coming from Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, in particular in the form of drugs and radical Islamic terrorism. 
The second is the regional water-hydropower nexus, where major solutions 
could best rely on international consortia with all major players present. 
The third is the optimisation of trans-continental transport routes for trade. 
As for organisational initiatives, the EU might, if invited, become an 
observer member of the SCO. Or, alternatively, the EU meetings with the 
five Central Asian states could for some purposes be extended to include 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.  
Overall we conclude in support of the shaping of a distinct normative 
or values-based strategy that would be at the heart of the branding of EU 
foreign policy world-wide, while seeing its application adapted to the 
conditions of various regions of the world. At first sight it might be 
supposed that it would be difficult or impossible for such a strategy to fit 
into a region such as Central Asia with political regimes that are currently 
so distant from European democratic norms. Yet on close examination the 
c a s e  o f  C e n t r a l  A s i a  s h o w s  t h a t  t h i s  n e e d  n o t  b e  s o ,  o n  t h e  c o n t r a r y .  
Moreover, since the EU has decided to have a Central Asia strategy it is 
obliged as a matter of strategic consistency to articulate this in its world 
view.  124 | 
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I.  Introduction: The EU and Central Asia 
Central Asia has a centuries-old tradition of bringing Europe and Asia together. It 
lies at a strategically important intersection between the two continents. The 
Central Asian States of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan have known considerable evolution in political and economic 
transformation since attaining independence. They have established statehood, 
safeguarded multi-ethnic understanding and inter-religious communication. By 
joining the OSCE, they subscribed to the Organization’s values, standards and 
commitments. By signing the United Nations Millennium Declaration they set 
themselves ambitious goals.  
At the beginning of the 21st century, the time has come for a new 
partnership between the EU and Central Asian States in a globalised world.  
The common goal of achieving stability and prosperity by means of peaceful 
inter-action makes Europe and Central Asia partners for increased cooperation. 
The strong EU commitment towards its Eastern neighbours within the framework 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy will also bring Europe and Central Asia 
c l o s e r  t o  e a c h  o t h e r ,  b o t h  i n  t e r m s  of political cooperation and economic 
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The development and consolidation of stable, just and open societies, 
adhering to international norms, is essential to bring the partnership between the 
European Union and Central Asian States to full fruition. Good governance, the 
rule of law, human rights, democratisation, education and training are key areas 
where the EU is willing to share experience and expertise. 
The EU can offer experience in regional integration leading to political 
stability and prosperity. Lessons learnt from the political and economic 
transformation of Central and Eastern Europe can also be offered. With their rich 
traditions and centuries-old exchanges, the EU and Central Asia can contribute 
actively to the dialogue between civilisations.  
Many challenges facing the globalised world affect Europe and Central Asia 
alike, and warrant a common response. Security questions and regional economic 
development require close cooperation of the EU with each Central Asian state, 
taking into account their geographical location, in particular with respect to 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. This applies i.a. to developments in the areas of 
border management, migration, the fight against organized crime and 
international terrorism, as well as human, drugs, and arms trafficking.  
The dependency of the EU on external energy sources and the need for a 
diversified energy supply policy in order to increase energy security open further 
perspectives for cooperation between the EU and Central Asia. EU efforts to 
strengthen local energy markets will help to improve investment conditions, 
increase energy production and efficiency in Central Asia and diversify energy 
supply and distribution in the region.  
Through this Strategy and the Commission’s assistance programme for the 
period of 2007-2013, the EU defines the priorities for its cooperation with each 
Central Asian state according to its specific needs, requirements and performance, 
including human rights, good governance, democracy and social development. 
Within the new external assistance instruments based on the EU-budget 2007-2013 
the EU has planned to double the financial means for assisting Central Asian 
States.  
Building upon and complementing the Commission’s assistance 
programme, Member States of the EU are prepared to study specific bilateral 
partnership and twinning programmes with individual Central Asian States as 
well as programmes with a regional dimension based on an adequate and 
coordinated needs-assessment. Member States will support the Community’s 
programmes to contribute to a more coherent and visible EU policy in the region.  
In order to address issues of particular importance, the EU will within the 
framework of this Strategy: 
•  Establish a regular regional political dialogue at Foreign Minister level; 
•  Start an “European Education Initiative” and support Central Asian 
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•  of an “e-silk-highway”; 
•  Start an “EU Rule of Law Initiative”; 
•  Establish a regular, result-oriented “Human Rights Dialogue” with each of 
the Central Asian States; 
•  Conduct a regular energy dialogue with Central Asian States. 
In implementing the goals and objectives laid down in this Strategy, the EU 
will be guided by the principles of equal dialogue, transparency and result 
orientation. It will seek close cooperation with all neighbouring countries of 
Central Asia. 
II.  EU strategic interests: Security and stability 
The EU has a strong interest in a peaceful, democratic and economically 
prosperous Central Asia. These aims are interrelated. The aim of the EU Strategy is 
therefore to actively cooperate with the Central Asian States in reaching these goals 
as well as to contribute to safeguarding peace and prosperity in neighbouring 
countries.  
The Strategy builds on the progress which the Central Asian States have 
themselves made since attaining independence. It takes account of their common 
aspects as well as specific national contexts and requirements.  
It also builds on the results obtained under the implementation of the 
various Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, EU assistance programmes and 
other initiatives taken by the EU to support the states of Central Asia.  
The Strategy is based upon common interests of the EU and the states of 
Central Asia. To align expectations of Central Asian partners with those of the EU 
will be a mutually beneficial and reinforcing process. 
The EU has an interest in security and stability as well as in adherence to 
human rights and the rule of law in Central Asian States because:  
•  Strategic, political and economic developments as well as increasing trans-
regional challenges in 
•  Central Asia impact directly or indirectly on EU interests; 
•  With EU enlargement, the inclusion of the Southern Caucasus into the 
European Neighbourhood Policy and the Black Sea Synergy Initiative, 
Central Asia and the EU are moving closer together; 
•  Significant energy resources in Central Asia and the region’s aim to diversify 
trade partners and supply routes can help meet EU energy security and 
supply needs.  
The EU strongly believes that strengthening the commitment of Central 
Asian States to international law, the rule of law, human rights and democratic 
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Central Asia, thus making the countries of the region reliable partners for the EU 
with shared common interests and goals. 
III.  Instruments 
In order to intensify cooperation with Central Asian States, the EU will make full 
use of the potential of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, Commission and 
Member States programmes, cooperation frameworks such as the Baku Initiative 
and political dialogue, using the variety of CFSP instruments. Cooperation with 
the UN, in particular the ECE, the OSCE, the Venice Commission of the Council of 
Europe, NATO, international financial institutions and with other regional 
organizations and fora will be enhanced. The EUSR, EU Member State embassies 
and the European Commission delegations should seek to strengthen cooperation 
with the OSCE. In addition, the EU seeks to put into place, together with  
Central Asian States, new forms of cooperation, such as a regular bilateral 
human rights dialogue. 
The EUSR and the Commission as well as Member States play an important 
r o l e  i n  i m p l e m e n t i n g  t h i s  S t r a t e g y .  T h e  E U S R  s h a l l ,  o n  b e h a l f  o f  t h e  H i g h  
Representative and in accordance with his mandate, together with the Commission 
and the Presidency, and without prejudice to Community competence, monitor the 
implementation process, make recommendations and report to relevant Council 
bodies on a regular basis.  
Twinning and seconding staff between EU and Central Asian 
administrations or companies is an essential part of EU cooperation with Central 
Asia in order to introduce EU-wide best practices in connection with Community 
legislation. This policy will be intensified based on the experience gained. 
Public-private partnership initiatives as well as bilateral instruments and 
Member State programmes can play an important role in increasing the EU’s 
commitment in Central Asia.  
Interaction with international financial institutions will be strengthened, 
including the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD). The European Investment Bank (EIB) should play an 
important role in financing projects of interest to the EU in Central Asia. 
IV.  Bilateral and regional cooperation 
The EU Strategy aims at a balanced bilateral and regional approach. The EU will 
balance policy approaches in Central Asia according to the differing needs of every 
country and to the performance of each country. The EU will foster regional 
cooperation among Central Asian States and between Central Asian States and 
other regions.  
Bilateral cooperation will be of special importance. It will be strengthened to 
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Central Asian States. It is essential to cooperate bilaterally on issues such as human 
rights, economic diversification, energy and other sectoral issues, including youth 
and education. The intensity of the cooperation will reflect the commitment to 
transition and reform of each country.  
A regional approach is suitable for tackling common regional challenges 
such as organised crime, human, drugs and arms trafficking, terrorism and non-
proliferation issues, inter-cultural dialogue, energy, environmental pollution, 
water management, migration as well as border management and transport 
infrastructure. In this regard the EU will cooperate with international financial 
institutions, multilateral and regional organizations and institutions.  
The EU is prepared to enter into an open and constructive dialogue with 
regional organizations in Central Asia and to establish regular ad hoc contacts i.a. 
with EURASEC, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), CICA, CSTO, 
CAREC and CARICC. 
V.  A strengthened EU approach  
Human rights, rule of law, good governance and democratization  
The development of a stable political framework and of functioning economic 
structures are dependent on respect for the rule of law, human rights, good 
governance and the development of transparent, democratic political structures.  
The EU and its Member States intend to step up support for the protection of 
human rights and for the creation and development of an independent judiciary, 
thus making a sustainable contribution to the establishment of structures based on 
the rule of law and international human rights standards. Cooperation on justice 
between the Central Asian States and the EU Member States will also be 
appropriate. The EU will cooperate closely with the OSCE, the Council of Europe, 
the UN and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in this field.  
The EU is engaged in human rights dialogues with a number of countries. 
Those dialogues are an instrument of the Union’s external policy. Human rights 
dialogues constitute an essential part of the EU’s overall strategy aimed at 
promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, sustainable 
development, peace and stability.  
Against this background and on the basis of the relevant EU guidelines, the 
EU will raise human rights issues with each Central Asian state through an 
appropriate channel for discussion, inter alia by entering into a structured, regular 
and results-oriented human rights dialogue. The form and the modalities of such 
dialogue will be defined individually and at a future stage. The objectives of a 
human rights dialogue with each of the countries of Central Asia should include: 
•  Discussing questions of mutual interest and enhancing cooperation on 
human rights, inter alia in multilateral fora such as the United Nations and 
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•  Raising the concerns felt by the EU as regards the human rights situation in 
the countries concerned, information gathering and initiatives to improve 
the relevant human rights situation.  
In addition, human rights dialogues contribute to supporting practical steps 
aimed at meeting human rights objectives at national level, in particular through 
financial and technical cooperation and specific projects to be funded under the 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights.  
The EU will respond to suggestions put forward by the Central Asian States 
and will further intensify cooperation on matters pertaining to the rule of law, 
good governance and combating corruption. To this end, the EU will develop a 
Rule of Law Initiative which addresses the specific priorities identified by each 
country. EU Member States and the Commission will coordinate their projects 
closely. Within the framework of this Rule of Law Initiative, the EU will support 
the Central Asian States in core legal reforms, including reform of the judiciary, 
and in drawing up effective legislation, for example in the fields of administrative 
and commercial law.  
In promoting the consolidation of peace and international justice, the EU 
and its Member States are determined to share, with the Central Asian States their 
experience in the adoption of the necessary legal adjustments required to accede to 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and in combating 
international crime in accordance with international law. 
The EU and Member States will aim to: 
•  Allocate adequate funds to this Rule of Law Initiative; 
•  Second judicial and administrative experts to Central Asian States on both 
short-term and longterm assignments; 
•  Provide training opportunities to experts from Central Asian States; 
•  Support the transparent implementation of legal reform; 
•  Offer the possibility of international exchanges by organizing and 
sponsoring specialized conferences; 
•  Facilitate cooperation by Central Asian States with the Venice Commission 
of the Council of Europe; 
•  Encourage implementation of ILO norms and conventions for decent work; 
•  Coordinate closely with existing activities of OSCE field missions, the Office 
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), bilateral 
programmes as well as the UN and the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights; 
•  and provide technical assistance and establish close cooperation aimed at 
making the legislative and constitutional amendments required for accession 
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The task of sustaining a culture of human rights and making democracy 
work for its citizens calls for the active involvement of civil society. A developed 
and active civil society and independent media are vital for the development of a 
pluralistic society. The EU will cooperate with the Central Asian States to this end 
and promote enhanced exchanges in civil society. 
The EU will also pursue its objectives of ensuring the promotion and 
protection of human rights throughout the world, as well as in Central Asia states, 
through international bodies such as the General Assembly or the Human Rights 
Council as appropriate. The EU is willing to cooperate with Central Asian States in 
these international fora to achieve this common aim. 
Investing in the future: youth and education 
Central Asia’s future will be shaped by its young people. The majority of Central 
Asia’s population is under the age of 25, providing enormous potential for 
development. Good education is essential in order to open up this potential for the 
younger generation.  
The EU and Member States will therefore set up a European Education 
Initiative for Central Asia in order to contribute to the adaptation of the education 
systems of Central Asian States to the needs of the globalised world. It is willing to 
cooperate with major international partners and donors supporting educational 
programmes and institutions.  
Under the European Education Initiative, the EU and Member States will in 
particular offer support in the fields of 
•  Primary school education; 
•  Secondary school education; 
•  Vocational education and training; 
•  Higher education cooperation, academic and student exchanges, for instance 
under the new Erasmus Mundus facility and TEMPUS and bilaterally. 
The EU will support the development of regional education centres and 
cooperate closely with the OSCE Academy in Bishkek. The EU stands ready to 
open European Studies Institutes in the region. The EU is prepared to grant 
scholarships for students from Central Asian countries to European universities. 
The EU will also support the continuation of the activities performed by the 
European Training Foundation in the field of vocational education and training in 
Central Asia.  
Furthermore, the EU stands ready to support Central Asian States in linking 
with the EU e-network through the development of an ‘e-silk-highway’ and to 
promote long distance learning. It is our aim to link Central Asia to global Internet-
based communication networks and to enable Central Asian students, teachers, 
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Promotion of economic development, trade and investment 
The EU supports the removal of trade barriers between the Central Asian States 
and it will continue to support WTO accession for the four Central Asian States 
which are not yet WTO members on commercially viable terms and in full 
compliance with WTO requirements. WTO accession is key for wider economic 
reforms and diversification and better integration of the countries into the 
international trade and economic system. The EU will promote the creation of 
regulatory and institutional frameworks for an improved business and investment 
environment and further support economic diversification. The EU will continue to 
cooperate with Central Asian States in order to improve access for Central Asian 
products to EU markets. In this regard the renewed EU Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP – 2006/2015) offers the best ever preferential framework aimed at 
encouraging exports and economic diversification in these countries. Equally, it 
will be an incentive for diversifying their economies on the basis of the market 
access advantages offered by the EU.  
Under INOGATE (Baku Initiative) and TRACECA (funded through DCI and 
ENPI), the EU will promote the development and expansion of the regional 
infrastructure in the fields of transport, energy and trade in order to make better 
use of Central Asia’s economic potential, not least through improved regional 
cooperation. As an important trade corridor between East and South Asia and 
Europe, Central Asia can benefit from increasing trade.  
The EU will continue to support the development of market economy 
structures in Central Asia. In this connection, the EU will cooperate with interested 
companies from the EU in a public-private partnership to promote the market 
economy. It will offer training and assistance programmes for Central Asian 
partners. The EU will support the aspirations and actions of the Central Asian 
States towards market economy structures. 
The EU will: 
•  Support deeper integration of Central Asia into the world trade and 
economic system, in particular through the WTO accession process and 
eventual membership; 
•  Support economic diversification with a view to promoting sustainable 
development by improving local skills and potential (science and 
technology, innovation, tourism), promotion of SMEs, development of basic 
infrastructure (road, rail, telecom, IT); 
•  Support substantial reforms of the financial systems which are needed in 
most countries, especially in the banking and micro credit sector; improved 
banking regulation, supervision and enforcement; privatisation of state 
banks; increased competition among banks and easier entrance for foreign 
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•  Study further possible options to enhance the Central Asian States’ ability to 
make better use of the available GSP and encourage regional trade; 
•  Develop the necessary systems, including with regard to regulatory 
approximation to the EC acquis, to allow a practical better access to the EU 
market for Central Asian products; 
•  Continue to support the efforts of the Central Asian States to fully 
implement the trade and economic provisions of the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements;  
•  Extend trade-related technical assistance and policy advice to facilitate the 
creation of legislative and institutional frameworks conducive to better 
business environments and to attracting foreign direct investment; 
•  Help the countries of the region to work out strategies to improve their 
individual credit ratings in order to qualify for future lending programmes; 
•  Support these countries in enforcing best customs practices as set by the 
World Customs Organisation; 
•  Support initiatives for know-how transfer and capacity building. 
Strengthening energy and transport links 
The EU and Central Asia share a paramount interest in enhancing Energy Security 
as an important aspect of global security. There is a common interest in 
diversifying export routes, demand and supply structures and energy sources.  
Besides oil, gas and electricity, water management is a decisive aspect of 
energy cooperation with Central Asia. Hydro-power production and distribution 
are crucial to promoting stability and prosperity in Central Asia and beyond, 
including Afghanistan and Pakistan. Its potential has not been sufficiently 
addressed.  
The development of resources in oil and gas has significantly increased the 
role of Central Asian States as energy producers and transit countries. Increasing 
oil and gas exploitation will contribute to better world market supplies and will be 
conducive to diversification. Gas deliveries from the region are of special 
importance to the EU.  
The key elements for a long-term partnership based on common interests 
and reciprocity can therefore be established in the years to come: the exploitation 
of the energy resources of Central Asian States calls for substantial and sustained 
investment as well as for comprehensive policies addressing all the components of 
their energy sectors and facilitating access to most developed markets. The EU, for 
its part, is ready to consider all options for the development and transportation of 
these resources, in cooperation with other interested partners.  
A market-based approach to investment and procurement and transparent, 
stable and non-discriminatory regulatory frameworks guarantee, for all sources of 
energy, the best prices and increased opportunities for all stake-holders. Against INTO EURASIA - MONITORING THE EU’S CENTRAL ASIA STRATEGY | 133 
 
this background, the EU will conduct an enhanced regular energy dialogue with 
Central Asian States in the framework of the Baku Initiative1. EU activities will 
also be based on the Energy Charter and bilateral MoUs on Energy issues. 
The EU will support the exploration of new oil, gas and hydro-power 
resources and the upgrading of the existing energy infrastructure. To enhance EU 
security of energy supply, the EU will also support the development of additional 
pipeline routes and energy transportation networks. 
It will also contribute to regional energy security and cooperation, and 
widen export markets for Central Asian producers. The EU will lend political 
support and assistance to Central Asian countries in developing a new Caspian Sea 
- Black Sea – EU energy transport corridor.  
The EU will promote the creation of an integrated Central Asian energy 
market and will support public-private partnerships which encourage EU 
investment.  
Based on the objectives laid down in the Baku Initiative the EU will focus 
cooperation with Central Asian States in particular on the following matters: 
•  Converging of energy markets on the basis of the EU internal energy market 
principles taking into account the particularities of the partner countries; 
•  Enhancing energy security by addressing the issues of energy 
exports/imports, supply diversification, energy transit and energy demand; 
•  Transparency and capacity-building in statistics and in the governance of 
the energy sector;  
•  Supporting and enhancing technological cooperation between the EU and 
the Central Asian States in the energy sector; 
•  Supporting sustainable energy development, including the development of 
energy efficiency, renewable energy sources and demand side management;  
•  Attracting investment towards energy projects of common and regional 
interest; 
•  Supporting the rehabilitation of existing pipelines and the construction of 
new pipelines and electricity transportation networks inside the region and 
towards Europe; 
•  Supporting the development of comprehensive action programmes aiming 
at the promotion of energy saving, energy efficiency and renewable energy, 
notably with a view to meeting commitments in the framework of the Kyoto 
protocol; 
•  Supporting the ‘Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund’ 
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•  Encouraging the countries to take initiatives similar to those taken by the EU 
in the Action Plan for an Energy Policy for Europe (European Council of 
March 2007).  
In addition, the EU will continue to promote the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative within the Central Asian region as a means to contributing 
to sustainable development and poverty reduction. 
Environmental sustainability and water 
Fair access to water resources will be a major challenge for the world in the 21st 
century. Most major environmental issues in Central Asia are related to the 
allocation, use and protection of the quality of water resources. With the region 
connected through cross-boundary rivers, lakes and seas, a regional approach to 
protecting these resources is essential. Linked to this is the need to improve 
forestry management. There is a need to have an integrated water management 
policy (upstream and downstream solidarity).  
For the EU water cooperation is of particular interest, especially in view of 
achieving by 2015 the Millennium Development Goals on clean drinking water and 
good sanitation facilities.  
Promoting cooperation on water management can at the same time foster 
regional security and stability and support economic development.  
An EU-Central Asia dialogue on the environment was launched in Spring 
2006 and will provide the basis for joint cooperation efforts.  
Environmental issues related to the extraction and transport of energy 
resources as well as vulnerability to climate change and natural disasters are also 
matters of major concern. Questions pertaining to the protection of the 
environment should be taken into account in regional dialogue at all levels. 
The EU will therefore:  
•  Support the implementation of the EECCA (Eastern Europe, Caucasus, 
Central Asia) component of the EU Water Initiative (EUWI-EECCA) for safe 
water supply and sanitation and integrated water resources management. 
•  Promote transboundary river basin management as well as regional 
cooperation under the Caspian Sea Environmental Convention; 
•  Give particular support to the integrated management of surface and 
underground trans-boundary water resources, including the introduction of 
techniques for a more efficient water use (irrigation and other techniques); 
•  Enhance cooperation for appropriate frameworks for facilitating the 
financing of water related infrastructure projects, including through 
attracting IFI’s and public-private partnership funds; 
•  Support regional capacity building on integrated water management and 
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•  Cooperate with Central Asian countries on climate change including 
support for the introduction and further implementation of the Kyoto 
Protocol mechanisms at regional level; 
•  Cooperate with Central Asian countries in combating desertification and 
safeguarding bio-diversity including support for the implementation of the 
UN Conventions on Biological Biodiversity and to combat Desertification; 
•  Improve sustainable management of forests and other natural resources in 
Central Asia, providing assistance for regional aspects of the indicative 
actions under the Forest Law Enforcement and Governance Ministerial 
process (FLEG); 
•  Encourage increased environmental awareness and the development of 
environmental civil society including through cooperation with the Central 
Asia Regional Environment Centre (CAREC).  
In the context of the above priorities, the EU will also give attention to related 
issues: 
•  Support Central Asian States in developing policies for pollution prevention 
and control;  
•  Upgrade natural disaster preparedness and assessment capability in Central 
Asia; 
•  Intensify cooperation with EnvSec Initiative. 
Combating common threats and challenges 
Modern border management creating open and secure borders could facilitate 
trade and exchange in the region and help combat regional criminal activity, 
especially the international drug trade.  
Assistance in fighting organised crime will be one of the priorities of the EU 
in the region aiming at a reduction of non-conventional threats to security.  
Migration is one of the major global challenges of the 21st century. The 
impact of migration, both positive and negative, can be felt in all countries, 
including in Central Asia. The EU seeks to enhance dialogue and cooperation on 
migration with regions of transit, origin and destination through the EU’s Global 
Approach to Migration. As part of the Global Approach the EU proposes to launch 
a close dialogue on migration with the eastern and south-eastern neighbouring 
regions.  
The EU will step up its support for the development of modern border 
management in the region of Central Asia, including the borders with Afghanistan. 
Afghanistan’s cooperation with its neighbours should be strengthened. Through 
BOMCA, the EU will seek a multilateral and regional approach.  
The EU will broaden BOMCA activities and seek synergy with projects 
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coordination and explore possibilities of close cooperation between BOMCA, the 
OSCE and other border projects from Member States and third countries. 
The EU will: 
•  Continue to introduce the basic principles of integrated border management 
in border guard services and other relevant services; 
•  Work on specific border crossing points; 
•  Provide organizational assistance to support transformation of border 
guards from a conscript to a professional service; to support transition from 
a purely military system to a more police-style law enforcement agency and 
to support efforts to strengthen control mechanisms; 
•  Seek increased involvement of customs services to facilitate trade; 
•  Update the legal framework in accordance with international law in the field 
of combating organized crime (e.g.: UN Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime and its Protocols), with a focus on illegal migration, 
trafficking in human beings, preventing and countering drugs and 
precursors trafficking; improve institutional capacity of law enforcement 
agencies, and strengthen regional cooperation in fighting trans-national 
organised crime. 
At the same time, the EU will continue to offer its assistance to help the 
interested Central Asian States –both at national and at regional level- to manage 
migration in a more balanced manner, which implies setting up well functioning 
systems to match labour demand and supply, facilitating integration of legal 
migrants and providing international protection to asylum seekers and refugees 
and other vulnerable persons.  
The EU will give greater support to the fight against corruption, the drug 
trade, human trafficking, illegal trade of weapons from and to Afghanistan and 
organised crime in Central Asia. It will step up cooperation with the Central Asian 
States to combat international terrorism. The EU will strengthen the fight against 
drugs with a specific EU presence in Dushanbe. It will support the rapid 
installation of the regional anti-drug centre (CARICC) in Almaty and intensify 
cooperation with UNODC also with a view to tracking chemical precursors of 
heroin production. Cooperation with China and the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization on drug-trafficking will be strengthened.  
The Ferghana Valley best embodies the challenges and possible perspectives 
of Central Asia. The EU is therefore prepared to lend assistance to Central Asian 
countries sharing borders in the Ferghana Valley in promoting projects which are 
designed to bring stability, prosperity and sustainable development to that region. 
The EU will dedicate special attention to programmes which address questions of 
border management, intra-regional trade and free movement of goods and 
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Building bridges: inter-cultural dialogue  
The diversity of religions and centuries-old traditions of peace and tolerance 
constitute a valuable heritage in Central Asia. Moderate and tolerant Islamic 
thinking respecting the constitutional secular principle is a hall-mark of the Central 
Asian countries. The EU highly values the peaceful multi-ethnic and multi-cultural 
coexistence of various creeds in Central Asia.  
Building on this, the EU will promote dialogue within civil society and 
respect for freedom of religion. 
VI.  The EU and Central Asia in the future 
This EU Strategy for Central Asia serves as an overall framework for the EU 
policies in the region of Central Asia. The EU sees a mutual interest in sustained 
dialogue and cooperation with the five Central Asian States respecting their 
differences and fostering closer cooperation among them on regional issues.  
The EU is willing to contribute substantially to security, stability and 
prosperity in Central Asia. To this end the EU is committed to opening 
Commission delegations in all five Central Asian countries. Member States will 
consider expanding the network of embassies in Central Asia.  
The EU will ensure coherence between this Central Asia Strategy and other 
EU regional initiatives, including the Black Sea Synergy Initiative. It will support 
intraregional trade and cooperation. It will also support active integration/ 
participation of Central Asia in the WTO in order to ensure better integration of 
these countries in the world trade and economic system. 
With this Strategy, the EU invites Central Asia to establish an enhanced 
political dialogue, including regular meetings at Foreign Ministers’ level with the 
EU troika. The EU will hold annual meetings of its Heads of Mission in the region. 
Based on the principles of this Strategy, the EU will work with each of the 
Central Asian countries to develop individual approaches to implementation, 
according to the specific needs and performance of each country, building on 
existing and future agreements, including PCAs.  
The progress made on implementing the Strategy will be reviewed by the 
Council in June 2008 and at least every two years thereafter. 
ANNEX - EC 2007-2013 regional assistance strategy for Central Asia 
The EC’s 2007-2013 Assistance Strategy for Central Asia is conceived as a tool to 
support strengthening of political dialogue with the Central Asian States at 
regional and national level and to pursue the objectives defined above. In order to 
reflect greater EU engagement in the region, the EC assistance budget to Central 
Asia will be significantly increased under the new financial perspectives 2007-2013 
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development cooperation instrument increasing from € 58 mio in 2007 to € 139 mio 
in 2013. 
The bulk of EC assistance to Central Asia – 70% – will be directed at the 
bilateral assistance programmes, taking into account the policy agenda of the 
individual Central Asia countries and their distinct political and social realities.  
With more than 50% of the rural population living below the poverty line, 
poverty reduction through social sector reforms and schemes, including education, 
to increase living standards especially in rural areas, will continue to be the key 
priority for EC bilateral assistance. Implementation of Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers or similar policy documents to which the Central Asian governments have 
committed themselves will serve as guiding framework for such programmes. The 
second focus of bilateral assistance will be promotion of good governance and 
democratic processes and the strengthening of public institutions coupled with 
implementation of core investment and trade policy reforms. The content of the 
programmes will be defined in agreement with the authorities and tailored to the 
specific needs of each country. 
Given its importance for the sustainable development of Central Asia, 30% 
of assistance will be dedicated to facilitating closer inter-state cooperation both 
within Central Asia and between Central Asia, South Caucasus and the EU, 
particularly in the energy, transport, environmental and education sectors. In these 
domains, the alignment of regional cooperation priorities and programmes for 
Central Asia with the regional strategy for EU Eastern neighbours lies at the heart 
of future assistance policy. Closely linking the focus of EU regional cooperation 
with Central Asia with that of the ENPI regional programmes will enable Central 
Asian countries to benefit effectively from the relevant inter-state energy, 
transport, environment and education initiatives and strengthened programmes 
set up under the ENPI East, facilitating their anchoring to Eastern Europe and 
access to global markets. INTO EURASIA - MONITORING THE EU’S CENTRAL ASIA STRATEGY | 139 
 
Annex B: The EUCAM Expert Working Group 
The Expert Working Group consisted of the following members: 
-  Anton Artemyev, Director, Kazakhstan Revenue Watch Program, Soros 
Foundation, Kazakhstan 
-  Michael Denison, Research Director, Control Risks, United Kingdom 
-  Nicolas De Pedro, Expert Central Asia, Fundacion Alternativas/OPEX, 
Spain 
-  Matteo Fumagalli, Assistant Professor, Department of International 
Relations and European Studies, Central European University, Hungary 
-  André W.M. Gerrits, Professor, Department of European Studies, University 
of Amsterdam, Senior Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute for 
International Relations (Clingendael), the Netherlands 
-  Anvar Kamolidinov, Freelance consultant, Water Resources, Water Policy, 
Irrigation & Drainage, Tajikistan 
-  Nargis Kassenova, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, 
KIMEP, Kazakhstan 
-  Parviz Mullojanov, Executive Director, Public Committee for Democratic 
Processes, Tajikistan 
-  Sebastien Peyrouse (France), Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Security 
and Development Policy, Sweden 
-  Gulnura Toralieva (Kyrgyzstan), MA Science Journalism Student, City 
University London, United Kingdom 140 | ANNEXES 
 
Annex C: List of EUCAM Events  
First Expert Working Group meeting, 6-7 October 2008, internal event, CEPS/FRIDE, 
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Promoting regional cooperation and development in Central Asia, 2-3 March 2009, 
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Brooklyn Institution and Asian Development Bank, Brussels  
The European Union and Central Asia: Building an energy security relationship, 16-17 
April 2009, conference, CEPS/FRIDE in partnership with Institute for 
International Relations and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Czech 
Republic, Prague  
The OSCE Chairmanship of Kazakhstan in 2010, 6 May 2009, roundtable, Eurasian 
Transition Group in partnership with CEPS/FRIDE, Vienna  
Preventive Diplomacy and the Role of UNRCCA in Central Asia, 11 May 2009, seminar, 
CEPS, Brussels  
Third Expert Working Group meeting, internal event, CEPS/FRIDE, 26 June 2009, 
Almaty 
The EU and Central Asia: Searching for Synergy and Promoting Cooperation of Civil 
Societies, roundtable, CEPS/FRIDE, 27 June 2009, Almaty  
Security Issues in Central Asia and the Swedish Presidency, 5 November 2009, 
roundtable, Institute for Security and Development Policy in partnership 
with CEPS/FRIDE, Stockholm  
Findings of the EUCAM Central Asian Mission, research seminar on the results of the 
mission to 5 countries of Central Asia by the EUCAM team, 16 November 
2009, CEPS, Brussels  
First conference for launch event of the present report “Into EurAsia – Monitoring the 
EU’s Central Asia Strategy”, CEPS, 22 February 2010, Brussels 
Second conference for launch event of the present report “Into EurAsia – Monitoring the 
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No. 3  Marlène Laruelle, Russia in Central Asia: Old History, New Challenges? 
September 2009 
No. 4  Sébastien  Peyrouse,  Central Asia's growing partnership with China, 
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Asia and its implications for the EU engagement, October 2009 
No. 6  Sébastien  Peyrouse,  The multiple paradoxes of the agriculture issue in 
Central Asia, November 2009 
No. 7  Michael Emerson and Evgeny Vinokurov, Optimisation of Central Asian 
and Trans-continental Land Transport Corridors, December 2009 
No. 8  Jacqueline Hale and Jos Boonstra, EU Assistance to Central Asia: Back to 
the Drawing Board?, January 2010 
No. 9  Peter Jones, The EU-Central Asia Education Initiative, February 2010 
Policy Briefs 
No. 1  Matteo  Fumagalli,  The ‘Food-Energy-Water’ Nexus in Central Asia: 
Regional Implications of and the International Response to the Crises in 
Tajikistan, October 2008  
No. 2  Neil Melvin and Jos Boonstra, The EU Strategy for Central Asia @ Year 
One, October 2008  
No. 3  Sebastian Peyrouse, Facing the Challenges of Separatism: The EU, Central 
Asia and the Uyghur Issue, January 2009  
No. 4  Nargis  Kassenova,  Kazakhstan and the South Caucasus corridor in the 
wake of the Georgia-Russia war, January 2009  
No. 5  Shairbek  Juraev,  Energy Emergency in Kyrgyzstan: Causes and 
Consequences, February 2009  
No. 6  Sukhrobjon Ismailov and Balazs Jarabik, The EU and Uzbekistan: Short-
Term Interests versus Long-Term Engagement, July 2009  142 | ANNEXES 
 
No. 7  Richard Pomfret, Central Asia and the Global Economic Crisis, July 2009  
No. 8  Gulnura Toralieva The EU's Approach to the Development of Mass Media 
in Central Asia, July 2009  
No. 9  Rico Isaacs, The EU's Rule of Law Initiative in Central Asia, August 2009  
No. 10  Jos Boonstra, The EU Strategy for Central Asia says 'security'. Does this 
include Security Sector Reform?, November 2009 
No. 11  George Gavrilis, Beyond the Border Management Programme for Central 
Asia (BOMCA), December 2009 
No. 12  Anna Matveeva, Tajikistan: 'Revolutionary situation' or a resilient state?, 
December 2009 
EUCAM Commentaries 
No. 1  Natalia Mirimanova, Water and Energy Disputes of Central Asia: in search 
of regional solutions?, February 2009 
No.  2  Nicolas de Pedro, The Kyrgyz Republic Presidential Elections: No 
surprises but few opportunities for democratization, August 2009 
No. 3  Jiri Copal, Human Rights in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan: How realistic is to 
expect further results after an EU open debate with civil society?, August 
2009 
No. 4  Adil Nurmakov, Kazakhstan's grip on virtual reality, August 2009 
No. 5  Maxim  Ryabkov,  Studying Europe in Central Asia: The Case of 
Kyrgyzstan, December 2009 
No. 6  Marlene Laruelle, The Growing Illiteracy in Central Asia: A Challenge for 
the EU, December 2009 
 
More commentaries can be found in the periodic EUCAM Newsletter at 
www.eucentralasia.eu.  
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